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“A SORDID CASE”: STUMP V. SPARKMAN, JUDICIAL IMMUNITY, 
AND THE OTHER SIDE OF REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS 
LAURA T. KESSLER* 
ABSTRACT 
 This Article presents a new historical account of Stump v. 
Sparkman, one of the most controversial Supreme Court decisions 
in the past fifty years.  Stump is the 1978 judicial immunity 
opinion in which the Supreme Court declared that judges are 
absolutely immune from liability for their official judicial acts, even 
if such acts are done maliciously or flawed by the commission of 
grave procedural errors.  The context of the case was horrific.  It 
involved the involuntary sterilization of a fifteen-year-old girl; she 
was sterilized pursuant to a court order that her mother had 
obtained from a state judge without any notice to the child, 
appointment of a lawyer to represent her, presentation of evidence, or 
opportunity to appeal.  As an adult she sued the judge and lost on 
the basis of the judicial immunity doctrine. 
 The basic project of this Article is to show why this largely 
overlooked case is important in American constitutional law beyond 
the narrow issue of judicial immunity, recovering it as a canonical 
decision relevant to contemporary debates about constitutional 
reproductive rights and procedural due process.  Specifically, this 
Article suggests that Stump emerged from an ongoing set of 
discussions about the nature and scope of then-nascent 
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constitutional protections for reproductive rights, as well as access to 
the federal courts by civil rights claimants.  These issues continue to 
be contested today, as courts and states reign in the scope of 
reproductive rights, and as federal judges increasingly employ 
procedural rules limiting the ability of civil rights victims to pursue 
their claims and receive a decision on the merits in federal court.  As 
these questions continue to filter through the courts, a close 
examination of the historical antecedents to these trends, as reflected 
in earlier Supreme Court decisions such as Stump, can help courts 
envision more just alternatives to the present course on these 
fundamentally important procedural and substantive questions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 When I was fifteen years old, I had a real bad pain on my right 
side.  . . .  
 . . . [I] was admitted into the hospital and my mother told me I 
was going in for an appendectomy.  . . . Then the shots came.  I kept 
hearing the nurses say, “make sure she is really out.  If she finds out 
what’s really going on, she will run.”  
 This all took place in a small room.  I can remember the men all in 
their green gowns.  They laid me on the table.  I was cry’in for my 
mom but she wasn’t there.  I saw this door that had two windows 
and I looked up to yell again, and when I did, a man in a green 
gown put a black mask on my face and told me to count backwards.  
Everything went black.  
 
Linda Spitler1   
 
What happened next became the subject of one of the leading 
United States Supreme Court decisions on judicial immunity, Stump v. 
Sparkman.2  Linda Spitler was sterilized pursuant to an ex parte court 
order that her mother had obtained a few days earlier from Judge 
Harold D. Stump of the DeKalb County Circuit Court in Auburn, 
Indiana.  Years later, Linda married Leo Sparkman and learned of 
her condition after failing to conceive a child.  She sued the judge, 
her mother, and the physicians involved in the sterilization in federal 
court for violating her civil rights and other abuses.  The trial court 
dismissed her suit before any trial, reasoning that Judge Stump was 
clothed with absolute judicial immunity and that his elimination from 
the case removed the necessary element of state action, requiring 
dismissal of the private defendants as well.  Sparkman took the 
question of the judge’s immunity all the way to the Supreme Court.  
Ultimately, the Court held that judges acting within their jurisdiction 
are absolutely immune from liability for their judicial acts, even if 
their exercise of authority is done maliciously or flawed by the 
                                                        
 1.  JAMIE RENAE COLEMAN & PAULA BATEMAN HEADLEY, THE BLANKET SHE CARRIED 1 
(2003).  This book is a first-person account of Linda Sparkman’s life, written with the 
assistance of a friend, Paula Headley.  Linda Spitler married Leo Sparkman, becoming 
Linda Sparkman.  She changed her name to Jamie Renae Coleman later in life.  See Shari 
Rudavsky, Looking at the History of Eugenics in Indiana, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Apr. 13, 2007, at 
1. 
 2.  435 U.S. 349 (1978). 
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commission of grave procedural errors.3  On remand to the Seventh 
Circuit, the court issued a brief per curiam opinion affirming the trial 
court’s dismissal of Sparkman’s claims against the private parties as 
well.  The apparent basis for this result, provided in four 
concurrences, was that Sparkman had not stated sufficient facts in her 
complaint describing an alleged conspiracy among the judge and the 
private parties to deprive her of her rights.4  This decision effectively 
terminated the entire case. 
The story of Stump v. Sparkman is really three stories.  First, and 
most basically, it is about the life of a family—the Spitlers.  It is about 
a teenager in conflict with her mother about her sexuality, how her 
mother turned to the legal system to control her daughter, and the 
long-term impact of that decision on the child, Linda Spitler.  At a 
second level, the story of Stump is about the history of eugenics in the 
United States.  Through its broad interpretation of judicial immunity 
despite the obvious unconstitutionality of the sterilization order, the 
Supreme Court became complicit in this history, indeed, part of it.  
From this perspective, Stump is a story of how constitutional 
reproductive rights continue to be a function of race, ethnicity, and 
socioeconomic status in America, and how the law works to channel 
sex and childbearing into the marital family by punishing those who 
do not conform to this ideal.  Finally, on a third level, the story of 
Stump is a tale of how the Supreme Court and lower federal courts 
have developed, interpreted, and applied procedural rules limiting 
the substantive reach of civil rights. 
Commentators have critically addressed each of the legal stories 
implicated by Stump.  For example, many scholars have written about 
socioeconomic inequality and reproductive rights, particularly how 
emphasizing the “choice” and privacy dimensions of reproductive 
rights has resulted in a divergent set of reproductive “rights” for 
privileged and poor women.5  Other scholars have focused on racial 
                                                        
 3.  Id. at 364 (1978) (disposing of all claims against Judge Stump on the basis of 
judicial immunity). 
 4.  Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d 261, 262–69 (7th Cir. 1979) (per curiam). 
 5.  Catharine MacKinnon, Roe v. Wade: A Study in Male Ideology, in ABORTION: MORAL 
AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES, 45, 52–54 (J.L. Garfield & Patricia Hennessey eds., 1984) 
(criticizing Roe’s basis in privacy instead of equality, and claiming that this choice resulted 
in Harris v. McRae’s holding that public funding for abortions is not constitutionally 
required); Carol Sanger, M is for the Many Things, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 15, 46 
(1992) (“How is it that maternity is a praiseworthy aspiration for some women while for 
others it is condemned as a sign of irresponsibility or irrationality?”); cf. Reva Siegel, 
Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal 
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inequality and reproductive rights, showing how motherhood remains 
a race privilege in our country.6  Many scholars have devoted 
attention to the law’s preference for the traditional nuclear family 
and punishment of those who do not adhere to this norm.7  Finally, 
there has been a significant critique of the increasingly “restrictive 
ethos” of federal civil procedure,8 as well as the Supreme Court’s 
                                                        
Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992) (employing a historical analysis demonstrating that 
abortion regulation is an issue of sexual equality as well as privacy). 
 6.  See SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE 145–67, 185 (2011) (showing, through 
historical analysis of Supreme Court cases involving discrimination against black unwed 
mothers, how “the regulation of sex, sexuality, and ‘morals’ functioned to maintain white 
supremacy”); DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY (1997) (exploring the 
disparagement of black motherhood through the birth control movement, fetal protection 
policies, welfare reform, and other legal developments); Michele Goodwin, Fetal Protection 
Laws: Moral Panic and the New Constitutional Battlefront, 102 CAL. L. REV. 781 (2014) 
(examining the recent emergence of fetal protection laws, their disproportionate use 
against racial minority and socioeconomically disadvantaged women, and providing an 
account of their constitutional illegitimacy); Zakiya Luna & Kristin Luker, Reproductive 
Justice, 9 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 327, 328 (2013) (examining the emergence and 
development of the reproductive justice movement, initially conceived of by feminists of 
color, which “takes into consideration that the right to have a child and the right to parent 
are as important as the right to not have children”). 
 7.  See CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN, UNMARRIED COUPLES, LAW & PUBLIC POLICY 4 
(2010) (“[F]amily law can be seen as essentially a set of statements by society in favor of a 
particular ideal—heterosexual marriage and reproduction within the nuclear family—
even though that idea now coexists with widespread different family structures.”); MARTHA 
ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER 
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995) (criticizing the law for privileging the bond 
between husband and wife, and arguing that the parent-child bond is the relationship that 
should be protected and subsidized by the law); Ariela R. Dubler, Essay, Sexing Skinner: 
History and the Politics of the Right to Marry, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1348, 1352 (2010) (re-
reading Skinner as a “story of the Supreme Court attempting to create a conservative 
bulwark against potentially encroaching forces of sexual freedom”); Melissa Murray, 
Strange Bedfellows: Criminal Law, Family Law, and the Legal Construction of Intimate Life, 94 
IOWA L. REV. 1253, 1256 (2009) (“[C]riminal law and family law have worked in tandem to 
produce a binary view of intimate life that categorizes intimate acts and choices as either 
legitimate marital behavior or illegitimate criminal behavior.”); Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends 
with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, 200 (2007) (“Those performing carework outside 
legal marriage, including in ‘non-conjugal relationships characterized by care and/or 
interdependence,’ are stigmatized both by the current boundaries of the legal family and 
by proposed boundaries that would extend legal recognition to same-sex couples.”); Laura 
T. Kessler, Transgressive Caregiving, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 12 (2005) (“[A] central means 
of oppressing a disfavored group in our society is to wage war on their familyhood.”); 
Michael Warner, Beyond Gay Marriage, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 259, 260 (Wendy 
Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002) (“Marriage sanctifies some couples at the expense of 
others.  It is selective legitimacy.”). 
 8.  See A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 353 (2009) (arguing that a “restrictive ethos” characterizes federal civil procedure 
today, with many rules being developed, interpreted, and applied in a manner that 
frustrates the ability of claimants to prosecute their claims and receive a decision on the 
merits in federal court); see also Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, 
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efforts to limit Congress’s capacity to protect groups through civil 
rights legislation.9 
These salient issues are all present in Stump, yet scholars have 
largely neglected this Supreme Court decision.10  When Stump has 
received attention, most scholars have addressed one or the other of 
these issues separately.  By examining these substantive and 
procedural issues together in the context of one seminal case, this 
Article provides three important contributions.  First, it revives Stump 
v. Sparkman as a canonical decision relevant to contemporary debates 
about constitutional reproductive rights and procedural due process.  
Second, it presents a unique case study demonstrating the illusory 
distinction between substance and procedure, a principle that legal 
scholars have argued for decades.11  Finally, this Article provides a 
glimpse of what “might have been” had the Supreme Court used 
Stump as an opportunity to outline a robust conception of 
reproductive rights encompassing the right to procreate—what this 
Article calls “the other side of reproductive rights.”12  As many 
scholars have argued,13 the Court’s failure to articulate such a vision 
has had long-term repercussions for present-day legal understandings 
of the nature and scope of reproductive rights, with middle class, 
                                                        
Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821 (2010) (describing the Supreme Court’s choice to 
shift from minimal notice pleading in the federal courts to a robust gatekeeping regime 
and giving some reasons for thinking the Court’s course on this matter may promise the 
worst of both worlds); Melissa Hart, Procedural Extremism: The Supreme Court’s 2008–2009 
Labor and Employment Cases, 13 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 253 (2009) (discussing 
several decisions showcasing the “procedural extremism” of the Roberts Court that limit 
employees’ access to the federal courts to litigate workplace disputes); A. Benjamin 
Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and Declining Access to Justice, 93 B.U. L. REV. 
441 (2013) (criticizing the heightened commonality standard for certifying class actions 
imposed by the Supreme Court in Wal-mart v. Dukes); Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary 
Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
15 (2010) (arguing that the motion to dismiss is the new summary judgment motion after 
Twombly and Iqbal). 
 9.  Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141 (2002); Kenji 
Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (2011). 
 10.  See infra Part II. 
 11.  See, e.g., Robert M. Cover & Owen M. Fiss, The Independence of Procedure?, in THE 
STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE 47–104 (Robert M. Cover & Owen M. Fiss eds., 1979); Martha 
Minow, Politics and Procedure, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (David 
Kairys ed., 1998). 
 12.  Others have framed this more broadly as simply “Reproductive Justice.”  See 
MELISSA MURRAY & KRISTIN LUKER, CASES ON REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND JUSTICE (2014); 
Luna & Luker, supra note 6. 
 13.  See sources cited supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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white women remaining more protected than low income women, 
including women of color. 
Part I of this Article discusses the immediate circumstances 
surrounding the case of Stump v. Sparkman, including a summary of 
the facts and procedural history, the controlling legal precedents at 
the time the suit was filed, the Supreme Court decision, and the 
outcome of the case on remand to the Seventh Circuit.  Part I also 
examines the history of the judicial immunity doctrine invoked by the 
Supreme Court in Stump.  Traditional articulations of this doctrine 
explain it as an essential, trans-substantive feature of our civil justice 
system intended to be equally relevant to many different sorts of 
substantive disputes for the purpose of ensuring an independent 
judiciary.  However, an examination of the historical context in which 
the Supreme Court first developed the doctrine in the nineteenth 
century suggests a more complex pedigree, rooted in the Supreme 
Court’s opposition to Congress’s aggressive efforts to institute civil 
rights for former slaves following the Civil War.  This new historical 
account reveals the substantive dimensions of the judicial immunity 
doctrine, particularly the expansive version embraced by the Court.  
Part I also discusses the Seventh Circuit’s sua sponte imposition of a 
heightened pleading standard to assess the sufficiency of Sparkman’s 
complaint after the Supreme Court found Judge Stump immune from 
suit and remanded the case for consideration of the claims against the 
remaining private defendants.  According to this analysis, Stump can 
be understood as an antecedent to current efforts by federal judges, 
and ultimately the Supreme Court, to limit access to the federal 
courts through a heightened pleading regime and other procedural 
measures.14 
Part II summarizes the scholarly reaction to the decision.  
Scholars are not bystanders; their analyses and critiques become part 
of the “story” of Supreme Court cases, shaping how we understand 
them and the historical record.  I argue that legal scholars, perhaps 
influenced by the Court’s narrow focus on the immunity issue, have 
neglected the decision’s broader implications for several intersecting 
civil rights movements, including disability rights, women’s rights, 
reproductive rights, and patients’ rights. 
                                                        
 14.  See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544 (2007) (replacing notice pleading announced in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 
47 (1957), with a more demanding “plausibility” pleading standard); see also Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (replacing the minimal commonality 
requirement to certify a class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
with a heightened commonality standard).  
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Part III provides a new historical account of Stump v. Sparkman by 
placing the decision within its broader social, historical, and legal 
contexts.  Specifically, Part III discusses some of the legal, political, 
and policy developments that were occurring at the time of the 
decision, particularly the federal government’s involvement in the 
systemic coercive sterilization of hundreds of thousands of poor 
women in the United States through its anti-poverty and population 
control efforts.  More broadly, Part III places the case within the 
longer history of eugenics and sterilization abuse in the United States.  
Contrary to popular conceptions, eugenics began in the United States 
long before it was practiced in Nazi Germany and continued for many 
years after eugenic sterilizations of institutionalized persons fell out of 
favor. 
Part IV explores how certain aspects of eugenic thinking, if not 
formal eugenic ideology, continue to influence contemporary law and 
public policy.  Among other legal developments, this Part examines 
the prosecution of drug addicted mothers; probation conditions 
limiting the reproductive freedom of sex offenders and “deadbeat 
dads” delinquent on their child support obligations; welfare reforms 
intended to influence welfare recipients’ reproductive choices; 
reproductive technologies enabling parents to select offspring with 
certain genetic characteristics; state marriage bans justified on 
grounds that same-sex couples are not able or fit to bear and raise 
children; and sterilization abuse in prisons.  Although many of these 
examples do not conform with classic understandings of eugenics, 
because they do not involve direct state-sponsored coercion, Part IV 
shows that they do share many continuities with our eugenic past. 
Ultimately, this reexamination of Stump v. Sparkman 
demonstrates how the shadow of eugenics in America extended well 
into the late twentieth century and arguably continues today.  More 
generally, this Article highlights the divergent content of reproductive 
rights for different groups in our society. Specifically, in the very same 
period when middle class women were winning victories in the 
Supreme Court for the rights of contraception use and abortion, the 
Supreme Court turned a blind eye to poor women struggling to resist 
coercive sterilizations.  Finally, this Article links Stump with a larger, 
ongoing project of federal judges implementing a procedural 
gatekeeping regime that frustrates the ability of civil rights victims to 
pursue their claims and receive a decision on the merits in federal 
court.  The Article’s larger aim is to help students and academics 
better appreciate the historical context of this case and the role it 
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might productively play in current debates about discrimination, 
reproductive freedom, and procedural justice. 
I.  SUMMARY OF THE CASE 
A.  Facts 
On July 9, 1971, Ora Spitler McFarlin of Auburn, Indiana, 
through her attorney Warren G. Sunday, presented a petition to 
Judge Harold D. Stump of the DeKalb County Circuit Court asking to 
have her fifteen-year-old daughter, Linda Spitler, surgically 
sterilized.15  The petition, entitled “Petition to Have Tubal Ligation 
Performed on Minor and Indemnity Agreement,”16 alleged that the 
daughter was “somewhat retarded although she is attending or has 
attended the public schools . . . and has been passed along with other 
children in her age level . . . .”17  The petition also stated that Linda 
was associating with “older youth or young men and . . . [had] stayed 
overnight with said youth or men” and that it would be in the 
daughter’s best interest to undergo a tubal ligation “to prevent 
unfortunate circumstances.”18 
These facts, alleged in the sterilization petition and reprinted in 
an extensive footnote in the Supreme Court opinion, do not begin to 
tell the full story.  Linda Spitler lived with her mother, two sisters, 
brother, and a series of step-fathers19 in a small rust belt town in 
Northern Indiana.20  Linda’s mother worked two jobs and was absent 
most of the time.21  The unfortunate circumstances of Spitler’s 
childhood included poverty, sexual and physical abuse, indifference, 
and neglect.22  Beaten by an older sister, alcoholic brother, and step-
father,23 and sent away at times to live with a second older sister24 and 
foster parents,25 Spitler says she “was never wanted or loved,”26 and 
                                                        
 15.  Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 351 (1978). 
 16.  Id. at n.1. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  See COLEMAN & HEADLEY, supra note 1, at 3, 9–10, 18–19. 
 20.  The “Rust Belt” refers to “the northeastern and midwestern states of the United 
States in which heavy industry has declined.”  See rust belt, AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 
(3d ed. 1992). 
 21.  See COLEMAN & HEADLEY, supra note 1, at 5, 24. 
 22.  Id. at 11, 20–23, 35, 38–39. 
 23.  Id. at 5, 9, 28. 
 24.  Id. at 15, 17–18. 
 25.  Id. at 27–29. 
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that her mother was “very strict”27 with her as a teenager and rarely 
permitted her to leave the house.28  When Spitler sought more 
independence—for example, an opportunity to go to the movies or 
socialize with young men—her sister and mother accused her of 
being a “whore” and “letting . . . dirty old men climb on me.”29 
The extent of Spitler’s sexual activities as a teenager is unclear.  
However, certain family circumstances likely influenced her mother’s 
decision to seek a court order authorizing the sterilization of her 
fifteen-year-old daughter.  Ora McFarlin had married her first 
husband, Pete Spitler, at age seventeen30 and had four children by her 
mid-twenties.31  In addition, Linda Spitler’s older sister, Kathy, 
became pregnant as a senior in high school,32 when Linda Spitler 
would have been about fifteen or sixteen years old.  This was 
approximately the same period when Ora McFarlin sought to sterilize 
Linda. 
The sterilization petition was an unusual legal document.33  It 
had no case caption naming the parties to the case or the court.  The 
caption merely read “State of Indiana County of DeKalb.”34  Although 
the document was titled a “Petition,”35 it did not in fact contain a 
petition or a motion asking for the court to take any action.  Rather, it 
                                                        
 26.  Id. at 34. 
 27.  Id. at 31, 36–37. 
 28.  Id. at 35. 
 29.  Id. at 20, 31, 35. 
 30.  Ora McFarlin was born in 1919 to William Wappes and Freda Preston, and she 
married Pete Spitler, Linda’s father, in 1937.  See Obituaries—McD, NOBLE COUNTY INDIANA 
LIBRARY, WHAN COLLECTION, http://gen.nobleco.lib.in.us/Obituaries/McD.htm (last 
visited Nov. 9, 2014).  She married David McFarlin in 1971.  Id.  McFarlin’s obituary lists 
her occupation as “dietary aide.”  Id.  Ora McFarlin’s mother died in childbirth when Ora 
was four years old.  See Death Records in Simon Journal 1900–1943, NOBLE RECORDS FROM 
THE WHAN COLLECTION, http://gen.nobleco.lib.in.us/Births/DeathsSimon.htm (last 
visited Nov. 9, 2014) (stating Freda Wappes (Preston) died in 1923 “from childbirth”). 
 31.  Specifically, a search of birth and death records shows Ora McFarlin had two sons 
and four daughters: Bruce (born 1940), Joe (born 1942), Carol (born 1943), Beverly 
(born 1944), Kathy (born 1954) and Linda (born 1955).  These birth dates were compiled 
by researching the public records for each child listed in Ora McFarlin’s obituary, supra 
note 30.  
 32.  See COLEMAN & HEADLEY, supra note 1, at 19. 
 33.  This discussion of the sterilization petition builds on a similar analysis by remedies 
scholar Doug Laycock.  See Douglas Laycock, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, 54 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 390, 392–93 (1977). 
 34.  The full text of the petition and Judge Stump’s order are reproduced in the first 
footnote of the Supreme Court’s opinion. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 351 n.1 
(1978). 
 35.  Id. 
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was written as an affidavit in which Ora McFarlin attested to her 
daughter’s mental defects and promiscuity and McFarlin’s inability to 
control her, and it stated that it would be in the child’s best interest to 
be sterilized.36  Oddly, McFarlin’s sworn statement included an 
indemnification clause, whereby, “in consideration of the Court . . . 
approving the Tubal Ligation” she agreed to “indemnify and . . . hold 
harmless” the physician and the hospital “from and against all or any 
matters or causes of action that could or might arise as a result of the 
performing of said Tubal Ligation.”37  McFarlin’s attorney affixed his 
signature below her signed, sworn statement as “Warren G. Sunday, 
Notary Public.”38 
A one-sentence order is typed at the end of the two-page 
document.39  It states, “I, Harold D. Stump, . . . do hereby approve the 
above petition by affidavit form on behalf of Ora Spitler McFarlin . . . 
subject to . . . McFarlin covenanting and agreeing to indemnify . . . 
Dr. John Hines and the DeKalb Memorial Hospital from any matters 
or causes of actions arising therefrom.”40  McFarlin’s attorney drafted 
the affidavit and the order;41 they appear together on his firm’s 
letterhead.42  Yet Warren Sunday did not sign the document as an 
attorney of record.  The reason is unclear, but there are several 
explanations worth exploring. 
Less than two years earlier, Indiana had undertaken a major 
overhaul of its civil court rules, conforming them with the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.43  Under the state’s new Trial Rule 11, if a 
client was represented by counsel, the attorney himself was required 
to sign and attest to the fact that he had read a pleading and believed 
that there is good ground to support it and that it was not interposed 
for delay.44  The attorney was subject to disciplinary action for a willful 
violation of this rule.45  According to the drafters of the new rule, “for 
                                                        
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Stump, 435 U.S. at 351. 
 39.  Id. at 352 n.1. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. at 351. 
 42.  See Exhibit A, Petition to Have Tubal Ligation Performed on Minor and Indemnity 
Agreement, Jul. 9, 1971, at 1, 2, Sparkman v. McFarlin, No. F-75-129 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 5, 
1975).  The National Archives in Chicago furnished a copy of this document. 
 43.  IND. R. CIV. P. v–vi (1969) (Indiana Supreme Court order adopting rules effective 
January 1, 1970). 
 44.  See IND. R. TRIAL P. 11(A) (West 1971).   
 45.  Id. 
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the most part, [it] preserves prior Indiana practice” and “[t]he only 
change is that the new rule also requires the address and telephone 
number [of the signatory] to be stated.”46  It is doubtful, therefore, 
that Warren Sunday’s failure to sign the petition as an attorney of 
record was due to confusion about the new rule.   
Perhaps it was the parties’ intention that Ora McFarlin proceed 
pro se.  But Warren Sunday prepared the document,47 and it is typed 
on his firm’s letterhead, which suggest this was not a pro se matter.  
Maybe there was an emergency, real or perceived, preventing 
Sunday from investigating the alleged facts.48  Certainly, the risk of a 
teen pregnancy would likely have been viewed a matter of great 
urgency in a small Midwestern town in 1971.  In addition, although 
not established in any trial record,49 and accounts conflict, some 
sources suggest that Linda Spitler had appendicitis.50  Assuming this is 
true, a desire to perform the sterilization concurrent with an 
appendectomy may have been viewed as an emergency by the parties.  
However, the prevailing rule at that time would have required, in that 
case, the petition to state “specific facts show[ing] . . . that immediate 
and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant 
before the adverse party or his attorney can be heard in opposition” 
and that “efforts have been made to give notice” or “the reasons . . . 
                                                        
 46.  IND. SUP. CT., STATE OF IND. CIVIL CODE STUDY COMM’N, INDIANA RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT 45–46 (1968) [hereinafter 1968 IND. RULES STUDY 
COMM’N]. 
 47.  Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 351 (1978). 
 48.  Chief Justice Burger raised this possibility during oral arguments, likening the 
sterilization petition to an ex parte injunction or temporary restraining order.  See Oral 
Argument at 34:12, Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (No. 76-1750), available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1977/1977_76_1750.  Such actions were one of a 
handful submitted on “verified pleadings” in Indiana, that is, by affidavit of the client.  See 
1968 IND. RULES STUDY COMM’N, supra note 46, at 46 (listing actions requiring verified 
pleadings). 
 49.   There was no trial or a record of any legal proceeding, see discussion, infra notes 
54–57, and Sparkman’s subsequent civil rights suit was dismissed before trial.  See infra Part 
II.E. 
 50.  Compare Oral Argument, supra note 48, at 42:20 (“I think that Linda, the facts 
would show, was in the hospital a few weeks earlier supposedly for the purpose of having 
her appendix removed and then was discharged.”) (oral argument of Richard H. Finley, 
Sparkman’s lawyer in the Supreme Court); COLEMAN & HEADLEY, supra note 1, at 1; 
Morton Mintz, Court Hears Case of Girl Sterilized Without Her Consent, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 
1978, at A10 (“To induce Linda to submit to surgery, McFarlin told her she would enter 
the hospital for an appendectomy to correct the appendicitis that Dr. Hines recently had 
been treating.  Actually, the physician performed both an appendectomy and the tubal 
ligation.”), with Stump, 435 U.S. at 353 (stating that Sparkman “was told that she was to 
have her appendix removed.  The following day a tubal ligation was performed upon her. 
She was released several days later, unaware of the true nature of her surgery”). 
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that notice should not be required.”51  The petition did not contain 
any of this information. 
Finally, evaluating the petition in the best possible light, perhaps, 
as suggested by remedies scholar Douglas Laycock, Sunday viewed this 
as a declaratory judgment action.52  But, as Laycock observes, the 
indemnity provision suggests that the parties had some doubt about 
the legality of the operation, even with a court’s approval.53  In sum, 
features of the document suggest the parties’ intended to keep it 
secret and potentially had doubts about both the factual allegations 
contained in it and the legality of the operation. 
Despite these red flags, Judge Stump signed the requested order 
the same day that he received the petition.54  Linda Spitler did not 
receive even rudimentary procedural due process, despite the 
extreme and permanent deprivation at stake.  She received no notice 
of the proceeding.  There was no hearing.55  She did not have a 
guardian ad litem appointed to represent her.  The court received no 
evidence beyond Ora McFarlin’s verified pleading.  Judge Stump did 
not cite any legal authority for his decision and, apparently, did not 
                                                        
 51.  IND. R. TRIAL P. 65(B) (West 1971). 
 52.  Laycock, supra note 33, at 393.  Another possibility, not explored by Laycock, is 
that Warren Sunday meant to treat the petition as an “agreed case,” a form of action 
whereby the parties to a controversy who agree upon the facts in the case bring an action 
before a court by affidavit and without process.  See IND. CODE ANN. § 2-1704 (LexisNexis 
1971); see also ABRAHAM CARUTHERS & ANDREW BENNETT MARTIN, HISTORY OF A LAWSUIT 
468–69 (1919); John D. Welman, Demurrer to Parts of Complaint, 7 IND. L.J. 165, 177 (1931) 
(“The parties may submit an agreed statement of facts, in good faith, signed by the parties, 
and ask that their rights be determined.  Thereupon the court may render judgment.  This 
statement, the submission, and judgment of the court is the entire record.”).  If that was 
the intention, the glaring flaw was the absence of Linda Spitler as a party to the 
agreement.  
 53.  Laycock, supra note 33, at 393.  Indeed, Richard H. Finley, the lawyer who argued 
Sparkman’s appeal in the Supreme Court, when asked why the parties came to the court at 
all, responded, “I believe . . . I think the doctor wanted the protection of an instrument 
signed by the Judge . . . .  They wanted a piece of paper with the Judge’s name on it . . . .”  
See Oral Argument, supra note 48, at 42:06. 
 54.  Stump, 435 U.S. at 352. 
 55.  Sparkman asserted in her memoir that Judge Stump approved the petition “while 
standing on a street corner, talking it over” with her mother.  See COLEMAN & HEADLEY, 
supra note 1, at xi.  Along the same lines, Marjorie Lindblom, a partner at Kirkland & Ellis, 
who as a young associate argued Sparkman’s appellate case pro bono on remand before 
the Seventh Circuit United States Court of Appeals, said “I recall Finley [Sparkman’s 
lawyer] telling me that the Judge had been presented with the petition in a diner.”  Laura 
Kessler Telephone Interview with Marjorie Press Lindblom, Partner, Kirkland & Ellis 
L.L.P. (Aug. 23, 2012).  None of these accounts is included in the Supreme Court opinion, 
but Justice Stewart’s dissent suggests the basic scenario, noting that Judge Stump “acted 
with informality” and “may not have been in his judge’s robes, or in the courtroom itself.”  
Stump, 435 U.S. at 368 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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even docket the case.56  As one newspaper reported, “The paper never 
was filed in court.  Judge Stump approved the sterilization without 
disclosing his actions to anyone.”57  Six days later, Linda entered 
DeKalb Memorial Hospital.58  She was told that she was to have her 
appendix removed.59  The next day a tubal ligation was performed on 
her by Dr. John H. Hines, assisted by another doctor and an 
anesthesiologist.60 
Two years later, Linda Spitler married Leo Sparkman.61  Failing 
to become pregnant, she discovered that she had been sterilized.62  
Linda Sparkman then brought Section 1983 and Section 1985 federal 
civil rights claims for damages against Judge Stump; Linda’s mother, 
Ora McFarlin; McFarlin’s attorney, Warren Sunday; the doctors who 
performed the operation; and the hospital.63  The main theory for 
holding the private defendants liable under the Civil Rights Act was 
that they had conspired with Judge Stump to bring about the 
unconstitutional acts.64  Linda Sparkman also joined supplemental 
(then called “pendent”)65 state law claims against the physicians for 
assault and battery and medical malpractice.66  Leo Sparkman 
asserted a pendent claim for loss of potential fatherhood.67  The case 
was filed in federal court in Indiana.68 
                                                        
 56.  Irene Merker Rosenberg, Stump v. Sparkman: The Doctrine of Judicial Impunity, 64 
VA. L. REV. 833, 834 (1978). 
 57.  See John Rutherford, Secret Court Order, INDIANAPOLIS NEWS, Jan. 18, 1978. 
 58.  Stump, 435 U.S. at 353. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F.2d 172, 173 (7th Cir. 1977), rev’d sub nom. Stump v. 
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Stump, 435 U.S. at 353.  Section 1983 provides remedies for violations of federal 
civil rights including declaratory relief and, in some cases, injunctive relief.  42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 (2012).  Section 1985 provides similar remedies for conspiracy to violate federal 
civil rights.  42 U.S.C. § 1985 (2012). 
 64.  Stump, 435 U.S. at 354. 
 65.  Pendent jurisdiction provided the authority of a federal court to hear a 
substantially related state law claim against a party already facing a federal claim, thereby 
encouraging efficiency by only having one trial at the federal level rather than one trial in 
federal court and another in state court.  See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 
U.S. 715 (1966).  The holding in Gibbs was essentially codified by Congress along with 
ancillary jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012), its supplemental jurisdiction statute. 
 66.  McFarlin, 552 F.2d at 173. 
 67.  Id. at 173–74. 
 68.  Stump, 435 U.S at 353. 
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B.  The Legal Landscape 
Sparkman was fighting an uphill battle with her lawsuit against 
Judge Stump.  At the time, precedent had established near-total 
judicial immunity as a settled feature of American law.  Indeed, the 
history of the judicial immunity doctrine in America suggests that the 
expansive form it took here may have been developed to protect 
judges from civil rights claims like Sparkman’s, despite Congress’s 
wishes to the contrary. 
The judicial immunity doctrine as we know it has its principal 
beginnings in the Supreme Court’s 1871 decision, Bradley v. Fisher.69  
Bradley was the defense counsel for John Surratt, one of the accused 
co-conspirators in Abraham Lincoln’s assassination.70  Judge Fisher 
had disbarred Bradley from practicing before the Supreme Court of 
the District of Columbia for allegedly insulting and threatening to 
assault him during Surratt’s trial.71  The Supreme Court of the United 
States, on a writ of mandamus, held that Judge Fisher, a judge in the 
criminal court, acted in excess of his jurisdiction to disbar Bradley 
from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia and ordered his 
reinstatement.72  Subsequently, Bradley brought an action for money 
damages against Judge Fisher.73 
The Supreme Court of the United States denied Bradley’s claim 
for damages, announcing a sweeping rule of absolute immunity for 
judges in their official capacity.74  Distinguishing judicial acts “in 
excess of jurisdiction” from judicial acts taken “with clear absence of 
all jurisdiction,”75 Justice Field writing for the Court, held that 
“judges . . . are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even 
when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to 
have been done maliciously or corruptly.”76  That is, judges are 
immune from all civil liability for any judicial act, unless there is “a 
                                                        
 69.  80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).  A previous decision, three years earlier, suggested 
an exception from immunity for judicial acts done in excess of jurisdiction and maliciously 
and corruptly, but this exception was eliminated in Bradley.  See Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. 
(Wall.) 523, 537 (1868). 
 70.  ANDREW JAMPOLER, THE LAST LINCOLN CONSPIRATOR: JOHN SURRATT’S FLIGHT 
FROM THE GALLOWS (2009). 
 71.  Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 337. 
 72.  74 U.S. (7 Wall) 364 (1869). 
 73.  Id. at 336–37. 
 74.  Id. at 356–57. 
 75.  Id. at 351. 
 76.  Id. 
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clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject matter.”77  Justice 
Field justified this broad rule on three grounds: its alleged long-
standing existence in Anglo-American common law,78 its necessity in 
protecting judicial independence,79 and the existence of alternative 
means, such as appeal and impeachment, as adequate for redressing 
litigant grievances.80 
Justice Field’s reasoning is compelling on its face, but his opinion 
is notably silent about the decision’s potential impact on a matter of 
great political importance at the time.  In 1871, the same year that the 
judicial immunity doctrine was fashioned by the Supreme Court in 
the broadest possible terms, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 
1871, also known as the Ku Klux Klan Act,81 intended to make state 
officials, including state judges, liable for civil rights violations.  The 
1871 law imposed civil liability on any person who, under color of 
state law, caused anyone to be deprived of his civil rights.82  Congress 
passed this law to target the rampant racially motivated violence being 
committed by groups like the Klan in former slaveholding states.83  
The line between private acts of violence and state-sponsored violence 
was blurry.  For example, public officials were often backed in 
elections by white supremacist groups like the Klan.84  Moreover, state 
officials and local judges were typically complicit, tolerating and 
condoning racial violence.85  Congress passed the Ku Klux Klan Act of 
1871 in recognition of the fact that the Thirteenth Amendment, 
ratified in 1865;86 the Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868;87 and 
early civil rights statutes passed by Congress pursuant to the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, were not adequate to 
                                                        
 77.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 78.  Id. at 347.   
 79.  Id. at 347–48. 
 80.  Id. at 350, 354. 
 81.  Ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012)). 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 454–55 
(1984); Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 
1323, 1334 (1952); James Gray Pope, Snubbed Landmark: Why United States v. Cruikshank 
(1876) Belongs at the Heart of the American Constitutional Canon, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
385, 387 & 387 n.4. (2014). 
 84.  See LEEANNA KEITH, THE COLFAX MASSACRE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF BLACK 
POWER, WHITE TERROR, & THE DEATH OF RECONSTRUCTION 58 (2008) (“Across the South, 
the Ku Klux Klan and related organizations emerged as armed wings of white political 
movements.”). 
 85.  See Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249 n.11 (1989) (discussing history). 
 86.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
 87.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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protect the freedom of blacks.88  The Civil Rights Act of 1871 
responded directly to the problem of state and local law enforcement 
complicity with private perpetrators of violence.89 
The sweeping judicial immunity doctrine announced by the 
Court in 1871 undercut Congress’s efforts to provide a civil rights 
remedy for freed blacks against racist state officials and judges.90  It 
had no constitutional or statutory basis.91  Notwithstanding Justice 
Field’s assertions, the decision was a sharp departure from the broad 
common law rule of general judicial liability recognized by the 
majority of the states at the time,92 as well as its English common law 
antecedents.93  Moreover, the Court’s holding in Bradley is consistent 
                                                        
 88.  See Gressman, supra note 83, at 1324–34; see also Rebecca Hall & Angela P. Harris, 
Hidden Histories, Racialized Gender, and the Legacy of Reconstruction: The Story of United States 
v. Cruikshank, in WOMEN AND THE LAW STORIES 29–37 (Elizabeth M. Schneider & 
Stephanie M. Wildman, eds. 2011). 
 89.  Gressman, supra note 83, at 1334.  According to Gressman, the 1871 Act went 
beyond outlawing conspiracy in the narrow sense of concerted joint action or even the 
requirement that the public and private parties reach an unstated understanding to 
deprive a citizen of her civil rights: “[T]he person whose civil rights were injured was given 
a civil cause of action against the officer who should have but did not protect him . . . .”  Id. 
(emphasis added); cf. Pope, supra note 83, at 417 (reviewing legislative history and 
concluding that Congress, in passing the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, was of the opinion that 
it “could reach private action if, in its view, state enforcement had failed”).  This position 
was not uniformly embraced by scholars or courts, however.  For a concise summary of the 
varying positions on just how much state action, if any, was contemplated by the 1871 Act, 
see Stephanie M. Wildman, 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (3)—A Private Action to Vindicate Fourteenth 
Amendment Rights: A Paradox Resolved, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 317, 325–26 (1980). 
 90.  It is not clear whether this was the Court’s intention, but historians note that 
Justice Field, as a Democrat, opposed Reconstruction and “had almost no interest” in 
blacks’ rights.  See FONER, supra note 83, at 530; see, e.g., also Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 
368 (1879) (Field, J., dissenting) (discussing Congress’s lack of authority to pass a law that 
resulted in the conviction of a Virginia judge for excluding African Americans from jury 
service solely on account of their race and suggesting a parade of horribles might result 
from the law, including the requirement that African Americans serve as judges). 
 91.  K.G. Jan Pillai, Rethinking Judicial Immunity for the Twenty-First Century, 39 HOW. L.J. 
95, 105 (1995). 
 92.  Robert Craig Waters, Judicial Immunity vs. Due Process: When Should a Judge Be Subject 
to Suit?, 7 CATO J. 461, 466 (1987) (“[F]rom 1869 to 1872 the Supreme Court extended a 
sweeping form of immunity to state-court judges that a majority of the states themselves 
would not have recognized under their own law.”); Note, Liability of Judicial Officers Under 
Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322, 326–27 (1969) (review finding that, in the year 1871, only 
thirteen states recognized the rule of absolute judicial immunity, six states denied 
immunity for malicious acts, and eighteen states never conclusively ruled on the issue of 
immunity). 
 93.  Jay M. Feinman & Roy S. Cohen, Suing Judges: History and Theory, 31 S.C. L. REV. 
201, 254 (1980) (“English law does not provide support for a broad rule of immunity 
except as it has been misread and misapplied by successive generations of American 
judges.”); id at 255 (“A very few of the highest courts were regarded as superior courts and 
presumed to have jurisdiction in all cases for reasons that are historical and not 
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with other Supreme Court decisions in this period reaffirming a 
narrow vision of federal power to protect blacks from state and local 
violence.94  Thus, although not explicit in the Bradley decision, its 
coincidental timing with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 
break with prior precedent, and fit within a line of cases evincing 
Supreme Court hostility to Reconstruction suggest that the judicial 
immunity doctrine has a complex,95 if not suspect, pedigree related to 
substantive objections to federal civil rights law, rather than simply the 
value of “judicial independence” invoked by the Court.96 
                                                        
compelling at present.  For judges of other courts, including most of the courts in 
England, the rule was only limited immunity; extrajurisdictional acts and acts within 
jurisdiction but motivated by malice were actionable.”); Judge Phillip J. Roth & Kelly 
Hagan, The Judicial Immunity Doctrine Today: Between the Bench and a Hard Place, 35 JUV. & 
FAM. CT. J. 3, 6 (1984) (“[A]rguments based on the long and unquestioned tenure of 
judicial immunity are spurious.  Not only do such arguments avoid the crucial inquiry into 
policy, but the facts of the matter are that judicial immunity occupies no such hallowed 
position in English or American common law.  Liability, not immunity, has been the 
longer standing rule, with absolute immunity coming as a relatively late development.”). 
 94.  See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25–26 (1883) (declaring the Civil 
Rights Act of 1875 unconstitutional, because Congress lacked the authority under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to outlaw race discrimination by private individuals and 
organizations; the Fourteenth Amendment protects only against state action); Virginia v. 
Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 322–23 (1879) (upholding the conviction of two black men by an all-
white jury, even though whites were rarely apprehended, tried, or convicted of crimes 
against blacks by state officials or judges); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 559 
(1875) (annulling the convictions of three men involved in the massacre of 100–300 
African Americans in Colfax, Louisiana, including about 50 being held as prisoners, 
because, inter alia, there was not sufficient state action shown even though Louisiana had 
done nothing to redress these brutal murders); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 
78–92 (1872) (holding that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment concerned only a scattered collection of miscellaneous federal rights related 
to national citizenship, and not individuals’ human rights generally).  For a history of 
Cruikshank, one of these decisions, and the other Supreme Court decisions “terminating” 
Reconstruction during this era, see Pope, supra note 83, at 385, 405–27 (2014). 
 95.  Other explanations for the sweeping form of judicial immunity announced in 
Bradley, beyond the imperative of judicial independence, include: (1) the desire to develop 
a uniform rule of judicial immunity for all courts, see Roth & Hagan, supra note 93, at 3–4; 
Feinman & Cohen, supra note 93, at 246, 265; (2) the declining need and desirability of 
judicial liability as the legal profession and state judicial systems became more 
professionalized, see Feinman & Cohen, supra note 93, at 243; (3) “[T]he necessities of 
judicial administration . . . as the judicial system became larger and more complex.  The 
threat of disruption from private suits against judges was a significant danger at a time 
when the system was barely able to function even without such interference,” id.; and (4) 
the Supreme Court’s general “conservative outlook,” including its desire to preserve the 
existing economic and social order and lack of concern for protecting individuals from the 
abuses of the powerful.  Id. at 248–49. 
 96.  After Bradley, in the name judicial independence and federalism, racist violence, 
with complicity of state officials and judges, continued unabated in the South.  See 
LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 190 (1993) (“The 
‘golden age’ of the lynch mob was in the years after 1880.  Any threat to the ideology of 
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Although the opinion of the Supreme Court gradually changed 
from non-interventionist and pro-states’ rights to one more 
concerned with the enforcement of the Bill of Rights and the 
preservation of civil rights beginning with the New Deal,97 it has held 
fast to the judicial immunity doctrine.  In 1967, the Supreme Court 
finally decided the question implicit in Bradley.  It held in Pierson v. 
Ray that Congress had not intended to eliminate judicial immunity 
for state judges when it passed the Civil Rights Act of 1871.98  Pierson 
involved a group of black and white “Freedom Rider”99 ministers who 
had engaged in a civil rights protest by attempting to use the “white-
only” waiting room in a segregated bus station in Jackson, 
                                                        
white supremacy made a black man a candidate for lynching.”); cf. In re Wall, 13 F. 814 
(S.D. Fla. 1882).  In re Wall involved a Florida lawyer who did: 
with an unlawful, tumult[u]ous, and riotous gathering, he advising and 
encouraging thereto, take from the jail of this county and hang a man, to the 
court known only as John.  . . . The offense . . . came to the personal knowledge 
of the court. As the judge was leaving the court-house for dinner, a prisoner was 
brought into the yard in custody of officers. Upon his return in the afternoon 
the dead body of the same person hung in a tree directly in front of the court-
house door.  No legal execution had taken place. The evidence shows that a 
person, whose name has not appeared, was taken from the jail, and, in the 
immediate vicinity of the court-house, hung to the limb of a tree . . . . 
Id. at 815.  The lawyer was disbarred for his role in the lynching, but no apparent action 
was taken against the judge.  Id. at 820.  The Supreme Court upheld the attorney’s 
disbarment, but Justice Field dissented, arguing that the lawyer who led a lynch mob 
should retain his license on the grounds of procedural improprieties.  See Ex parte Wall, 
107 U.S. 265, 290, 318 (1883) (Field, J., dissenting).  The lynched man, Charles Owens, 
had allegedly attempted to rape a young woman of a prominent family.  “Although Charles 
Owens was white, the fact that approximately forty per cent of Tampa’s population was 
black may have figured in the desire of whites to deal summarily with a man accused of 
attempted rape.”  Robert P. Ingalls, General Joseph B. Wall and Lynch Law in Tampa, 63 FLA. 
HIST. Q. 51, 51, 62 n.54 (1984). 
 97.  See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (declaring state 
laws establishing separate public schools for black and white students unconstitutional); 
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 642 (1950) (striking down state law 
requiring segregated graduate and professional education); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 
629, 636 (1950) (holding that segregated state law schools violate the Equal Protection 
Clause); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (holding that courts cannot enforce 
racial covenants on real estate); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 386 (1946) (holding that 
segregated accommodations on interstate buses are unconstitutional). 
 98.  386 U.S. 547, 553–55 (1967) (applying judicial immunity to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
claims).  For a history of the circuit split leading up to Pierson, see J. Randolph Block, 
Stump v. Sparkman and the History of Judicial Immunity, 1980 DUKE L.J. 879, 901–07. 
 99.   Pierson, 386 U.S. at 553 n.8 (referring to the ministers as Freedom Riders).  
Freedom Riders were civil rights activists organized by the Congress for Racial Equality 
(CORE) who rode interstate buses into segregated Southern states with the purpose of 
desegregating public transportation in the South.  See RAYMOND ARSENAULT, FREEDOM 
RIDERS: 1961 AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (2006).   
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Mississippi.100  They were arrested and convicted by a “municipal 
police justice.”101  After the defendants successfully challenged their 
convictions, the ministers sued the arresting police officers along with 
the judge under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act,102 the successor 
to the 1871 Ku Klux Klan Act, alleging a conspiracy to deprive them 
of their civil rights.  Applying Bradley v. Fisher, the Court held that 
Congress did not intend to eliminate judicial immunity when it 
passed the Ku Klux Klan Act, and that the judge was immune from 
suit.103  Chief Justice Warren explained for the majority, “The 
legislative record [of the Civil Rights Act of 1871] gives no clear 
indication that Congress meant to abolish wholesale all common-law 
immunities.”104  Although Justice Douglas severely criticized the 
majority’s decision for misreading the legislative history of the Act,105 
as have contemporary scholars,106 the lower federal courts consistently 
                                                        
 100.  Pierson, 386 U.S. at 548–49. 
 101.  Id. at 549. 
 102.  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 103.  Pierson, 386 U.S. at 553–55. 
 104.  Id. at 554. 
 105.  Id. at 558–59 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  Specifically, Justice Douglas stated: 
[E]very member of Congress who spoke to the issue assumed that the words of 
the statute meant what they said and that judges would be liable.  Many members 
of Congress objected to the statute because it imposed liability on members of 
the judiciary . . . . 
  Yet despite the repeated fears of its opponents, and the explicit recognition 
that the section would subject judges to suit, the section remained as it was 
proposed: it applied to “any person.”  There was no exception for members of 
the judiciary. In light of the sharply contested nature of the issue of judicial 
immunity it would be reasonable to assume that the judiciary would have been 
expressly exempted from the wide sweep of the section, if Congress had 
intended such a result. 
  The section’s purpose was to provide redress for the deprivation of civil rights.  
It was recognized that certain members of the judiciary were instruments of 
oppression and were partially responsible for the wrongs to be remedied.  The 
parade of cases coming to this Court shows that a similar condition now obtains 
in some of the States.  Some state courts have been instruments of suppression of 
civil rights.  The methods may have changed; the means may have become more 
subtle; but the wrong to be remedied still exists. 
Id. at 561–563 (citations omitted). 
 106.  See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 957–58 
(2007) (presenting detailed legislative background of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 
demonstrating that no one in Congress disputed the analogy between the 1871 Act and a 
similar 1866 Act holding judges criminally liable; the sponsor of the 1871 Act never 
disputed opponents’ allegations that the law would make judges civilly liable; supporters of 
the 1871 Act explicitly referenced state courts as the intended target of the law; and that 
the 1871 bill was passed overwhelmingly). 
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applied the judicial immunity doctrine after Pierson.  These were the 
controlling precedents when Linda Sparkman filed her lawsuit against 
Judge Stump and the other defendants in 1978. 
C.  The District Court Case and Appeal to the Seventh Circuit 
The trial judge in Stump, Jesse Eschbach, had previously ruled 
rather consistently for plaintiffs in welfare,107 labor,108 and civil rights 
cases.109  However, given the legal landscape, perhaps it is not 
surprising that Judge Eschbach dismissed Sparkman’s federal civil 
rights claims as to all parties on the ground that Judge Stump, the 
only state official named as a defendant, was absolutely immune from 
suit.110  Consequently, no state action could be shown, which was 
necessary to the federal claims.111  Judge Eschbach also dismissed the 
pendent state-law tort claims, given the failure of the federal claims 
before trial.112 
                                                        
 107.  See, e.g., Green v. Stanton, 364 F. Supp. 123, 128 (1973) (holding state policy 
denying welfare benefits to pregnant women for their “unborn children” until the actual 
birth of the child violates federal Social Security Act), rev’d in part, 499 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 
1974), vacated, Stanton v. Green, 421 U.S. 983 (1975); Grubb v. Sterrett, 315 F. Supp. 990, 
995 (1970) (holding that a state welfare regulation denying welfare benefits to a child with 
a stepparent present in the home violates federal welfare law); Broddie v. Gardner, 258 F. 
Supp. 753, 757–58 (N.D. Ind. 1966) (holding that a child adopted by a parent after his 
parent became disabled and eligible for benefits is entitled to child’s benefits under the 
Social Security Act). 
 108.  See, e.g., Local 186, Intern. Pulp, Sulfite and Paper Mill Workers v. Minnesota 
Mining & Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp. 1284, 1295 (1969) (denying summary judgment in action 
by union against employer on behalf of employees who had been discriminated against on 
the basis of sex); Dick v. Sinclair Glass Co., 283 F. Supp. 505, 513–14 (N.D. Ind. 1967) 
(granting temporary injunction prohibiting employer from violating National Labor 
Relations Act). 
 109.  See, e.g., Affeldt v. Whitcomb, 319 F. Supp. 69, 79 (1970) (holding that a durational 
residency requirement for voting infringed the right to vote and to equal protection). 
 110.  Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 354 (1978). 
 111.  The “derivative” immunity rule followed by the majority of circuits at the time 
required the dismissal of any claims against a private party alleged to have conspired with 
an immune state official, no matter how strong the allegations of the conspiracy or severe 
the violation of constitutional rights. See Martha O. Shoemaker, Note, Stump v. Sparkman: 
The Scope of Judicial and Derivative Immunities Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 6 WOMEN’S RTS. L. 
REP. 107, 111 n.21, 115–17 (1980). 
 112.  See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“Needless 
decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice 
between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law.  
Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, . . . the state claims should be 
dismissed as well.”). 
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Sparkman appealed to the Seventh Circuit, which unanimously 
reversed on the immunity question.113  Although the court 
acknowledged Bradley and Pierson as relevant authority,114 it found the 
facts of Sparkman’s case to lie outside the boundaries of the judicial 
immunity doctrine as defined by those precedents.  “Judicial 
immunity,” the court said, “is available . . . only where the judge has 
jurisdiction.”115  Judge Stump’s action did not meet this requirement, 
according to the court.  Indiana statutes in existence at the time 
permitted sterilizations, but only of institutionalized persons and only 
if certain procedures were followed.116  These procedures included 
the right to notice, the opportunity to defend, and the right to 
appeal.117  According to the Seventh Circuit, this statutory scheme 
“negat[ed]” subject matter jurisdiction;118 there was simply no 
statutory authority for Judge Stump’s actions.119  Nor did the common 
law, according to the court, provide any jurisdictional basis for Judge 
Stump’s order.120  In sum, the Seventh Circuit found no express basis 
in statutory or common law for a court to order the sterilization of a 
minor child simply upon a parent’s petition.121  To give judges 
immunity in such cases, Judge Swygert wrote, “would be sanctioning 
tyranny from the bench.”122 
D.  The Supreme Court Proceedings and Decision 
Judge Stump and his co-defendants appealed to the Supreme 
Court.  The law clerk assigned to review Stump’s petition for 
certiorari recommended against hearing the case, because he thought 
there would be “institutional costs.”123  As he explained: 
This is a sordid case.  If this Court grants review the case will 
attract even wider attention and publicity than it has already 
                                                        
 113.  Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F.2d 172, 176 (7th Cir. 1977), rev’d sub nom. Stump v. 
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). 
 114.  Id. at 174. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. at 174–75, 175 n.3 (citing IND. CODE §§ 16-13-13-1 to 6 (1971)). 
 117.  Id. at 175. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id.  
 121.  Id. at 174–75. 
 122.  Id. at 176. 
 123.  Prelim. Mem. from Monte Stewart, law clerk, to Chief Justice Warren Burger 5 
(Aug. 17, 1977) (on file with the Washington and Lee University School of Law in Lewis F. 
Powell, Jr. Papers, Supreme Court Case Files, Powell Archives, 76-1750 Stump v. 
Sparkman).  
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received—all for the wrong reasons.  And regardless of how 
the Court rules on the narrow legal issue raised (judicial 
immunity), its decision, because of the underlying fact 
pattern, will be very susceptible to popular 
misunderstanding . . . .  These costs would seem to outweigh 
any benefits to be derived from plenary review of a CA 
opinion so fact-specific that its precedential value, its 
potential for mischief, is de minimis.124 
Justice Powell’s clerk agreed, noting that “the public would 
misunderstand whatever ruling came out of this case.”125  Moreover, 
because Judge Stump had not yet been tried on the merits, there was 
some sentiment among the justices that certiorari should be 
denied.126  If Judge Stump prevailed at trial, the Court could avoid 
wading into this controversial case.  Yet, some of the justices disagreed 
with the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation and application of the 
judicial immunity doctrine.  For example, Justice Powell wrote in his 
notes of the conference discussing the certiorari petition that the 
Seventh Circuit had “settled law of immunity for that circuit,” and 
“this decision severely undercuts Pierson v. Ray.”127  Perhaps given 
these conflicting considerations, five justices initially voted to reverse 
summarily without issuing an opinion.128  However, Justice Brennan, 
who initially voted not to hear the case for lack of a trial on the 
merits, switched his vote to grant certiorari and hear oral argument, 
                                                        
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Handwritten note from Nancy Bregstein, law clerk, to Lewis S. Powell, Jr. (on file 
with the Washington and Lee University School of Law in Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, 
Supreme Court Case Files, Powell Archives, 76-1750 Stump v. Sparkman).  However, 
Powell’s clerk was less adamant than Justice Burger’s about denying certiorari, for two 
reasons.  First, she noted that “if the issue is certworthy, public reaction . . . would not be a 
valid reason for denying cert.”  Id.  Second, she argued, the fact that Judge Stump had not 
yet been tried should not figure into the Justice’s decision about whether to hear the case.  
Id.  
 126.  For example, Justice Powell scribbled on the vote sheet indicating his vote to deny 
certiorari, “Case has not been tried on the merits.”  Conference Notes of J. Lewis F. Powell, 
Jr. (Sept. 27, 1977) (on file with the Washington and Lee University School of Law in 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, Supreme Court Case Files, Powell Archives, 76-1750 Stump v. 
Sparkman) [hereinafter Powell Conference Notes].  Similarly, Justice Blackmun wrote at 
the end of the preliminary certiorari memo circulated among the justices, “The judge will 
be free to plead and prove some qualified immunity or defense at trial.  Deny.”  
Handwritten note by Harry A. Blackmun (Aug. 23, 1977) (on file with the Library of 
Congress in Harry A. Blackmun Papers, box 269, folder 4). 
 127.  Powell Conference Notes, supra note 126. 
 128.  Id.  
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and Justice Marshall followed.129  This switch apparently produced the 
requisite four votes necessary to grant certiorari and hear oral 
argument, as required by Supreme Court rules. 
At oral argument,130 Justice Stewart’s questions suggested he was 
skeptical that Judge Stump had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the 
sterilization petition.  He asked: 
What if Mrs. McFarlin had presented a piece of paper to 
your client, the Judge, and said my daughter is incompetent, 
she is a kleptomaniac, she has done a lot of shoplifting and I 
want your approval to have her right hand chopped off and 
the Judge had signed the approval and that surgery had 
been performed . . . .  
 . . . .  
 . . . [L]et us assume . . . that the Court had ordered that 
operation on that representation by the parent.  Would you 
be making the same argument?131 
Similarly, Justice Marshall asked, “What statute do you have in Indiana 
that authorized the parent to sterilize the child without the child’s 
permission?  . . . [W]ill you give me the case that the Judge cited?  He 
didn’t cite a piece of law about anything.”132 
 Some of the Justices’ questions also suggested skepticism about 
whether Judge Stump’s order was a judicial act deserving of 
immunity.  For example, one justice asked whether there was any 
record in the courthouse that the sterilization petition was ever filed 
in court.133  The attorney for Judge Stump conceded that there was 
                                                        
 129.  Id. (“The vote that should have prevailed was 5 to Rev. summarily, 2 to grant . . . 
and hear oral argument, and 2 to deny.  But then Brennan outmaneuvered us by switching 
to a grant and TM [Thurgood Marshall] followed.”). 
 130.  The description of the oral arguments in the Supreme Court is based on a 
transcription of the recording by the author of this article.  The recording may be accessed 
online at Oyez.org, a project of the Chicago-Kent College of Law providing audio 
recordings of United States Supreme Court decisions dating back to 1955.  See Oyez, 
CHICAGO-KENT COLLEGE OF LAW, http://www.oyez.org/about.  This discussion uses the 
author’s determinations as to who is speaking, verified by independent research, 
throughout. 
 131.  Oral Argument, supra note 48, at 6:44.  After some back and forth, the attorney for 
Judge Stump replied, “In answer to your question your honor, that would be an 
inappropriate action on the part of the Judge.  . . . Certainly cutting off her hand is not 
going to improve her physically.”  Id. at 8:11–28.  Justice Stewart rejoined, “Well do you 
think this improved this child physically, this operation?”  Id. at 8:32.  For verification that 
Justice Stewart is the speaker, see Mintz, supra note 50, at A10 (reporting on this 
exchange); see also Oral Argument, supra note 48, at 9:28 (referring to Justice Stewart’s 
question).  
 132.  Id. at 12:00. 
 133.  Id. at 14:34. 
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not, but asserted that this was “not an unusual occurrence,”134 and, in 
any case, “It was certainly a judicial act.  It was presented to the Judge, 
as a judge, signed by him as a judge.”135 
 Other questions from the justices signaled concern about the 
lack of due process, including the absence of a guardian ad litem to 
represent Linda Spitler136 and the absence of an evidentiary record,137 
principled judicial inquiry of the child’s best interests,138 or 
opportunity for her to appeal.139  Chief Justice Burger, in contrast, 
seemed less troubled by the apparent lack of due process.  He likened 
the proceeding to a petition for a temporary restraining order, noting 
that a temporary restraining order could be granted “on the same 
kind of representations and petition as was presented here, could it 
not?”140  Even Justice Marshall, long recognized for his strong support 
for constitutional protection of individual rights, evinced some 
sympathy for Judge Stump.  “There are many experienced judges who 
have made mistakes,” asserted Justice Marshall.141 
After oral argument, according to Justice Blackmun’s conference 
notes, Justice White indicated that he thought Judge Stump’s order 
                                                        
 134.  Id. at 14:53 (referencing petitions for approval of minors’ estates that are not 
generally docketed).  
 135.  Id. at 16:29.  Along the same lines, Justice Powell suggested that if a parent has the 
unequivocal right to consent to surgery of a minor child, as the attorney for Judge Stump 
asserted at oral argument, then Judge Stump’s approval of the sterilization was not 
necessary under Indiana law.  Id. at 27:47.  “Doesn’t that leave the court in the position of 
performing only a ministerial act?  . . .  What judgment does he make?” asked Justice 
Powell.  Id. at 28:22.  His notes from oral argument echo this assessment.  See Powell 
Conference Notes, supra note 126 (“There was no judicial decision.  . . . Judge’s consent 
was not required under statute.  It was an unnecessary act.”). 
 136.  Oral Argument, supra note 48, at 37:05, 63:20, 65:06; see also Powell Conference 
Notes, supra note 126 (indicating that Justice Stevens, during oral argument, had asked 
whether “this would have been a different case” if Judge Stump had appointed a guardian 
ad litem”).  
 137.  Oral argument, supra note 48, at 28:46–29:52. 
 138.  Id. at 28:50. 
 139.  Id. at 16:37. 
 140.  Id. at 43:04–44:00.  Some of the justices also asked questions suggesting that the 
plaintiff did not have sufficient evidence to support her conspiracy claim, presaging the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals disposition of the case on remand.  See infra Part II.E.  
For example, Justice Marshall said, “I am not too sure that you have any right to charge 
him [Judge Stump] with conspiracy at all.  You don’t know whether he saw anybody . . . .  
To have a conspiracy you’ve got to have people.”  See Oral Argument, supra note 48, at 
53:58.  The attorney for Linda Sparkman responded, “I think we could show if there were 
a trial that there was a conspiracy.”  Id. at 54:20. 
 141.  Id. at 68:28. 
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was “too informal a way to pass muster,”142 but he was nevertheless 
inclined to accept the trial judge’s dismissal of Sparkman’s claim 
against Judge Stump and said he might dissent if the Court decided to 
affirm the Seventh Circuit.143  Still, he and three other Justices all 
agreed this was a hard case.144  Justice Stevens floated the idea of 
certifying the question of Judge Stump’s jurisdiction to the Indiana 
Supreme Court.145  Chief Justice Burger thought that Judge Stump 
made a “clear error,” but indicated that “if judicial immunity doctrine 
means anything, it must apply here.”146  Ultimately, the Supreme 
Court reversed the Seventh Circuit in a 5–3 decision.147  Justice White 
wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger and 
Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Stevens.148 
In reversing, the Supreme Court articulated the by now well-
established two-prong test.  To be protected by immunity, a judge 
must have subject matter jurisdiction over the question and perform 
an official judicial act.149  As to the first prong, Justice White’s majority 
opinion disagreed with the determination by the Seventh Circuit that 
there was a “clear absence of all jurisdiction” for Judge Stump to 
consider Ora McFarlin’s petition.150  According to Justice White, 
Indiana law gave state circuit courts “original exclusive jurisdiction in 
all cases at law and in equity” unless specifically prohibited by statute 
or case law.151  The absence of specific authority in Indiana law to 
decide a petition for sterilization under these circumstances was 
insignificant; the critical factor was that no law expressly prohibited 
Judge Stump from entertaining the petition.  According to the 
majority, as a judge sitting in a court of general jurisdiction, Judge 
                                                        
 142. Conference Notes of Harry S. Blackmun (Jan. 13, 1978) (on file with the Library of 
Congress in Harry A. Blackmun Papers, box 269, folder 4) [hereinafter Blackmun 
Conference Notes]. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Blackmun Conference Notes, supra note 142 (indicating that Chief Justice Burger 
and Justices Stewart, and Stevens all felt this was a “hard case”); Powell Conference Notes, 
supra note 126 (indicating that Justice White felt this was a “tough case”). 
 145.  Powell Conference Notes, supra note 126. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 364 (1978).  Justice Brennan had voted to join 
the dissent in conference, see Powell Conference Notes, supra note 126, but did not take 
part in the opinion.  Stump, 435 U.S. at 364.  According to news reports, he did not 
participate because he was ill when the case was considered.  See Morton Mintz, High Court 
Rules Judge Isn’t Liable, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1978, at A1. 
 148.  Stump, 435 U.S. at 350–51. 
 149.  Id. at 356–57, 360. 
 150.  Id. at 357. 
 151.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing IND. CODE § 33-4-4-3 (1975)). 
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Stump had jurisdiction over any action before him absent a specific 
statutory or common law prohibition.152 
The Supreme Court also found that Judge Stump’s order was a 
judicial act, the second requirement for judicial immunity.153  A 
judicial act, according to the Court, exists where the judge’s act is one 
“normally performed by a judge” and where the parties “dealt with 
the judge in his judicial capacity.”154  In the majority’s view, approving 
petitions with respect to minors was a “function normally performed 
by a judge . . . in his judicial capacity.”155  Addressing the Seventh 
Circuit’s assertion that even if Judge Stump had jurisdiction, he was 
deprived of immunity because of his failure to observe elementary 
principles of procedural due process, Justice White countered: “A 
judge is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts even if 
his exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave 
procedural errors.”156 
The majority’s decision vividly illustrates the view that the 
procedural rule (or in this case, a quasi-procedural rule, judicial 
immunity) should not bend in the face of substantive claims.  By 
refusing to let Sparkman raise any substantive objections to the 
sterilization order, the Supreme Court in Stump upheld the judicial 
immunity doctrine in the face of compelling substantive injustice.  By 
endorsing this doctrine in this context, the Court explicitly identified 
the value of an independent judiciary over substantive justice. 
To be sure, the value of judicial independence is a foundational 
element of our judicial system. As explained by Justice White: 
Despite the unfairness to litigants that sometimes results, the 
doctrine of judicial immunity is thought to be in the best 
interests of “the proper administration of justice . . . [, for it 
allows] a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in 
                                                        
 152.  Id. at 358–59 
 153.  Id. at 362–64. 
 154.  Id. at 362. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id. at 359. In contrast, remedies scholar Douglas Laycock argues that the “grave 
procedural errors” referenced by Justice White represent the gravamen of Spitler’s legal 
action.  See Laycock, supra note 33.  According to Laycock, as a judge sitting in a court of 
general jurisdiction, Judge Stump did have the power to hear the sterilization petition, 
however wrongly decided, id. at 395–397.  However, the lack of effort to serve Linda Spitler 
deprived the court of personal jurisdiction over her and thus deprived Judge Stump of 
immunity from suit.  Id. at 393–94, 400.  By resolving the immunity issue without discussing 
personal jurisdiction, according to Laycock, the Court modified the traditional test for 
judicial immunity, which Laycock asserts requires both subject matter jurisdiction and 
personal jurisdiction.  Id. at 392, 393–95, 404–06. 
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him [to] be free to act upon his own convictions, without 
apprehension of personal consequences to himself.”157 
In the normal course, a party who believes he has been wronged by a 
judge acting in her official capacity may ask the judge to reconsider; 
appeal to a higher court; or, if the party suspects judicial wrongdoing, 
file a complaint with the bar association.158  However, a party cannot 
generally sue the judge for monetary damages.159  A judge should not 
have to answer to a lawsuit whenever she issues a ruling that makes a 
litigant unhappy.  Such threats of personal liability would have a 
chilling effect on judicial independence by discouraging judges from 
exercising judicial discretion and judgment.160 
Despite the fundamental importance of an independent 
judiciary, the Court’s reasoning is unsatisfactory.  The judicial 
immunity doctrine cannot be separated from the larger framework of 
our judicial system, prescribing that there must be an adversarial 
process, predicated on a fair chance for competing sides to be heard 
by an unbiased decision maker.  The majority’s strict interpretation of 
the judicial immunity doctrine preserved one aspect of this system—
the unbiased decisionmaker—but it ignored the fact that the 
proceeding granting the sterilization order lacked every other feature 
of procedural justice.  There was no notice, no personal jurisdiction, 
no opportunity to present or test evidence, and no opportunity to 
appeal.  This Kafkaesque character of the case distinguished it from 
earlier Supreme Court decisions emphasizing the availability of 
                                                        
 157.  Stump, 435 U.S. at 363 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 
(1871)). 
 158.  See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 525–
28 (4th ed. 2010).  
 159.  Id. 
 160.  See Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 348; Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 564 (1967) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting).  Other justifications for the doctrine of judicial immunity 
include: 
[P]rotecting judges from liability for honest mistakes; . . . relieving judges of the 
time and expense of defending suits; . . . removing an impediment to responsible 
men entering the judiciary; . . . necessity of finality; . . . appellate review is 
satisfactory remedy; . . . the judge’s duty is to the public and not to the individual 
[litigant before him]; . . . judicial self-protection; . . .  [and] separation of powers. 
Id. at 564 n.4.  The Supreme Court has given so much weight to these considerations that 
judicial immunity extends beyond good faith errors and protects corrupt or malicious 
decisions.  See Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 347–49.  Reversal of erroneous decisions and, 
in egregious cases, removal of malfeasant judges are the accepted remedies for judicial 
error or misbehavior.  LAYCOCK, supra note 158, at 525–28. 
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alternative remedies to the aggrieved litigant161 and could easily have 
provided the basis for a narrow exception without disrupting the basic 
doctrine of judicial immunity.162  Moreover, the question of subject 
matter jurisdiction was close;163 as many of the Justices themselves 
noted, this was a “hard case.”164  There were compelling constitutional 
values sounding in privacy, equality, due process, and reproductive 
rights that called for the abrogation of immunity in this case. 
Finally, as discussed in Part I.B., the sweeping form of absolute 
judicial immunity forged by the Supreme Court in Bradley was itself a 
questionable rule, borne of an anti-Reconstruction Supreme Court 
willing to allow private racial violence and tyranny—committed in 
complicity with state officials, including judges—to continue 
                                                        
 161.  See Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554 (“His errors may be corrected on appeal, but he should 
not have to fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or 
corruption.”); Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 354 (“Against the consequences of [judges’] 
erroneous or irregular action, from whatever motives proceeding, the law has provided for 
private parties numerous remedies, and to those remedies they must, in such cases, 
resort.”). 
 162.  Other proposals, which are beyond the scope of this Article, are to qualify judges’ 
immunity for criminal, malicious, corrupt, or negligent acts.  See, e.g., Feinman, supra note 
93, at 291 (proposing a flexible standard accounting for whether the judge acted 
“according to normal procedural standards in good faith”); Pillai, supra note 91, at 144–45 
(1995) (proposing compensation where a state or federal judicial commission investigates 
a complaint and finds it merits formal sanctions); Roth & Hagan, supra note 93, at 12–13 
(discussing alternatives, from absolute immunity to a negligence standard, and proposing 
a system of judicial liability supplemented with insurance protection); Brittney Kern, 
Comment, Giving New Meaning to “Justice For All”: Crafting an Exception to Absolute Judicial 
Immunity, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 149, 176–80 (proposing an exception for acts that violate 
the Model Code of Judicial Conduct and are undertaken with malice); Timothy M. 
Stengel, Comment, Absolute Judicial Immunity Makes Absolutely No Sense: An Argument for an 
Exception for Judicial Immunity, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 1071, 1105–07 (2012) (proposing an 
exception where criminal charges are filed related to the conduct and the act is judicial). 
 163.  The general jurisdiction statute gave Judge Stump “original exclusive jurisdiction 
in all cases at law and in equity whatsoever . . . and jurisdiction in “all other causes, 
matters, and proceedings where exclusive jurisdiction thereof is not conferred by law upon 
some other court, board or officer,” Stump, 435 U.S. at 357 & 357 n.8, and another statute 
provided that a parent may consent to medical or hospital care or treatment of her child, 
including surgery.  Id. at 358.  However, there was no specific statutory or common law 
basis under which Judge Stump could order the sterilization of a child simply upon the 
petition of a parent.  See Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F.2d 172, 174 (7th Cir. 1977), rev’d sub 
nom. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).  Moreover, concluding that general 
jurisdiction cloaks a judge with blanket immunity stretches the judicial immunity doctrine 
beyond recognition.  Given such a reading, it would be impossible for a judge sitting in a 
court of general jurisdiction to ever act in excess of authority, so long as she is performing 
a judicial act. See Laycock, supra note 33, at 405 (“The result is an immunity with no 
meaningful limits—perhaps no limits at all for judges of courts of general jurisdiction.”); 
Stengel, supra note 162, at 1077 (“[I]t appears that a judge serving on a court of general 
jurisdiction has virtually no limit to her immunity . . . .”). 
 164.  See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
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unabated after the Civil War.  The Supreme Court subsequently 
embraced an ahistorical conception of doctrine in the post-1960s civil 
rights era, with similar consequences.  Ultimately, none of this moved 
the Court majority in Stump.165  Linda Sparkman lost her liberty 
despite an unjust order, unjust process, and unjust interpretation of 
federal law and common law precedent. 
Justice Stewart wrote a stinging dissent, joined by Justices Powell 
and Marshall.  Agreeing that judges of general jurisdiction enjoy 
absolute immunity for their judicial acts,166 he wrote, “I think what 
Judge Stump did . . . was beyond the pale of anything that could 
sensibly be called a judicial act.”167  For Justice Stewart, the meaning 
of a “judicial act” must be informed by the immunity doctrine’s 
underlying purpose of protecting judges’ “principled decision-
making.”168  “[P]rincipled decision-making,” according to Stewart, 
involves the presence of litigants, weighing the merits, and an 
opportunity to appeal.169  Lacking all these features, the proceeding 
in Stump did not merit the protection of the immunity doctrine, and a 
civil action against the judge should be permitted to redress the 
wrong done.170  Stating that it was “factually untrue” that authorizing a 
sterilization pursuant to a parent’s request was an act “normally 
performed by a judge,”171  Stewart wrote, “[T]here is no reason to 
believe that such an act has ever been performed by any other Indiana 
judge, either before or since.”172 
According to news reports, on March 28, 1978, when the 
Supreme Court issued its ruling, “The intensity of feelings evoked 
                                                        
 165.  However, there is some indication that Justice Stevens felt that Bradley v. Fisher, 80 
U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871) and Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) should be revisited.  
Justice Blackmun’s conference notes record Stevens as saying, “Pierson was bad.  And 
wrong on the merits.”  Blackmun Conference Notes, supra note 142. 
 166.  Stump, 435 U.S. at 364–65 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citing Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554). 
 167.  Id. at 365. 
 168.  Id. at 368–69. 
 169.  Id.  The lack of an appeal remedy was particularly important to Justice Powell, who 
dissented separately to emphasize this issue.  According to Justice Powell, courts 
historically justified immunity on the ground that judicial errors may be corrected on 
appeal.  Id. at 370 (Powell, J., dissenting).  This interpretation is backed by prominent 
remedies scholars.  See LAYCOCK, supra note 158, at 526 (“Indeed, judicial immunity and 
the right of appeal arose at the same time.  The writ of error, under which a higher court 
reviews the record for errors of law, replaced the writs of false judgment and attaint.  The 
writ of false judgment was a suit against the judge; attaint was a similar procedure against 
jurors.”); Laycock, supra note 33, at 401–03. 
 170.  Stump, 435 U.S. at 368–69 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 171.  Id. at 365.  
 172.  Id. at 367.  
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among the justices became obvious in the hushed chamber of the 
court . . . .”173  After Justice White briefly summarized the fifteen-page 
majority opinion, Justice Stewart read aloud most of his five-page 
dissent from the bench, an infrequent occurrence for dissenters.174  
Chief Justice Burger, who voted with the majority, was sitting at 
Stewart’s right as Justice Stewart “spoke in a strong, controlled 
voice.”175  “As one cutting phrase tumbled on another, Burger’s face 
reddened.  Other justices also appeared to be uncomfortable.  The 
tension struck observers as almost palpable.”176 
Left undecided by the Supreme Court was the question of 
whether Linda Sparkman’s federal civil rights claims against the 
private parties—her mother, the physicians, and the hospital—must 
be dismissed once Judge Stump, the only state official named as a 
defendant, was found to be immune from suit.177  The Court 
remanded this issue to the Seventh Circuit.178 
E.  Remand to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
The question before the Seventh Circuit on remand was whether 
Judge Stump’s immunity would remove the necessary state action 
from the alleged conspiracy to sterilize Linda Sparkman and result in 
the automatic dismissal of the federal civil rights claims against the 
private defendants.179  At the time, the circuits were split on this 
question.  The majority of the federal appellate circuits adopted a per 
se dismissal rule in this situation, also known as the “derivative 
immunity” doctrine.  According to this approach, “Private persons 
cannot be held liable for conspiracy to violate a person’s 
constitutional rights if the other conspirators are state officials who 
are themselves immune to liability under the facts alleged.”180  In 
other words, a public official’s immunity also shields his private co-
                                                        
 173.  Mintz, supra note 147. 
 174.  Id.  
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  Stump, 435 U.S. at 364 n.13. 
 178.  Id. at 364. 
 179.  Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d 261, 262 (7th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).  To bring 
the private defendants within the ambit of § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, the Sparkmans 
were required to prove that the private defendants had conspired with a state official to 
deprive them of a right secured by federal law or the Constitution.  Id. at 263–64. 
(Sprecher, J., concurring) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970)).  
Without Judge Stump, the crucial requirement of state action would be missing, and the 
Sparkmans’ civil rights claims would fail. 
 180.  Sykes v. California, 497 F.2d 197, 202 (9th Cir. 1974). 
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conspirators from liability for civil rights violations.  In contrast, a 
minority of circuits at the time rejected the derivative immunity 
rule.181 
The Seventh Circuit avoided taking sides on the question. Sitting 
en banc,182 it issued a brief per curiam opinion affirming the district 
court’s dismissal of Sparkman’s claims.183  However, the five judges in 
the majority supplied the apparent basis for this result in a series of 
concurring opinions.  These concurring judges agreed that, to make 
out a claim of conspiracy between a state judge and a private person 
under the Civil Rights Act, the plaintiff must set forth detailed facts in 
the complaint demonstrating an agreement between the state judge 
and the private party to deprive the plaintiff of her constitutional 
rights.184  In other words, in the majority’s view, for Linda Sparkman 
to maintain her civil rights action in federal court against her mother 
who executed the sterilization petition, the attorney who drafted it, 
the physicians who performed the sterilization, and the hospital—and 
specifically to have the opportunity to move on to the discovery phase 
of litigation—she would have to allege additional facts showing an 
agreement between each of the private parties and Judge Stump to 
deprive her of her constitutional rights. 
This new more stringent pleading requirement was at odds with 
the simple notice pleading standard announced by the Supreme 
Court in Conley v. Gibson,185 controlling at this time.  Under Conley, 
courts were prohibited from dismissing a claim unless it was clear that 
there was “no set of facts” that the plaintiff could prove to establish 
the claim.186  An underlying purpose of this framework was to give 
litigants a chance to support and present their claims after a full 
opportunity to engage in discovery.  In this view, embodied in the 
Federal Rules, closing the courthouse door on Sparkman at this early 
stage of the litigation would not be consistent with notions of 
                                                        
 181.  See Shoemaker, supra note 111, at 124–25.  
 182.  Normally, an appellate panel consists of three judges, and a full en banc hearing is 
held before a majority of the circuit judges who are in regular active service and who are 
not disqualified.  See Fed. R. App. P. 35(a).  On remand, eight judges heard oral argument 
on the derivative immunity question in this case.  See Sparkman, 601 F.2d at 261 (listing 
Chief Judge Fairchild and Circuit Judges Bauer, Sprecher, Swygert, Cummings, Pell, Tone, 
and Wood as the assigned judges). 
 183.  Id. at 262. 
 184.  Id. at 262 (Fairchild, C.J., concurring); id. at 263 (Pell, J. and Bauer, J., 
concurring); id. at 265–68 (Sprecher, J., concurring); id. at 269 (Tone, J., concurring). 
 185.  355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
 186.  Id. at 45–46. 
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procedural fairness undergirding our modern civil justice system.187  
Moreover, according to Marjorie Press Lindblom, who, as a young 
associate at Kirkland and Ellis in Chicago, argued Sparkman’s appeal 
pro bono on remand before the entire Seventh Circuit, this reasoning 
was “totally out of the blue.”188  The issue had not been briefed or 
argued. 
Nevertheless, as civil procedure scholars have documented, many 
lower federal courts had begun to embrace heightened pleading rules 
for civil rights claims beginning in the 1960s and 1970s.189  The trend 
was fueled by concerns over burgeoning dockets, a perception that 
civil rights claims are more likely to be frivolous, and the alleged 
proliferation of civil rights litigation.190  “The end result compelled 
civil rights plaintiffs to plead facts, often relating to the state of mind 
of the defendant, without the benefit of discovery.”191  The majority of 
the Seventh Circuit panel’s invocation of a heightened pleading 
standard on remand was consistent with this emerging trend in the 
lower federal courts at this time to carefully scrutinize civil rights 
claims.  Over time, this trend extended beyond the civil rights context 
to a variety of situations. As civil procedure scholar Benjamin Spencer 
explains: 
Though the Supreme Court had indicated that Rule 8 [of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] required only simple 
notice pleading with no need for factual detail, lower federal 
courts developed and imposed their own more stringent 
pleading standards for certain claims that required 
increased levels of factual detail before such claims would be 
permitted to proceed to discovery.192 
One might concede that Sparkman’s claim was the type requiring 
increased factual detail.  Although Judge Stump had at this point 
                                                        
 187.  See A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1, 23 
(2009). 
 188.  Laura Kessler Telephone Interview with Marjorie Press Lindblom, supra note 55. 
 189.  See Douglas A. Blaze, Presumed Frivolous: Application of Stringent Pleading Requirements 
in Civil Rights Litigation, 31 WM. & MARY. L. REV. 935, 991 (1990); Christopher M. Fairman, 
Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 567–68 (2002); A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading 
Civil Rights Claims in the Post-Conley Era, 52 HOWARD L.J. 99, 112–13 (2008); C. Keith 
Wingate, A Special Pleading Rule for Civil Rights Complaints: A Step Forward or a Step Back, 49 
MO. L. REV. 677, 693 (1984). 
 190.  See Fairman, supra note 189, at 567, 575–76; Spencer, supra note 189, at 113. 
 191.  See Fairman, supra note 189, at 552. 
 192.  Spencer, supra note 187, at 3–4 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); 
see id. at 14 (“[T]he type of factual detail needed” to sufficiently support a claim “varies 
depending on the legal and factual context in which a claim is situated.”). 
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been eliminated as a defendant, the issue of judicial independence 
was still lurking in the case.  If the action were to go forward against 
the private defendants, Judge Stump, even as a non-party, could be 
subject to discovery as to an alleged agreement to deprive Linda 
Sparkman of her constitutional rights, including the requirement that 
he respond to document requests and depositions.193  He might also 
be called as a witness at trial.194  The heightened pleading standard 
announced by the majority thus provided some measure of protection 
to judges from being entangled as potential witnesses in satellite 
                                                        
 193.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(1) (“A party may, by oral questions, depose any 
person . . . .”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 31(a)(1) (“A party may, by written questions, depose any 
person . . . .”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(c) (“[A] nonparty may be compelled to produce 
documents and tangible things or to permit an inspection.”). 
 194.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 (c)(1) (providing for subpoenas by the district courts for 
attendance at a hearing or a trial).  Although Rules 26(b) and (c) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure may well have protected Judge Stump from such discovery on the basis of 
lack of relevance, annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense 
had the action gone forward, precedent suggests that Judge Stump would not have been 
protected by any blanket privilege.  Although some jurisdictions have since recognized a 
“judicial deliberations” privilege protecting judges from discovery requests relating to their 
decision-making processes or communications relating to their holdings, these 
jurisdictions remain in the minority and there was no jurisdiction that had adopted such a 
privilege when Stump v. Sparkman was decided.  Cf. Matter of Certain Complaints Under 
Investigation by an Investigating Comm. of the Judicial Council of the Eleventh Circuit, 783 F.2d 
1488, 1518–22 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that the deliberations and private 
communications of judges and judicial officers were entitled to a qualified privilege 
against discovery requests mirroring executive privilege, but explicitly noting that they 
could find no prior cases recognizing this privilege and relying on dicta); see also Thomas v. 
Page, 837 N.E.2d 483 (Ill. App. 2 Dist. 2005); In re Enforcement of a Subpoena, 927 N.E.2d 
1022 (2012).  Nor do the Federal Judicial Center’s Benchbook for federal judges or Code of 
Judicial Conduct reference any privilege protecting judicial deliberations or prohibit 
judges from testifying as fact witness.  See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGES (6th ed. 2013), available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/Benchbook-US-District-Judges-6TH-FJC-MAR-
2013-Public.pdf/$file/Benchbook-US-District-Judges-6TH-FJC-MAR-2013-Public.pdf; 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES (Mar. 20, 2014), 
available at  
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/CodesOfConduct/CodeConductUnitedStates
Judges.aspx.  The ABA’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct is also silent.  See ABA, MODEL CODE 
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2011 ed.), available at http://www.americanbar.org/ 
groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_code_of_judicial_conduct.html; 
cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (even the executive privilege, which is 
constitutional, is qualified and may be overcome by a sufficient showing that the 
information is essential to the justice of the case).  The Supreme Court confirmed these 
conclusions two years after it decided Stump v. Sparkman in Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 31 
(1980) (“[J]udicial immunity was not designed to insulate the judiciary from all aspects of 
public accountability.  . . . Neither are we aware of any rule generally exempting a judge 
from the normal obligation to respond as a witness when he has information material to a 
criminal or civil proceeding.”). 
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litigation related to the act of discharging their authorized duties.  
This was no small concern.  As Chief Judge Fairchild asserted, “In 
most judicial decisions the judge ‘agrees’ with one or more parties 
and their counsel.  Thus it is easy for a state court loser to fulfill, 
superficially, the agreement element of conspiracy.”195 
The majority’s approach also had another benefit.  By falling 
back on the heightened pleading rule, the court avoided announcing 
a per se rule of no liability as to private persons who act in concert 
with immune state officials to deprive citizens of their civil rights.  
There was a circuit split as to this question,196 and it seems that at least 
some judges in the Seventh Circuit were concerned about the broad 
reach of derivative immunity.197  In an opinion just a few years prior, 
Judge Pell found “somewhat disturbing the lack of any rationale for a 
rule which would appear to carry over governmental immunity to 
private individuals.”198  The heightened pleading doctrine invoked in 
the judges’ concurrences thus enabled them to avoid confronting the 
derivative immunity issue, which apparently failed to win a majority in 
either direction.199  From this perspective, rather than a giant leap 
backward for civil rights claimants, the heightened pleading 
requirement that apparently justified the court’s per curiam dismissal 
of Sparkman’s claims may be understood as a proverbial “glass half-
full” for civil rights law. 
However, even accepting arguendo that the heightened pleading 
standard represented a reasonable compromise in this context given 
                                                        
 195.  Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d 261, 262 (1979).  Thus, according to Judge 
Fairchild:  
I would build into any principle for the recognition of a § 1983 claim based on a 
private person’s conspiracy with a state judge, a requirement of pleading and 
proof not only that the private party used the state court proceedings to produce 
a constitutional wrong, but that there was agreement between the party and 
judge beyond ordinary request and persuasion by the prevailing party, and that 
the state court judge invidiously used his office to deprive the § 1983 plaintiff of 
a federally protected right. 
Id. (Fairchild, C.J., concurring). 
 196.  See Shoemaker, supra note 111, at 111 n.21, 115–17. 
 197.  See Grow v. Fisher, 523 F.2d 875, 878 (7th Cir. 1975). 
 198.  Id. 
 199.  Specifically, Judges Sprecher, Swygert, Cummings, and Wood were opposed to 
derivative immunity in this context.  Sparkman, 601 F.2d at 263 (Sprecher, J., concurring); 
id. at 269 (Swygert, J., Cummings, J. & Wood, J., dissenting).  Chief Judge Fairchild and 
Judges Pell, Bauer, and Tone, in separate concurrences, were either completely silent on 
the issue or stated there was no need to reach it since the case could be dismissed on the 
basis of the insufficiency of pleadings.  Id. at 262 (Fairchild, C.J., concurring); id. at 263 
(Pell, J. & Bauer, J., concurring); id. at 268–69 (Tone, J., concurring). 
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the competing values at stake, and even if the heightened pleading 
requirement invoked by the majority was “less offensive than the 
absolute bar of derivative immunity,”200  Sparkman should have been 
provided an opportunity to amend her complaint to add more facts 
substantiating the agreement element of her claim.  The more 
stringent pleading standard had not been in place when Sparkman 
originally filed her complaint,201 and no court had ruled on the 
sufficiency of the pleadings before.202  Under these circumstances, 
according to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure203 and circuit 
precedent at the time,204 leave to amend a complaint was to be “freely 
given” unless it “appear[ed] to a certainty that the plaintiff would not 
be entitled to any relief under any state of facts which could be 
proved in support of his claim.”205 
The purpose of this liberal amendment rule, along with the 
other procedural innovations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
adopted in 1938, was “to promote open access to the courts” and the 
“resolution of disputes on the substantive merits as opposed to 
procedural technicalities.”206  Despite this controlling liberal 
amendment rule, the concurring judges in the majority were silent as 
to whether Sparkman should have the chance to amend her 
complaint to meet its new, stricter pleading standard.207  They did not 
even address the standard then in effect for when amendment should 
                                                        
 200.  Craig B. Merkle, Note, Derivative Immunity: An Unjustifiable Bar to Section 1983 
Actions, 1980 DUKE L.J. 568, 598. 
 201.  See Sparkman, 601 F.2d at 281 (Swygert, J., Cummings, J. & Harlington Wood, J., 
dissenting). 
 202.  Specifically, when the Seventh Circuit first received the case on appeal, it held that 
Judge Stump was not immune from suit, but it never questioned the sufficiency of the 
pleadings.  See discussion supra Part I.C.  Nor had the sufficiency of the pleadings been 
ruled on by the district court.  Sparkman, 601 F.2d at 275.  Although the private defendants 
had filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) in the trial 
court, the motion was filed after the defendants’ answer to the complaint, and was 
therefore expressly waived by Rule 12(h)(1).  See Answer of Defendants Warren G. Sunday, 
John H. Hines, John C. Harvey, M.D., Harry M. Covell, M.D., Sparkman v. McFarlin, No. F 
75-129 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 22, 1975); see Answer of Ora E. McFarlin, Sparkman v. McFarlin, 
No. F 75-129 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 23, 1975); Motion to Dismiss [on behalf of all defendants], 
Sparkman v. McFarlin, No. F 75-129 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 13, 1976); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h). 
 203.  Fed. R. Civ. P. (15)(a). 
 204.  See Sparkman, 601 F.2d at 281 (citing, inter alia, Stern v. U.S. Gypsum, Inc., 547 
F.2d 1329, 1334 (7th Cir. 1977)). 
 205.  Id. (quoting Fuhrer v. Fuhrer, 292 F.2d 140, 143 (7th Cir. 1961)).  
 206.  See Spencer, supra note 8, at 353, 355–56. 
 207.  Sparkman, 601 F.2d at 281.  
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be allowed.208  Sub silencio, they evaluated the original complaint 
under the newly announced heightened pleading standard post hoc, 
apparently concluding it was insufficient to state a cause of action. 
Sparkman’s original complaint had asserted that “the actions of” 
her mother, the physicians who performed the sterilization, the 
hospital, and Judge Stump were taken “in concert and with the 
common goal and result of sterilizing” her, depriving her of privacy, 
due process, and equal protection, and that “the concerted action was 
taken against [her] because of her sex, her marital status and of her 
allegedly low mental ability.”209  Although unstated, the majority of 
the concurring judges apparently concluded that these factual 
allegations were insufficient to support the “agreement” element of 
her civil rights claim, which was necessary for her to show state action 
and keep her claims in federal court.210 
The poignant injustice of the court’s imposition of a heightened 
pleading standard on Linda Sparkman as a condition of pursuing her 
civil rights claims in federal court should not be lost in this analysis, 
given the bare-bones petition that led to her sterilization.  Indeed, 
one scholar has argued that Ora McFarlin’s “bizarre petition 
presented nothing to decide.  A document with no named parties and 
no prayer for relief may be so unlike any normal pleading that it does 
not present a ‘case,’ or even a ‘matter,’ within the jurisdictional 
statute.”211 
                                                        
 208.  Judge Sprecher did try to justify the court’s disposition in terms of Adickes v. S.H. 
Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970), a summary judgment case.  Sparkman, 601 F.2d at 263–64.  
Neither ducking the issue nor mixing up dismissal and summary judgment standards is an 
excuse for the court’s failure to give Sparkman a chance to amend.   
 209.  See Complaint at ¶ 30, Sparkman v. McFarlin, No. F 75-129 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 26, 
1975), available in HAROLD D. STUMP ET AL., PETITIONERS V. LINDA KAY SPARKMAN AND LEO 
SPARKMAN. U.S. SUPREME COURT TRANSCRIPT OF RECORD WITH SUPPORTING PLEADINGS 
app. A15 (Richard H. Finley et al., eds., 1976). 
 210.  See sources cited supra note 184.  In essence, the majority’s rejection of Sparkman’s 
allegations can be understood as an exercise of disbelief, likely because the allegations 
were inconsistent with the Seventh Circuit judges’ expectations of how a judge normally 
behaves.  As civil procedure scholar Benjamin Spencer asserts, such “fact skepticism” “is 
inappropriate; rejecting facts because they report occurrences that members of the Court 
would find to be out-of-step with their expectations regarding an official’s behavior is a 
complete violation of the assumption-of-truth rule.”  See A. Benjamin Spencer, Iqbal and 
the Slide Toward Restrictive Procedure, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 185, 192, 196 (2010).  
According to the “assumption-of-truth rule,” “a claimant’s factual allegations are entitled 
to be believed and accepted at the pleading stage . . . .”  Id. at 192.  This rule has since 
been rejected by the Supreme Court, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), but it was 
controlling law when the Seventh Circuit considered Sparkman’s claims on remand from 
the Supreme Court. 
 211.  Laycock, supra note 33, at 397. 
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Perhaps the judges believed Sparkman would not be able to state 
additional facts showing a conspiracy, rendering an amendment 
futile.  Yet there are facts in the record suggesting a conspiracy. 
Specifically, Ora McFarlin’s petition for sterilization included an 
indemnity clause relieving the hospital and all physicians involved of 
any liability for the medical procedure, and Judge Stump’s order 
specifically incorporated this clause, stating that he approved the 
petition, in essence, on the condition that McFarlin indemnify the 
physicians.212  Some type of coordination or understanding among 
the physicians, Ora McFarlin, and Judge Stump could be inferred 
from this language.  In any case, discovery would have provided 
Sparkman with an opportunity to learn of more facts surrounding her 
sterilization, facts she was not in a position to know given the secrecy 
of the entire proceeding that led to the sterilization.  Despite these 
compelling circumstances, it seems that the specter of discovery and a 
potential trial on judicial corruption in small town America was simply 
too much for the judges to countenance.  Whatever else the court’s 
per curiam opinion was meant to express, it is clear the judges 
wanted, more than anything, to rid the court of this “sordid case.”213 
With this final blow, Linda Sparkman’s claims for her nonconsensual 
sterilization were foreclosed under federal civil rights law against all 
defendants.214 
II.  SCHOLARLY REACTION TO STUMP 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Stump v. Sparkman was quickly 
and roundly criticized by legal scholars for its expansive 
interpretation and application of judicial immunity.215  For example, 
                                                        
 212.  See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text. 
 213.  See sources cited supra notes 123–124 and accompanying text. 
 214.  Although Linda and Leo Sparkman could have pursued their tort claims against 
the private physicians and the hospital in state court after the Seventh Circuit dismissed 
their federal civil rights claims, they did not pursue any further action.  See COLEMAN & 
HEADLEY, supra note 1, at 82. 
 215.  See, e.g., Block, supra note 98, at 881 (suggesting that the Court in Stump misstated, 
misinterpreted, and misapplied the doctrine of judicial immunity); Feinman & Cohen, 
supra note 93, at 261 (“[T]he majority opinion as a whole employs a formalistic approach 
with only the pretense of weighing competing values”); Rosenberg, supra note 56, at 838–
42 (suggesting that Judge Stump was acting in the capacity of a juvenile court judge 
without specific statutory authority to order the sterilization of a noninstitutionalized 
person, thus raising doubts as to the Supreme Court’s determination of jurisdiction and 
absolute immunity); Shoemaker, supra note 111, at 127 (asserting that Judge Stump’s 
order “approved” the sterilization, but it did not order it, and therefore “[n]o jurisdiction 
exists for an Indiana circuit court judge to issue such advisory opinions at the request of 
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the decision has earned a place among the twenty-four “worst 
decisions of the Supreme Court”216 according to one author, 
alongside infamous cases such as Plessy v. Ferguson217 and Korematsu v. 
United States.218  As this strong and succinct critique explains: 
 Absolute immunity for judges is a court-made principle.  It 
is not based on the Constitution of the United States, nor on 
a statute passed by Congress nor by state legislation.  . . . But 
absolute judicial immunity can make judges into tyrants who 
cannot be questioned, except by appeal to a higher court.  
Absolute immunity places judges above the law.219 
Another commentator described Stump “as an example of the worst 
sort of self-dealing by the judiciary.”220 
News coverage of the decision was also bitingly critical.  One 
political editorial cartoon depicted a Supreme Court justice nailing a 
sign to the bench: “A Judge Can Do No Wrong*”.221  The footnote 
after the asterisk stated, “* This replaces constitutional protections of 
individual rights.”222  
 
                                                        
private parties”); Marianne Schwartz O’Bara, Note, Stump v. Sparkman: Judicial Immunity 
or Imperial Judiciary, 47 UMKC L. REV. 81, 90–91 (1978) (“The practical effect of the 
decision is that there will be no effective limits upon the application of the [judicial 
immunity] doctrine.”). 
 216.  See JOEL D. JOSEPH, BLACK MONDAYS: WORST DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT 
23–25, 247–57 (1987). 
 217.  163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding the constitutionality of state laws requiring racial 
segregation in public facilities under the “separate but equal” doctrine). 
 218.  Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the constitutionality 
of an Executive Order ordering Japanese Americans into internment camps during World 
War II). 
 219.  JOSEPH, supra note 216, at 255–56. 
 220.  Block, supra note 98, at 880. 
 221.  Herb Block, A Judge Can Do No Wrong, Mar. 30, 1978. 
 222.  Id. 
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Another cartoon depicted a Supreme Court justice with an angel and 
devil beside each of his ears.  The angel states, “Wise and just 
decisions tempered with mercy and reason, arrived at only after 
patient, soul-searching deliberation . . . this is what we expect, nay, 
demand of a judge, your Honor!”223  The judge responds, “Who is this 
little wimp to lecture me?,”224 and the devil answers, “Right, Judge!—
                                                        
 223.  Pat Oliphant, Who is This Little Wimp?, WASH. STAR, Apr. 2, 1978. 
 224.  Id. 
A 1978 Herblock Cartoon, © The Herb Block Foundation. 
Kessler Final Proof  
2015] “A SORDID CASE” 873 
You’re immune, anyway!”225  The Washington Post ran an editorial 
stating, in part, “[T]he Supreme Court this week carried the doctrine 
too far in the case of a young woman who was sterilized after what 
was, at best, a kangaroo-court proceeding.”226  One of Justice Powell’s 
law clerks clipped this editorial and shared it with the Justice.  The 
clerk’s cover note stated, “I cut this out of the Post this morning.  Your 
vote to deny cert looks better all the time.”227 
Despite this critical response to the decision’s immunity holding, 
Stump v. Sparkman has received little attention as a case relevant to 
eugenics, reproductive rights, disability rights, women’s rights, race 
theory, or feminist theory.  In legal scholarship and law school texts, 
cases such as Buck v. Bell228 and Skinner v. Oklahoma229 are regarded as 
canonical on eugenics and sterilization, and Griswold v. Connecticut,230 
Eisenstadt v. Baird,231 and Roe v. Wade232 are generally treated as the key 
early cases on reproductive rights.233  Only a few law review articles 
have addressed the underlying substantive implications of Stump.234  It 
has appeared primarily in civil rights, remedies, and constitutional law 
                                                        
 225.  Id. 
 226.  Judicial Omnipotence, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 1978. 
 227.  Supreme Court of the United States, Handwritten note from Robert D. Comfort to 
Justice Lewis F. Powell (Mar. 31, 1978) (on file with the Washington and Lee University 
School of Law in Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers, 1921–1998, Ms 001, Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Archives, Washington and Lee University, Lexington, VA). 
 228.  274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (holding that a state statute permitting compulsory 
sterilization of the unfit, including the mentally retarded, does not violate the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 229.  316 U.S. 535, 538 (1942) (holding that a state cannot impose compulsory 
sterilization as punishment for a crime). 
 230.  381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (holding that it is unconstitutional for a state to intrude 
upon a married couple’s decision to use contraceptives). 
 231.  405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972) (establishing the right of unmarried people to possess 
contraception and engage in potentially non procreative sexual intercourse). 
 232.  410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (establishing existence of due process right to abortion). 
 233.  The definition of a canonical case is contestable, but one rough measure is the 
frequency of citation of a case in legal scholarship.  As of February 26, 2015, Buck, Skinner, 
Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe were cited in 1503, 3559, 10,188, 4255, and 13,226 law reviews, 
respectively, in Westlaw’s “Journals and Law Reviews” (JLR) database, compared with 494 
citations for Stump v. Sparkman.  Of these 494 citations, a qualitative review suggests that 
the majority of Stump citations relate to its holding on judicial immunity rather than its 
significance as a reproductive rights or discrimination case. 
 234.  See, e.g., Beverly Horsburgh, Schrödinger’s Cat, Eugenics, and the Compulsory 
Sterilization of Welfare Mothers: Deconstructing an Old/New Rhetoric and Constructing the 
Reproductive Right to Natality for Low-Income Women of Color, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 531, 570 
(1996); Sandra S. Coleman, Comment, Involuntary Sterilization of the Mentally Retarded: 
Blessing or Burden?, 25 S.D. L. REV. 55, 63–64 (1980); Gary A. Dodge, Comment, Sterilization, 
Retardation, and Parental Authority, 1978 BYU L. REV. 380, 385–86. 
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casebooks for the purpose of educating students about the doctrine of 
judicial immunity.235  However, Stump is an important data point in 
the history of eugenics in the United States for at least two reasons.  
First, Stump highlights the long arc of eugenic thinking in this 
country, which, contrary to many accounts, reached well into the 
twentieth century.  Second, it highlights the continuing divergent and 
unequal meanings of “reproductive rights” for privileged and less 
privileged people in our country.  The remaining sections turn to 
these aspects of Stump. 
III.  STUMP’S BROADER SOCIAL, HISTORICAL, AND LEGAL CONTEXT 
A.  Eugenics in the Late Twentieth Century? 
Justice Stewart wrote in his dissent, “[T]here is no reason to 
believe that such an act has ever been performed by any other Indiana 
judge, either before or since.”236  In Justice Stewart’s view, Judge 
Stump was acting so far outside his judicial authority that holding him 
accountable would not threaten immunity’s larger policy goal of 
ensuring a completely independent judiciary.  That is, requiring a 
“loose cannon”237 like Judge Stump to answer for his actions in a court 
of law would not open the floodgates. 
The irony of Stewart’s dissent is that, while the ex parte order of 
Judge Stump may have represented a particularly egregious example 
of sterilization abuse, the basic scenario presented by Linda 
Sparkman’s claims was not an aberration.  Beginning in the late 
1960s, the medical profession and government systematically targeted 
poor women for “family planning” services as part of an anti-poverty 
and population control agenda.  According to historian Michael Dorr, 
the post-World War II baby and economic booms had reached their 
                                                        
 235.  See, e.g., THEODORE EISENBERG, CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 
220–27 (4th ed. 1996); PAUL G. KAUPER & FRANCIS X. BEYTAGH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
CASES & MATERIALS 654 (5th ed. 1980); LAYCOCK, supra note 158, at 525–28; EDWARD D. 
RE ET AL., REMEDIES 219 (1992); JONATHAN D. VARAT ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 1254 (13th ed. 2009).  One exception is Professor Walter Wadlington, who 
has included Stump in all of his casebooks. See WALTER WADLINGTON ET AL., CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON LAW AND MEDICINE 778–83 (1980) (presenting Stump in the context of 
sterilization). 
 236.  Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 367 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 237.  Id.  Specifically, Stewart said, “A judge is not free, like a loose cannon, to inflict 
indiscriminate damage whenever he announces that he is acting in his judicial capacity.”  
Id. 
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peak in the early 1960s.238  “By the late 1960s and early 1970s, people 
drew parallels between starvation and war in [Vietnam] and America’s 
crowded, dirty, and decrepit inner cities . . . .”239  “‘Illegitimate 
children’ born to impoverished single mothers became the new 
social/eugenic menace.”240  Historian Rebecca Kluchin adds that this 
was the period when “forced sterilization moved from the realm of 
state public health departments and eugenics boards to federal family 
planning.”241 
In 1965, in his State of the Union address, President Lyndon B. 
Johnson expressed concern about “the explosion in world 
population,”242 and shortly thereafter, the federal government began 
to fund at least some family planning services under the auspices of 
his War on Poverty.243  The Nixon administration expanded this 
initiative in 1970.244  The Title X Family Planning Program was 
                                                        
 238.  See Gregory Michael Dorr, Protection or Control? Women’s Health, Sterilization Abuse, 
and Relf v. Weinberger, in A CENTURY OF EUGENICS IN AMERICA: FROM THE INDIANA 
EXPERIMENT TO THE HUMAN GENOME ERA 161, 163–64 (Paul A. Lombardo ed., 2011) 
(documenting growing concern for population growth in the late 1960s and early 1970s). 
 239.  Id. 
 240.  Id. at 166.  For example, here is the perspective of the Indiana Surgeon General, 
as reported in a 1968 editorial:  
Dr. Herschel C. Moss[] has been whacking the drums for eight years or so over 
what he considers General Hospital’s “arbitrary and discriminatory rules that 
literally force the lower income groups to have more children.”  His general 
concern is the number of children born into this world unwanted and destined 
for a marginal kind of life on welfare rolls, a burden on the taxpaying public. 
Fremont Power, Editorial, Two Views Heard on Sterilization, INDIANAPOLIS NEWS, Jan. 26, 
1968.  Fears of rising political power of African Americans may also have motivated these 
concerns.  See Loretta J. Ross, African-American Women and Abortion: A Neglected History, 3 J. 
HEALTH CARE POOR & UNDERSERVED 274, 281–82 (1992) (“Perhaps in response to the 
militancy of the [civil rights] movement and its potential for sweeping social change, 
members of the white elite and middle class suggested that black population growth 
should be curbed.  White Americans held inordinate fears that a growing welfare class of 
African-Americans concentrated in the inner cities would not only create rampant crime, 
but exacerbate the national debt, and eventually produce a political threat from majority-
black voting blocs in urban areas.”). 
 241.  Rebecca M. Kluchin, Locating the Voices of the Sterilized, PUB. HISTORIAN, Summer 
2007 at 131, 133. 
 242.  Lyndon B. Johnson, Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, 
Jan. 4, 1965, available at Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency 
Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26907. 
 243.  See Janet L. Dolgin & Katherine R. Dieterich, The “Other” Within: Health Care Reform, 
Class, and The Politics of Reproduction, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 377, 395–96 (2012) (citing 
LINDA GORDON, THE MORAL PROPERTY OF WOMEN: A HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL 
POLITICS IN AMERICA 289 (2002)). 
 244.  Id. at 396; see also Richard Nixon, Statement on Signing the Family Planning 
Services and Population Research Act of 1970, Dec. 26, 1970, available at Gerhard Peters 
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enacted as part of the Public Health Service Act245 and authorized 
federal grants to subsidize family planning services for low-income 
individuals.246  Around this same period, and apparently supported by 
a recommendation of the Family Law Section of the American Bar 
Association,247 states began adopting welfare rules designed to impose 
financial disincentives against poor women having more children.248  
In 1970, the Supreme Court upheld such a rule in Dandridge v. 
Williams.249 
According to historian Rickie Solinger, the federal government 
increased expenditures for birth control between 1967 and 1971 from 
$4.5 million to $24 million.250  The primary purposes for this increase 
were diminishing poverty and reducing welfare dependency.251  
Reproductive autonomy was low on the list of reasons for this 
increase.252  As she explains, in 1974, “the federal Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare decided . . . to develop an attractive 
federal funding scheme for reimbursing the states for sterilizing poor 
women.  The funding scheme allowed for much less generous 
reimbursement for abortions [than for sterilization].”253  Solinger 
notes, “For many poor women after Roe . . . reproductive choice came 
to mean deciding between an abortion they didn’t have the money to 
pay for and a sterilization they also did not have the money for, but 
                                                        
and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2865. 
 245.  Family Planning Services and Population Research Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
572, 84 Stat. 1504 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300 to 300a-6 (2012)). 
 246.  Id. (stating as the Act’s first purpose to “assist in making comprehensive voluntary 
family planning services readily available to all persons desiring such services” and 
prioritizing grants to programs “furnishing of such services to persons from low-income 
families”). 
 247.  See Hon. Nanette Dembitz, Should Public Policy Give Incentives to Welfare Mothers to 
Limit the Number of Their Children?, 4 FAM. L.Q. 130, 133 (1970) (article reprinting the final 
revised version of the second report of the Committee on Law and Family Planning of the 
Section of Family Law of the ABA) (“The conclusion of this report is that . . . the use of 
incentives to welfare mothers to limit child-bearing should be a primary objective in 
devising public assistance programs.”). 
 248.  Id. at 133–34. 
 249.  See 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (upholding as constitutional a Maryland law capping 
federal welfare benefits at $250.00 per month regardless of a family’s size or need). 
 250.  RICKIE SOLINGER, BEGGARS AND CHOOSERS: HOW THE POLITICS OF CHOICE SHAPES 
ADOPTION, ABORTION, AND WELFARE IN THE UNITED STATES 9–10 (2001). 
 251.  Id. (citing Social Security Act, ch. 531, tit. XX, § 2001, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1397 (2006)). 
 252.  Id. 
 253.  Id. at 11. 
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for which the federal government would pick up the tab.”254  Between 
1968 and 1973, sterilizations in the United States skyrocketed.  
Whereas 400,000 people underwent sterilization in 1968, 
approximately two million people (half men and half women) 
underwent sterilization in 1973.255 
Of particular note, the Family Planning Division of Nixon’s 
Office of Economic Opportunity developed a set of guidelines to 
protect the medical and legal rights of the poor receiving sterilization 
services from programs receiving federal family planning funds.256  
Among other features, the guidelines “specif[ied] that OEO patients 
must be provided adequate counseling, that they must not be coerced 
in any way, and that only those able to give meaningful informed 
consent themselves would receive voluntary sterilization 
operations.”257  The guidelines were developed in 1971 and approved 
in 1972,258 shortly after President Nixon rolled out his federal family 
planning program as part of the War on Poverty.259  However, senior 
agency officials would not release the guidelines despite the repeated, 
stated concerns of the Dr. Warren Hern, the agency official who 
oversaw the guidelines’ development.260  According to Dr. Hern, who 
in 1973 testified before a United States Senate subcommittee 
investigating sterilization abuse, “I felt that many people’s lives were at 
stake, and we knew that some programs were going ahead [with 
sterilizations] without the guidelines even though we had requested 
them not to.”261  The federal government did eventually issue 
guidelines, but not until after thousands of men and women were 
sterilized without their consent with federal family planning money.262 
                                                        
 254.  Id. 
 255.  See Dorr, supra note 238, at 175; see also RICKIE SOLINGER, PREGNANCY AND POWER: 
A SHORT HISTORY OF REPRODUCTIVE POLITICS IN AMERICA 194–200 (2005). 
 256.  Quality of Health Care—Human Experimentation, Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on 
Health of the Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong. 1504, 1509 (1973) [hereinafter 
1973 Human Experimentation Senate Hearings] (statement of Warren M. Hern, M.D., M.P.H., 
Former Chief, Program Development and Evaluation Branch, Family Planning Division, 
Office of Economic Opportunity). 
 257.  Id. at 1509. 
 258.  Id. at 1541–42 (memorandum from Warren M. Hern, M.D., M.P.H., Chief, 
Program Development and Evaluation Branch, Family Planning Division, Office of Health 
Affairs to E. Leon Cooper, M,D., Mar. 30, 1972). 
 259.  See sources supra notes 244–246 and accompanying text. 
 260.  Id. at 1503, 1509–10 (Hern testimony).  According to Dr. Hern, around the time 
the guidelines were to be issued, “I was told that the 200 advance copies I was holding for 
press release would be taken from me, counted out, and put in a safe.”  Id. at 1510. 
 261.  Id. at 1510 (Hern testimony). 
 262.  See sources cited infra notes 281–282 and accompanying text. 
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Between 1974 and 1987, the ACLU Reproductive Freedom 
Project brought twenty-one forced sterilization lawsuits.263  In one of 
those cases, Cliett v. Hospital of University of Pennsylvania,264 Valerie 
Cliett, an African-American woman, was sterilized postpartum without 
her knowledge or consent in the Hospital of the University of 
Pennsylvania.265  According to her 1980 file: 
 Plaintiff, an indigent Black mother of three, brings this 
state tort action against physicians and hospitals for 
performing sterilization upon her immediately after 
childbirth without her knowledge or consent.  Plaintiff 
underwent an operation to reverse the sterilization, but after 
two years of trying unsuccessfully to become pregnant, it 
appeared that the reversal operation had been ineffective.266 
In another case, Cox v. Stanton,267 the plaintiff, Nial Ruth Cox, a 
black woman, described her situation this way: 
I was living with my mother and eight sisters and brothers.  
My father . . . is dead.  My family was on welfare, but 
payments had stopped for me because I was eighteen.  We 
had no hot or cold running water, only pump water.  No 
stove.  No refrigerator, no electric lights.  . . . I got pregnant 
when I was 17.  I didn’t know anything about birth control 
or abortion.  When the welfare caseworker found out I was 
pregnant, she told my mother that if we wanted to keep 
getting welfare, I’d have to have my tubes tied—temporarily.  
Nobody explained anything to me before the operation.  
Later on, after the operation, I saw the doctor and I asked 
him if I could have another baby.  He said that I had 
nothing to worry about, that, of course, I could have more 
kids.  I know now that I was sterilized because I was from a 
welfare family.268 
According to the ACLU,  Nial’s mother “consented” to what she was 
told would be a temporary tying of her daughter’s fallopian tubes 
                                                        
 263.  Kluchin, supra note 241, at 131. 
 264.  Id. 
 265.  Id. at 131–32. 
 266.  Id. at 132 (citing Reproductive Freedom Project, American Civil Liberties Union 
Foundation, “Legal Docket, June 18, 1980,” American Civil Liberties Union Records, 
Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, box 387, folder 14, 15). 
 267.  381 F. Supp. 349 (E.D.N.C. 1974), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 529 F.2d 47 (4th 
Cir. 1975).  
 268.  1973 Human Experimentation Senate Hearings, supra note 256, at 1586 (ACLU Press 
Release and statement of Nial Ruth Cox, summarizing Cox v. Stanton). 
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“under threat of removal from the welfare rolls of her entire 
family.”269 
 The case that drew the most significant national attention was 
Relf v. Weinberger,270 filed by the Southern Poverty Law Center in 
1973.271  In Relf, Minnie Lee and Mary Alice Relf, ages twelve and 
fourteen, were sterilized without their mother’s knowledge or 
consent.272  According to critical race scholar Dorothy Roberts, the 
Relf sisters “were the youngest of six children of a Black couple living 
in Montgomery, Alabama.”273  Their parents were extremely poor.  
They were “uneducated farmhands, who survived after migrating to 
the city on relief payments totaling $156 a month.”274  According to 
the complaint: 
 On June 13, 1973, a family planning nurse . . . picked up 
Mrs. Relf and the younger girls and transported them to a 
doctor’s office.  Mrs. Relf was told the girls were being taken 
for some shots.  . . .  
 . . . Neither Mrs. Relf nor the girls spoke with anyone at 
the doctor’s office.  From the doctor’s office the children 
and their mother were transported to the hospital where the 
girls were assigned a room.   
 . . . It was at this time that Mrs. Relf, who neither reads nor 
writes, put her mark on what was later learned to be an 
authorization for surgical sterilization.  . . . Mrs. Relf was 
then escorted home.   
 . . . Minnie and Mary Alice were left by themselves in a 
ward.  . . . So far, neither child had even seen the physician 
who was to perform the operation nor had either child been 
explained what was going to happen to her.  . . .   
 . . . . 
 . . . [T]he next morning . . . both children were placed 
under a general anesthetic and surgically sterilized.275 
                                                        
 269.  Id. at 1585. 
 270.  372 F. Supp. 1196 (D.D.C. 1974), vacated as moot, 565 F.2d 722, 727 (D.C. Cir. 
1977) (per curiam) (vacated upon HEW’s declaration to issue new regulations complying 
with the court’s order). 
 271.  Relf v. Weinberger, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, http://www.splcenter.org/get-
informed/case-docket/relf-v-weinberger.  
 272.  See Complaint at 8–10, ¶¶ 6–11, Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196 (D.D.C. 
1974) (No. 1557-73), available at 
http://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/Relf_Original_Complaint.pdf. 
 273.  ROBERTS, supra note 6, at 93. 
 274.  Id.  
 275.  Complaint, supra note 272, at 8–10, ¶¶ 6–11. 
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The local family planning clinic had been administering birth 
control injections to the sisters and their older sibling, Katie, for some 
time.276  The use of birth control injections on the Relf sisters is 
consistent with reports of widespread inappropriate, experimental use 
of such shots on poor women during this time period.277  According 
to United States Senator Edward Kennedy, who chaired a Senate 
committee investigating the Relf case and a federal bill on the 
protection of human subjects, “When the Federal program 
supporting the Family Planning Clinic [where the Relf sisters were 
being treated] was transferred” from one federal agency to another, 
“Depo-provera was properly banned for use at that clinic.  That action 
may have led to these sterilizations.”278  Mrs. Relf, who was illiterate, 
believed that by marking an “X” on the forms she was consenting to 
additional birth control shots for her girls.279 
The Southern Poverty Law Center filed a lawsuit on behalf of the 
Relf sisters.  Katie Relf served as the lead plaintiff, having only averted 
sterilization the day Minnie and Mary Alice were taken to the hospital 
by locking herself in her room.280  The district court found that 
“[o]ver the last few years, an estimated 100,000 to 150,000 low-income 
persons have been sterilized annually under federally funded 
programs.”281  The court also found “there is uncontroverted evidence 
in the record that minors and other incompetents have been 
sterilized with federal funds and that an indefinite number of poor 
people have been improperly coerced into accepting a sterilization 
operation under the threat that various federally supported welfare 
benefits would be withdrawn . . . .”282 
                                                        
 276.  Id. at 8, ¶¶ 3–4.  
 277.  See, e.g., 1973 Human Experimentation Senate Hearings, at 1444 (“Our hearings 
demonstrated, to the alarm of the then FDA Commissioner Edwards, that Depo-provera 
was used widely in the routine practice of medicine throughout the state of 
Tennessee.  . . .  As a result of these hearings, its manufacturer, Upjohn, voluntarily ceased 
shipping the drug to the Arglington [S]chool [and Hospital for the Mentally Retarded] 
and to the State family planning units in Tennessee.  Upjohn agreed that the use of the 
drug in Tennessee was inappropriate.”) (opening remarks of Senator Edward Kennedy). 
 278.  Id. at 1445. 
 279.  Complaint, supra note 272, at 8 ¶ 6, 9 ¶ 8; see also Dorr, supra note 238, at 161. 
 280.  Complaint, supra note at 272 ¶ 12; see also Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196, 
1200–01 (D.D.C. 1974), vacated as moot, 565 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (per curiam). 
 281.  Relf, 372 F. Supp. at 1199.  For more on Relf, see Lisa Ikemoto, Infertile by Force and 
Federal Complicity: The Story of Relf v. Weinberger, in WOMEN AND THE LAW STORIES 179–206 
(Elizabeth M. Schneider & Stephanie M. Wildman eds., 2011). 
 282.  Relf, 372 F. Supp. at 1199.  The judge prohibited the use of federal dollars for 
sterilizations of minors and mentally incompetent persons and the practice of threatening 
women on welfare with the loss of their benefits if they refused to comply.  Id. at 1204–05.  
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The Relf court’s findings are consistent with other accounts of 
what was occurring during this time period.  According to a victim 
named Nial Ramirez whose testimony was read before a North 
Carolina eugenics victims’ compensation task force:283 
 At the young age of seventeen I was pregnant with my 
daughter Deborah living in a household with my mom and 
my siblings.  My mother was a single mom and times were 
tough so we were on public assistance just trying to survive.  
During that time it was common for social workers to visit 
from time to time.  Not often, just pop up on visits to 
evaluate the household living conditions.  
 . . . .  
 One particular social worker discovered I was expecting 
and all attention went solely on me.  The visits from the 
social worker became very frequent and I began to feel the 
pressure of the social worker coercing me into something I 
wasn’t familiar with.  I was told I [sic] that if I continued to 
have children the livelihood of my family would suffer 
greatly.  I was told that if I had more children then my family 
would no longer receive the help of public assistance.  The 
social worker convinced my mom to sign for me to undergo 
an operation that would prevent me from getting pregnant 
not knowing all the while I was being set up to be sterilized 
like I was some type [sic] animal.  . . .    
 In 1973[,] I got married and my husband and I wanted 
desperately to have children.  It was impossible because later 
I found out I was never to conceive.  You see, I was told when 
                                                        
The district court also declared the federal regulations authorizing the use of federal 
family planning funds for these practices “arbitrary and unreasonable,” and ordered the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) (now the Department of Health 
and Human Services) to amend its regulations.  Id.  As the litigation made its way through 
the courts, HEW withdrew the challenged regulations, issued interim regulations 
complying with the district court’s order, and represented on appeal its intention to issue 
final compliant regulations.  See Relf v. Weinberger, 565 F.2d 722, 725–26 (D.C. Cir. 1977) 
(per curiam).  The Court of Appeals held that the controversy was mooted by HEW’s 
actions and remanded the case back to the district court for dismissal.  Id. at 727. 
 283.  The North Carolina Eugenics Victims Compensation Task Force was established 
on March 8, 2011, by executive order of Beverly Perdue, then governor of North Carolina.  
GOV. BEVERLY EAVES PERDUE, EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 83: GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE TO 
DETERMINE THE METHOD OF COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF NORTH CAROLINA’S 
EUGENICS BOARD (2011), available at http://wayback.archive-it.org/org-
67/20130104020149/http://www.governor.state.nc.us/NewsItems/ExecutiveOrderDetail.
aspx?newsItemID=1732.  The purpose of the Task Force was to “[r]ecommend possible 
methods or forms of compensation to those persons forcibly sterilized under the North 
Carolina Eugenics Board program.”  Id.  For a fuller discussion of the Task Force’s process 
and outcome, see the discussion infra accompanying notes 387 to 394.  
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I was operated on that I could have it reversed but I was lied 
to and butchered.  I have been traumatized from this 
experience.284 
Not all coercive sterilizations occurred within the welfare context.  
As Mary English, another North Carolina sterilization victim, testified: 
 I was raised in an era in Fayetteville where I trusted my 
doctors completely.  So, when my doctor said he had a 
program.  I wouldn’t have to worry about anything else, not 
to worry.  He handed me a piece of paper, a hospital form.  I 
signed it.  And he said he’d let me know if he could get me 
into the program and that this would help me cause I 
wanted to go to college.  I had three great kids.  I wanted to 
raise my kids and the moment I found a wonderful young 
man I could come back . . . and have this surgery undone 
and have more kids and have this great life. 
 Well again.  I signed it.  In other words, I was sold the 
Cadillac with no engine.  I trusted him completely. 
 So, couple years later, three and a half, I got engaged.  
Wonderful man, loved my kids, loved me.  I went back to the 
same clinic which by the way I had still been attending and 
told the doctor I was ready to have the surgery undone 
because I was ready to get remarried.  At which point, he 
leans over his desk and says ‘what’.  I said I’m ready to have 
the surgery undone now.  I’m gonna get married.  And he 
laughed.  I don’t mean he chuckled.  I mean he laughed. 
 And he said, “I don’t know what you’re talking about 
you’re sterile.  You’ll never have anymore [sic] children.”  
So, I told him no, no, no.  That’s not the surgery I signed up 
for.  . . . And he laughed again. 
 He said “look I don’t know what you’re talking about.  
You’re sterile.  . . . I don’t care what you think I told you” 
and he laughed again “but you’re sterile and you’re not 
gonna have no more kids.  You oft to be thankful for the 
three you got.” . . . 
. . . . 
 . . . I tried to find lawyers that would help.  No one would 
take the case and they all had an amazing, amazing 
statement.  Each and everyone [sic] of them.  “You need to 
let this go and forget about it.” 
                                                        
 284.  N.C. DEP’T ADMIN., GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE TO DETERMINE THE METHOD OF 
COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF NORTH CAROLINA’S EUGENICS BOARD 26–27 (Jun. 22, 
2011) [hereinafter GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE JUNE 22, 2011 HEARING], available at 
http://www.doa.nc.gov/ncjsvf/documents/meetings/Minutes222011.pdf (testimony of 
Deborah Chesson reading statement of her mother, Nial Ramirez). 
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 Second lawyer: “You know you need to just put this behind 
you and just forget about it.” . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . I had an emotional breakdown.  I was hospitalized.  I 
came out, dealt with things.  Going to college, kids, moving, 
getting another apartment, getting a house, the rain, snow, 
the prices at the grocery store.  What I did not deal with was 
finding out I had been sterilized in ’72.285 
As these accounts demonstrate, in the 1960s and 1970s, eugenics 
migrated outside of the traditional context of eugenics boards, 
prisons, and mental institutions.286  Within the culture of aggressive 
federal family planning, and often with the support of federal 
funding, physicians became a significant part of the story, sometimes 
not obtaining consent, obtaining it days after a surgery, obtaining it 
when patients were under the influence of medications and the stress 
of childbirth, or obtaining consent by other deceptive means.287  Many 
victims did not understand the nature of the procedure, and 
physicians routinely exploited patients’ lack of understanding by not 
explaining the permanence of tubal ligation.288  Historian Rebecca 
Kluchin explains that in this period: 
Coercive surgeries, recorded as voluntary, blended into 
rising rates of tubal ligation [for all women] . . . [These 
involuntary surgeries] often went unnoticed by hospital 
administrators and watchdog groups.  Further, at the time 
that this new form of coercive sterilization emerged, 
standards of informed consent were in the process of being 
developed, but had not been implemented.  . . . The 
absence of standards of informed consent created an 
environment in which coercion could flourish.289 
Thus, even as late as the 1970s, sterilizations of the poor absent 
informed consent or basic due process were occurring in the United 
States, supported by the official policy of the federal government.  It is 
unclear whether Linda Spitler’s sterilization involved Medicaid or 
federal family planning dollars.  There is no trial record. Her family’s 
circumstances and the timing of her sterilization, just one year after 
                                                        
 285.  Id. at 39–41 (testimony of Mary English). 
 286.  See generally Dorr, supra note 238, at 163–73 (documenting eugenic sterilization 
practices as part of family planning and welfare). 
 287.  See Kluchin, supra note 241, at 134–35. 
 288.  Id. at 139.  For example, “[A] physician from Los Angeles followed a policy of 
informing patients of the permanence of tubal ligation only if they asked.”  Id. 
 289.  Id. at 135.  For a review of some of this history, see SOLINGER, supra note 250, at 9–
10 and Dorr, supra note 238, at 166–71. 
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the federal government pumped millions of dollars into family 
planning for low-income individuals,290 raise this possibility.  In any 
case, physicians during this period would not have found the 
sterilization of a poor, uneducated woman like Linda Spitler to be an 
unusual event. 
More generally, this was a period of attacks on poor women’s 
reproductive autonomy.  In 1976, Congress passed the Hyde 
Amendment,291 barring the use of certain federal funds, most notably 
Medicaid funds, to pay for abortions.  In 1980, the Supreme Court 
upheld the Hyde Amendment,292 justifying the denial of federal funds 
even for medically necessary abortions of poor women.  As many 
commentators have noted, this policy effectively removed 
reproductive choice from indigent women.293 
The Supreme Court justices must have been aware of the 
systemic problem of coerced sterilization when they decided Stump v. 
Sparkman.  The Relf case had received significant coverage in national 
newspapers, like the New York Times, just a few years earlier.294  Relf was 
the basis for new federal laws and regulations requiring informed 
consent for patients and protections against coercive sterilizations of 
certain vulnerable populations.295  The Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (“HEW”) promulgated the final version of 
these regulations in 1978, the same year that the Supreme Court 
decided Stump.296 
Furthermore, amici for several organizations brought to the 
Court’s attention the scope of the coercive sterilization problem.  For 
example, a brief filed by the American Civil Liberties Union, the 
Indiana Civil Liberties Union, and the Mental Health Law Project 
stated, “Sterilization abuse has been another large and growing 
                                                        
 290.  See sources cited supra notes 244–246 and accompanying text. 
 291.  Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. No. 94–439, tit. II, § 209, 90 Stat. 1434 (1976) (codified 
at 42 U.S.C § 18023) (an act of Congress ending federal Medicaid funding for the 
abortions of poor women unless a woman’s life is endangered by pregnancy or if the 
pregnancy is the result of rape or incest).  
 292.  Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
 293.  See ROBERTS, supra note 6, at 231–32; SOLINGER, supra note 250, at 14; Leslie 
Friedman Goldstein, A Critique of the Abortion Funding Decisions: On Private Rights in the Public 
Sector, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 313, 316–17, 342 (1981). 
 294.  See Dorr, supra note 238, at 183 n.1 (citing several news reports covering the 
lawsuit in the New York Times and other national newspapers). 
 295.  See discussion supra note 282. 
 296.  Provision of Sterilization in Federally Assisted Programs of the Public Health 
Service, 43 Fed. Reg. 52146, 52165–67 (Nov. 8, 1978) (codified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 50.201–210 
(2009)). 
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concern of the ACLU, and ACLU attorneys, together with the 
Reproductive Freedom Project of the ACLU Foundation, have 
represented many women seeking to remedy and deter the resulting 
violations of substantive and procedural rights.”297  Another amicus 
brief filed by several mental health and disability rights organizations 
stated: 
 Some of the proposed amici organizations have devoted 
much time and energy to public education, drafting of 
legislation, and lobbying efforts aimed at securing the repeal 
of mandatory sterilization laws and educating physicians and 
other professionals as to the lack of scientific and medical 
justification for involuntary sterilization practices. And yet, 
these efforts . . . may come to naught if judges are granted 
the unilateral power to authorize sterilization in the absence 
of a statute so providing.298 
An amicus brief filed by the National Center for Law and the 
Handicapped (“NCLH”) discussed, at length, abuses that had 
occurred as part of the sterilization movement.299  The NCLH brief 
included a section detailing the history of the eugenics movement in 
the United States from 1900 to the 1940s, arguing that this history 
“illustrates the dangers inherent in the development and 
authorization of involuntary sterilization.”300  In sum the Court was 
informed by amici of the larger history and continuing pattern of 
eugenic sterilization in the United States, yet it seems the Justices did 
not connect the dots so as to see what happened to Linda Sparkman 
as indicative of larger, systemic injustice.  Referencing the NCLH 
brief, Justice Blackmun’s clerk wrote in a memo to Justice Blackmun, 
                                                        
 297.  See Motion of the American Civil Liberties Union et al. to File Brief Amici Curiae 
and Brief Amici Curiae at *ii–*iii, Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (No. 76-1750), 
1978 WL 206600 (citing as an example Walker v. Pierce, 560 F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1977), a case 
involving the coercive sterilizations of two women by Dr. Clovis H. Pierce, a South Carolina 
physician, who routinely required poor women on Medicaid to submit to a sterilization 
upon delivery of a third child).  
 298.  Motion for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae and Brief for Amici Curiae American 
Coalition of Citizens With Disabilities; Epilepsy Foundation of America; Counsel for 
Handicapped People Developmental Disabilities Law Project at *xiv–*xv, Stump v. 
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (No. 76-1750), 1978 WL 223472. 
 299.  Motion for Leave to File Brief and Brief of the National Center for Law and the 
Handicapped, Inc. Amicus Curiae at *7–*14, Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) 
(No. 76-1750), 1978 WL 223474. 
 300.  Id. at *7 (capitalization omitted). 
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“I think everything that is said in the brief is true but none of it is 
relevant to deciding this case.”301 
This was also a period of a rapid expansion of children’s 
constitutional rights, particularly with regard to procreation.  In a 
series of decisions, the Supreme Court expressed the view that even 
state and parental interests must give way to mature minors’ choices 
regarding reproductive rights.  For example, in 1976, Planned 
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,302 the Supreme Court held 
that a state cannot impose a parental consent requirement on minor 
girls seeking an abortion.303  As children’s rights scholar Anne Dailey 
explains, “[T]he Danforth Court suggested that girls who engage in 
sexual activity leading to pregnancy are to be treated the same as 
adult women for purposes of the decision whether to terminate their 
pregnancies.  . . . [T]he privacy right recognized in Danforth . . . 
emancipate[d] minor girls from the . . . decisionmaking authority of 
their parents.”304  A year later, in Carey v. Population Services 
International,305 a plurality of the Court held that a state may not 
constitutionally prohibit the distribution or sale of contraceptives to 
minors.306  And in 1979, the Court held in Bellotti v. Baird307 that a state 
may not require a mature child to first notify her parents and seek 
consent before going to a court to obtain judicial approval for an 
abortion.308 
In sum, when the Court decided Stump, the justices had been 
fully apprised of the ongoing problem of systemic eugenic 
sterilization in the United States.  Moreover, the Court was in the 
midst of intense jurisprudential activity establishing minors’ 
reproductive rights.  Given this context, the majority’s formalistic, 
narrow analysis, focusing on whether Judge Stump’s order was a 
“judicial act,” represents an example of legal abstraction at its worst.309  
                                                        
 301.  Mem. from Keith Ellison, law clerk, to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, at 2 (Jan. 9, 
1977) (on file with the Library of Congress in Harry A. Blackmun Papers, box 269, folder 
4). 
 302.  428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
 303.  Id. at 74. 
 304.  See Anne C. Dailey, Children’s Constitutional Rights, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2099, 2132 
(2011). 
 305.  431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
 306.  Id. at 681–82. 
 307.  443 U.S. 622 (1979). 
 308.  Id. at 651. 
 309.  Some classic feminist and race theory critiques of abstract legal reasoning include 
ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE (1999); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE 
AND RIGHTS 44–51 (1991); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and 
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What happened to Linda Spitler was horrendous; the Court’s 
mechanical application of the doctrine of judicial immunity, which 
prevented her from having a day in court, represents an even deeper 
injustice. 
Perhaps the Court’s fealty to protecting judges blinded it to the 
underlying equities, legal context, and history of the case.  Indeed, in 
1991, the Court reaffirmed the view that judges are immune from suit 
for virtually anything they say or do from the bench.310  With rare 
exceptions,311 lower federal courts continue to hold fast to the judicial 
immunity doctrine.312  However, the broader history of how 
“reproductive choice” in the United States separates women by race 
and class suggests that something more was at play in Stump than the 
apparent feudalism of federal judges.  As the next section 
demonstrates, Stump fits quite comfortably into the history and 
trajectory of eugenics in America. 
B.  Stump’s Antecedents: The Long History of Eugenics in the United 
States 
The story of Stump begins more than a century ago with the 
eugenics movement in the United States.313  Eugenics started in 
Europe with Sir Francis Galton, who coined the term “eugenics” and 
defined it as “hereditarily endowed with noble qualities.”314  Eugenics 
                                                        
Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987); Carrie Menckel-Meadow, Portia in a 
Different Voice: Speculations on a Women’s Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 39 
(1985). 
 310.  See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991) (per curiam) (holding that a California 
judge who ordered a public defender to be dragged by a police officer from a nearby 
courtroom and brought before him cannot be sued for damages). 
 311.  See, e.g., Dawn v. Ciavarella, No. 3:10–CV–0797, 2010 WL 3122858, at *1, *4 (M.D. 
Pa. Aug. 9, 2010) (order granting judicial immunity on some claims but denying dismissal 
of others in civil rights action against a judge who conspired with another judge and the 
owner of a for-profit juvenile detention center to send thousands of juveniles to the center 
in exchange for kickbacks from the owner); John Hurdle & Sabrina Tavernise, Former Judge 
is on Trial in ‘Cash for Kids’ Scheme, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/09/us/09judge.html?module=Search&mabReward=re
lbias%3As. 
 312.  See, e.g., King v. McCree, 2014 WL 3579785, at *1–3 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding that a 
judge who “maintained a romantic and sexual relationship with the complaining witness” 
in a felony child-support case, had lunch with the witness, and gave her $6,000, was 
absolutely immune from a civil rights action alleging that the judge’s relationship with the 
witness violated the defendant father’s constitutional rights).  
 313.  Eugenics is “[t]he study of hereditary improvement of the human race by 
controlled selective breeding.”  AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 632 (2000). 
 314.  FRANCIS GALTON, F.R.S., INQUIRIES INTO HUMAN FACULTY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT 
42 n.2 (BiblioBazaar 2009) (1883).  
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came to the United States through the work of Richard Dugdale in 
1877.315  Dugdale was not a eugenicist, but his work was later adopted 
by eugenicist organizations in America.316  Charles Benedict 
Davenport, a Harvard trained biologist and director of Cold Spring 
Harbor Laboratory, and his protégé, Harry Laughlin, are widely 
credited as leaders of the American eugenics movement.317  However, 
as historians have come to understand, many scientists, physicians, 
and other social authorities played a role in advancing eugenics in 
this country.318  According to historian Mark Largent, “[i]t is difficult 
to find many early-twentieth-century American biologists who were 
not advocates of eugenics in some form or another.”319  As such, 
historical research has led to a wider appreciation of the fact that 
eugenics existed in the United States long before it was practiced in 
Nazi Germany.320  American eugenics—now called “negative 
eugenics”—focused on preventing unworthy genes through race, 
disability, and other marriage restrictions, involuntary sterilization, 
and ethnically-targeted limits on immigration.321  This Article focuses 
on eugenic sterilization, the main issue in Stump. 
                                                        
 315.  See Nicole Huberfeld, Three Generations of Welfare Mothers Are Enough: A Disturbing 
Return to Eugenics in the Recent “Workfare” Law, 9 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 97, 113 (1998). 
 316.  Id.; see also EDWARD J. LARSON, SEX, RACE, AND SCIENCE: EUGENICS IN THE DEEP 
SOUTH 19 (1995) (“Although the early work of . . . Dugdale laid a foundation on which 
later eugenicists built, the time was not yet quite ripe for the eugenics movement to 
flourish.”). 
 317.  See MARK A. LARGENT, BREEDING CONTEMPT: THE HISTORY OF COERCED 
STERILIZATION 2 (2008); see also RAYNA RAPP, TESTING WOMEN, TESTING THE FETUS: THE 
SOCIAL IMPACT OF AMNIOCENTESIS IN AMERICA 36 (1999) (“Many scientists of renown were 
eugenicists, and their political commitments ran the entire gamut from left to right.”). 
 318.  LARGENT, supra note 317, at 2. 
 319.  Id. 
 320.  See VICTORIA F. NOURSE, IN RECKLESS HANDS: SKINNER V. OKLAHOMA AND THE NEAR 
TRIUMPH OF AMERICAN EUGENICS (2008); Dorr, supra note 238, at 171 (“[W]hen the Nazis 
passed their eugenics laws, thousands of Americans had already undergone eugenic 
sterilization.”); Paul A. Lombardo, Introduction: Looking Back at Eugenics, in A CENTURY OF 
EUGENICS IN AMERICA 1 (Paul A. Lombardo ed., 2011) [hereinafter Lombardo, 
Introduction]; Paul A. Lombardo, Disability, Eugenics, and the Culture Wars, 2 ST. LOUIS U. J. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 57, 74 (2008) [hereinafter Lombardo, Disability] (“[T]he first six 
presidents of the twentieth century—Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, Woodrow 
Wilson, Warren Harding, Calvin Coolidge and Herbert Hoover—all had taken positions 
supporting some kind of eugenic policy.”). 
 321.  LARSON, supra note 316, at 22.  In contrast, European eugenics—or “positive 
eugenics”—believed genius and talent were hereditary and focused on inbreeding within 
the upper class to protect them from those in the lower “social pecking order.”  
Huberfeld, supra note 315, at 112–13.  For more detailed treatments of the various 
expressions of American eugenics, see for example, JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE 
LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM, 1860–1925, at 97–116 (1955); MAE M. NGAI, 
IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA (2004); Paul 
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The first state to pass a compulsory eugenic sterilization law was 
Indiana,322 where the Stump v. Sparkman controversy arose.  The 1907 
law provided compulsory sterilization for “criminals, idiots, imbeciles 
and rapists.”323  The Indiana Supreme Court overturned the law in the 
1921 case of Williams v. Smith,324 finding it unconstitutional under the 
Fourteenth Amendment for lack of procedural safeguards.325  Indiana 
passed another compulsory sterilization law in 1927—this time with 
procedural safeguards including notice, hearing, and appeal rights.326  
Indiana’s eugenics program included identifying the state’s “feeble-
minded.”327  Most of the individuals designated were among the rural 
poor.328 
In the same year, the United States Supreme Court upheld 
Virginia’s compulsory sterilization law in Buck v. Bell.329  According to 
the Court, Carrie Buck was “a feeble minded white woman who was 
committed to the State Colony . . . .  She is the daughter of a feeble 
minded mother in the same institution, and the mother of an 
illegitimate feeble minded child.”330  Like Linda Spitler, although 
                                                        
A. Lombardo, Miscegenation, Eugenics, and Racism: Historical Footnotes to Loving v. Virginia, 
21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 421 (1988); Leti Volpp, Divesting Citizenship: On Asian American 
History and the Loss of Citizenship Through Marriage, 53 UCLA L. REV. 405 (2005). 
 322.  See Note, Eugenic Sterilization in Indiana, 38 IND. L.J. 275, 276 (1963).  Sterilizations 
performed by Dr. Harry C. Sharp at the Indiana State Reformatory go back more than 
eight years before the 1907 law passed.  See Julius Paul, “Three Generations of Imbeciles 
are Enough”: State Eugenic Sterilization Laws in American Thought and Practice 342 
(1965) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://buckvbell.com/pdf/JPaulmss.pdf.  
There is dispute over how many boys at the Indiana State Reformatory received 
vasectomies prior to the 1907 Act; Dr. Sharp himself put the number at 456.  See Harry C. 
Sharp, Vasectomy as a Means of Preventing Procreation in Defectives, 53 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 1897, 
1899 (1909), available at http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/col_facpub/4/ (“Since October, 
1899, I have been performing an operation known as vasectomy . . . .  I have 456 cases that 
have afforded splendid opportunity for postoperative observation . . . .”). 
 323.  Act of Mar. 9, 1907, ch. 215, 1907 Ind. Acts 377–78, invalidated by Williams v. 
Smith, 131 N.E. 2 (Ind. 1921), available at 
https://scholarworks.iupui.edu/bitstream/handle/1805/1053/1907%20General%20Acts-
%20OCR.pdf?sequence=1. 
 324.  See Williams, 131 N.E. at 3. 
 325.  Id. at 2 (“In the instant case the prisoner has no opportunity to cross-examine the 
experts who decide that this operation should be performed upon him.  He has no chance 
to bring experts to show that it should not be performed; nor has he a chance to 
controvert the scientific question that he is of a class designated in the statute.”). 
 326.  See Paul, supra note 322, at 345. 
 327.  Id. 
 328.  See Alexandra Minna Stern, “We Cannot Make a Silk Purse out of a Sow’s Ear”: Eugenics 
in the Hoosier Heartland, 103 IND. MAG. HIST. 3, 6 (2007). 
 329.  274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
 330.  Id. at 205.  
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described as feeble minded, Carrie Buck had no cognitive disabilities 
and neither did her daughter.331  Bearing an illegitimate child 
provided the basis for allegations against her even though her 
pregnancy resulted from a rape by the nephew of her foster 
parents.332  The Supreme Court, in an 8–1 decision written by Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, upheld the law’s constitutionality, noting that 
it was necessary to prevent “being swamped with incompetence.”333  
Holmes, without explaining why the mentally ill and developmentally 
disabled were unworthy of equal protection or procedural due 
process, famously pronounced: “Three generations of imbeciles are 
enough.”334 
With the Supreme Court’s imprimatur on eugenic sterilizations, 
the practice flourished.335  Fifteen years later the Court again 
considered the forced sterilization question—this time in the form of 
an Oklahoma statute that targeted “habitual criminals.”336  The Act 
exempted certain types of crime, among them embezzlement.337  The 
Court, without overturning Buck v. Bell, struck down the Act as a 
violation of equal protection.338  Although the Court did not overturn 
Buck v. Bell, “widespread support of eugenics came to an eventual halt, 
when the Nazi regime pushed the philosophy and practice of 
                                                        
 331.  See PAUL A. LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, NO IMBECILES: EUGENICS, THE 
SUPREME COURT, AND BUCK V. BELL 103–48 (2008) (discussing the largely sham process by 
which Carrie Buck and her daughter, Vivian, were proven to be “feeble minded”). 
 332.  See id. at 116, 139–40.  There are online repositories of original documents from 
the Buck case. See, e.g., Eugenics: Three Generations, No Imbeciles: Virginia, Eugenics & Buck v. 
Bell, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA CLAUDE MOORE HEALTH SCIENCES LIBRARY, 
http://www.hsl.virginia.edu/historical/eugenics/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2014); Reading 
Room, Georgia State University College of Law, 
http://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/buckvbell/. 
 333.  Buck, 274 U.S. at 207. 
 334.  Id.  
 335.  See Paul Popenoe, The Progress of Eugenic Sterilization, 25 J. HEREDITY 19, 20 (1934), 
available at http://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/buckvbell/ 41 (noting that between 1907 and 
1931, twenty-seven states passed eugenic sterilization laws).  
 336.  Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942).  The Act defined a “habitual 
criminal” as a person who had “been convicted two or more times for crimes ‘amounting 
to felonies involving moral turpitude . . . .’” Id. 
 337.  Id. at 537. 
 338.  Id. at 538–39 (noting that grand larceny and embezzlement were felonies, but that 
the sterilization exemption for embezzlement resulted in a substantially similar crime 
being exempted from sterilization.  One stealing twenty dollars from a stranger three times 
is subject to sterilization but one stealing the same amount from the till of his place of 
employment three times is exempt.). 
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eugenics over the line of what American eugenicists found 
acceptable.”339 
However, compulsory sterilization did not disappear.  
Sterilizations of people with mental disabilities were permitted 
throughout the twentieth century.  For example, Indiana’s 1927 
sterilization law was amended several times and not repealed until 
1974,340 three years after Linda Spitler’s sterilization.  Indiana’s law 
was a “benchmark for the rest of the nation,”341 with more than thirty 
states following its lead and passing compulsory sterilization laws.342  
State compulsory sterilization laws targeted different kinds of people.  
Some states identified the “crippled, blind, degenerate, and 
deficient,”343 while others picked “paupers and the criminalistic.”344  
Historian Paul Lombardo explains, “[I]n all states those most likely to 
be sterilized were poor people living in state institutions.”345  Many of 
the people subject to these laws were considered “poor white trash” or 
“misfits” by social workers or doctors.346  The term “feeble minded” 
was a catchall linked as closely to poverty and perceived antisocial 
behavior as actual mental disability.347  As one commentator explains, 
“Often, these authorities never actually tested the victims for mental 
disability.”348 
Controlling the sexuality of poor women who did not conform 
with white middle-class standards of womanhood is also an important 
theme running throughout the history of eugenics in America.  For 
example, in North Carolina, poor working-class white women were 
sent to a reformatory for girls called Samarcand Manor where 
                                                        
 339.  Huberfeld, supra note 315, at 116.  
 340.  See Stern, supra note 328, at 35. 
 341.  See Jason S. Lantzer, The Indiana Way of Eugenics: Sterilization Laws, 1907–74, in A 
CENTURY OF EUGENICS IN AMERICA: FROM THE INDIANA EXPERIMENT TO THE HUMAN 
GENOME ERA 26, 31 (Paul A. Lombardo ed., 2011). 
 342.  See Elof Axel Carlson, The Hoosier Connection: Compulsory Sterilization as Moral 
Hygiene, in A CENTURY OF EUGENICS IN AMERICA 11, 21 (Paul A. Lombardo ed., 2011). 
 343.  Lombardo, Disability, supra note 320, at 64 (citing Washington and North Dakota 
laws). 
 344.  Id. (citing South Dakota law). 
 345.  Id. 
 346.  Michael G. Silver, Note, Eugenics and Compulsory Sterilization Laws: Providing Redress 
for the Victims of a Shameful Era In United States History, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 862, 867 
(2004). 
 347.  Id.; see generally JAMES W. TRENT, JR., INVENTING THE FEEBLE MIND: A HISTORY OF 
MENTAL RETARDATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1994) (documenting changing conceptions 
of the “feebleminded” over the past 150 years). 
 348.  See Silver, supra note 346, at 867. 
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sterilization and other physical abuses occurred.349  They were 
institutionalized for “noncriminal status offenses like ‘running 
around,’ ‘incorrigibility,’ being ‘in danger of prostitution’ or ‘beyond 
parental control,’ and in one case, as an incest victim whose father’s 
conviction as the perpetrator left her without a legal guardian.”350  
Samarcand was not unusual.  “By 1924, there were fifty-seven publicly 
funded institutions for delinquent girls, with only two states failing to 
provide at least one reformatory.”351  Historian Susan Cahn notes that 
the specter of untamed sexuality of unmarried lower-class white 
women who fled rural areas in the 1920s for economic opportunities 
in cities threatened patriarchal norms of domesticity and motherhood 
as well as “racialized distinctions between white virtue and black 
vice.”352  Much attention has been given to sterilization laws aimed at 
mentally disabled people.  However, as this example demonstrates, 
historians of eugenics have long emphasized that eugenics took on a 
variety of meanings, contexts, and forms.353 
During the New Deal and through the 1950s, sterilization was 
used as a solution to welfare dependency and social disorder.354  It was 
also connected with child welfare policy.  For example, in Minnesota, 
the eugenic sterilization law was part of the “Children’s Code,” which 
“included a civil commitment law that empowered county probate 
judges to commit neglected, dependent, and delinquent children . . . 
to state guardianship without the approval of parent or kin,” often for 
life.355  In the 1950s, southern lawmakers proposed laws that would 
require sterilization of women giving birth to illegitimate children 
and made having more than one illegitimate child a crime, among 
other measures aimed at regulating “immoral” sex and childbirth in 
the African-American community.356 
                                                        
 349.  See Susan Cahn, Spirited Youth or Fiends Incarnate: The Samarcand Arson Case and 
Female Adolescence in the American South, 9 J. WOMEN’S HIST. 152, passim (1998). 
 350.  Id. at 172. 
 351.  Id. at 156. 
 352.  Id. at 154. 
 353.  See Lombardo, Introduction, supra note 320, at 1. 
 354.  Id. at 4. 
 355.  Molly Ladd-Taylor, Eugenics and Social Welfare in New Deal Minnesota, in A CENTURY 
OF EUGENICS IN AMERICA 117, 119 (Paul A. Lombardo ed., 2011). 
 356.  See ANDERS WALKER, THE GHOST OF JIM CROW: HOW SOUTHERN MODERATES USED 
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION TO STALL CIVIL RIGHTS 77–82 (2009); see also Susan 
Frelich Appleton, Illegitimacy and Sex, Old and New, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 
347, 353, 351–353 (2012) (discussing southern lawmakers “manipulative attempts to 
maintain racial apartheid” in the aftermath of Brown through the “construct of 
illegitimacy”). 
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Scholars have documented the strategic shift that eugenics took 
in this period.  Eugenicists were being criticized for their focus on 
heredity as the primary justification for eugenics policies; thus, 
historians have shown how the movement shifted to environmental 
and social justifications.357  Beginning in the nineteenth century, and 
continuing largely unabated until the middle of the twentieth 
century, the eugenics movement emphasized the centrality of 
motherhood—particularly white, middle class motherhood—to the 
future of the country.358  Given this view, significant attention was 
given to ensuring that only “fit” women became mothers.359  This was 
achieved through a combination of abortion and contraception 
restrictions aimed at ensuring that middle class women produced 
large families360 and marriage and family counseling urging women to 
make good marriage choices and fulfill their procreative potential in 
helping to build a better race.361 
As discussed in Part III.A, in the 1960s and early 1970s, eugenics 
took the form of federal welfare and family planning policy: poor, 
minority women were often targeted for sterilization.362  These 
different examples demonstrate the shifting justifications for 
eugenics, which have variously included racism; concerns about 
hereditary degeneracy; controlling women’s sexuality; channeling sex 
and reproduction into the marital family and maintaining the 
gendered marital family more generally; social and economic 
efficiency; population control; and theological determinism.363 
In the 1970s, several developments contributed to the demise of 
at least the most overt, coercive forms of eugenics.  In 1972, it was 
revealed that the United States Public Health Service had conducted 
unethical and harmful syphilis experiments on poor rural blacks in 
Macon County, Alabama, for over forty years.364  The result was public 
                                                        
 357.  WENDY KLINE, BUILDING A BETTER RACE: GENDER, SEXUALITY, AND EUGENICS FROM 
THE TURN OF THE CENTURY TO THE BABY BOOM 4, 124–57 (2001). 
 358.  Id. 
 359.  Id. 
 360.  Cf. Siegel, supra note 5, at 280–304 (arguing that the nineteenth century campaign 
against abortion was rooted in judgments about women’s proper roles, their duty to bear 
and raise children, and their central role in the production of citizens). 
 361.  See KLINE, supra note 357, at 124–57. 
 362.  See supra Part III.A. 
 363.  See discussion supra notes 313–355 and accompanying text; see also Lombardo, 
Introduction, supra note 320, at 7. 
 364.  See Jean Heller, Human Guinea Pigs: Syphilis Patients Died Untreated, THE EVENING 
STAR & THE WASH. DAILY NEWS, July 25, 1972, at A1; Jean Heller, Syphilis Victims in U.S. 
Study Went Untreated for 40 Years, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1972, at A1. 
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outcry and federal laws and regulations requiring the protection of 
participants in clinical studies involving human subjects.365  
Additionally, lawsuits and state laws began to establish the rights of 
persons in state mental institutions,366 and there was a movement to 
treat mentally disabled and mentally ill persons in the community.367  
A series of Supreme Court cases established a constitutional right to 
privacy, which included a right to bodily integrity, to choose whether 
to use contraceptives, and abortion.368  In 1978, in response to Relf v. 
Weinberger, the federal government finally issued regulations 
prohibiting the use of federal family planning funds to sterilize 
persons under the age of twenty-one, mentally incompetent persons 
of any age, and institutionalized persons of any age.369  It also 
promulgated similar restrictions for Medicaid, under which the 
majority of publicly-funded sterilizations were now performed.370 
Historian Gregory Dorr suggests that these seemingly unrelated 
rights claims by individuals involved in the welfare, civil rights, 
women’s health, and patients’ rights movements all converged in a 
way that fundamentally undermined eugenic ideology in the United 
                                                        
 365.  Specifically, studies involving human subjects now require informed consent, 
communication of diagnosis, and accurate reporting of test results.  In addition, 
biomedical and behavioral research involving human subjects must be approved, 
monitored, and reviewed by institutional review boards (“IRBs”), independent ethics 
committees (“IECs”), or ethical review boards (“ERBs”).  These changes were required, in 
large part, by the National Research Service Award Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348, § 211, 
88 Stat. 342, 351–52 (repealed 1978).  For a general discussion of the legislative and 
administrative reaction to the syphilis experiments, see Michael J. Malinowski, Choosing the 
Genetic Makeup of Children: Our Eugenics Past-Present, and Future?, 36 CONN. L. REV. 125, 165–
70 (2003). 
 366.  See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 
1305 (5th Cir. 1974); N.Y. State Ass’n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. 
Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). 
 367.  See generally BOB SMUCKER, PROMISE, PROGRESS, AND PAIN: A CASE STUDY OF 
AMERICA’S COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH MOVEMENT FROM 1960 TO 1980 (2007), available 
at http://mentalhealthhistory.org/Promise_Progress_Pain.pdf (providing a detailed 
history of the community mental health movement). 
 368.  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 369.  Provision of Sterilization in Federally Assisted Programs of the Public Health 
Service, 43 Fed. Reg. 52146, 52165–67 (Nov. 8, 1978) (codified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 50.201–
50.210 (2009)). 
 370.  See Federal Financial Participation in State Claims for Sterilizations, 43 Fed. Reg. 
52171 (Nov. 8, 1978) (codified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 441.250–441.259 (2009)).  The rules 
included a complex procedure to ensure women’s informed consent, a thirty-day waiting 
period between consent and the procedure, a prohibition on sterilization for anyone who 
is younger than twenty-one or mentally incompetent, the provision of translators when 
necessary, and a prohibition on signing consent forms while a patient is undergoing labor, 
childbirth, or abortion.  Id. at 52171–72.   
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States.371  As he explains, “[T]he central issue was whether the 
victims—the Relf girls, the syphilitic men, and institutionalized 
mental patients—had given their informed consent.”372  These 
developments, according to Dorr, “implicitly undermined the durable 
Progressive Era notion that, in the public interest, the state can 
reliably substitute its judgment for individual decision making.”373  In 
response, many states moved to repeal what they now saw as 
antiquated and biased sterilization laws, however sporadically applied.  
Indiana’s Governor Otis Bowen signed that state’s repeal into law in 
1974.374  Although not entirely clear when the last involuntary 
sterilization of a competent adult occurred in the United States,375 
there are currently at least fifteen states that still authorize 
sterilization for persons with mental disabilities by statute376 and at 
least nine that authorize it by judicial decree.377  These laws all require 
                                                        
 371.  See Dorr, supra note 238, at 176. 
 372.  Id. 
 373.  Id. 
 374.  Act of Feb. 13, 1974, No. 60, § 1, 1974 Ind. Laws 2d Reg. Sess. 262; see also Lantzer, 
supra note 341, at 36–37.  In 2013, the West Virginia House of Delegates voted 
unanimously to repeal its eugenic sterilization law, but a companion bill died in the 
Senate.  See H.B. 2463, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2013), S.B. 193, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(W. Va. 2013). 
 375.  Some sources place it in Oregon in 1981.  See, e.g., Sangeeta Chattoo & Karl Atkin, 
‘Race’, Ethnicity and Social Policy: Theoretical Concepts and the Limitations of Current Approaches 
to Welfare, in UNDERSTANDING ‘RACE’ AND ETHNICITY: THEORY, HISTORY, POLICY, PRACTICE 
25 (Gary Craig et al. eds., 2012). 
 376.  See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-49-201 to -207 (LexisNexis 2014); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 
27-10.5-128 to -132 (West 2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 45a-691 to -700 (Thomson Reuters 
2014); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 5701–5716 (Michie 2003); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-20-1 to -
6 (LexisNexis 2012); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 560:5-601 to -612 (Michie 2010); IDAHO CODE §§ 
39-3901 to -3910 (Michie 2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, §§ 7001–7016 (West 2010); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 330.1629 (West 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:6D-5 (West 2009); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 5123.86 (LexisNexis 2009); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 436.205 to 436.335 
(2013); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 62A-6-101 to -116 (LexisNexis 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 
8705–8716 (LexisNexis 2012); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2974 to -2980 (LexisNexis 2013). 
 377.  See C.D.M. v. Alaska, 627 P.2d 607, 612 (Alaska 1981) (reasoning that authorizing 
sterilization of incompetent persons is part of a court’s “inherent parens patriae 
authority”); Mildred G. v. Valerie N., 707 P.2d 760, 771–72 (Cal. 1985) (reasoning that 
statute which completely prohibited sterilization of incompetent persons violated the 
liberty and privacy rights protected by the federal and state constitutions); A.W. v. T.M.W., 
637 P.2d 366, 374–75 (Colo. 1981) (reasoning that power to authorize sterilizations flows 
from courts’ broad authority to “protect the person or property of an incompetent” and a 
person’s “constitutional right not to have the option of sterilization completely 
foreclosed”); P.S. v. W.S., 452 N.E.2d 969, 971–72, 976–77 (Ind. 1983) (reasoning that 
courts have power to authorize sterilization of incompetent persons when in their best 
interests, on facts where autistic minor female had fascination with blood and would pick 
at her skin to discover the source of the blood and her parents and doctors feared she 
would harm herself in this way during menstruation); In re Guardianship of Matejski, 419 
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that certain protections are in place, including in most cases the right 
to notice and counsel, an opportunity for the person to be heard as to 
the need for sterilization, and the right to cross-examine witnesses.378  
Further, a petition to sterilize an individual must be proved by clear 
and convincing evidence;379 courts have found the less exacting 
preponderance standard to be unconstitutional given the seriousness 
of the interests at stake.380 
According to historians, all told, more than 63,000 people were 
forcibly sterilized under eugenics-inspired official state programs in 
the U.S. between 1907 and 1980.381  Moreover, “[t]he actual number 
is most certainly higher—perhaps much higher—as some physicians 
sterilized without oversight, but because of limited documentation, 
the total number cannot realistically be estimated.”382 
Notwithstanding the isolated success of litigants like the Relf sisters, 
victims have generally found it difficult to obtain relief through the 
courts for the constitutional wrongs suffered.  Statutes of limitations 
and lack of standing often prevent legal redress.383  Tracking down 
victims and their families is a formidable task.  Many victims are dead, 
elderly, or unknown.384  Accessing medical information is a challenge 
because of rules protecting patient confidentiality.385 
                                                        
N.W.2d 576, 580 (Iowa 1988) (quoting IOWA CODE § 145.2 (1977)) (reasoning that repeal 
of law mandating sterilization of persons who are “mentally ill or retarded, syphilitic, 
habitual criminals, moral degenerates, or sexual perverts and who are a menace to society” 
did not evince legislative intent to strip courts of authority to authorize sterilizations of 
incompetent persons); In re Moe, 432 N.E.2d 712, 718 (Mass. 1982) (reasoning that courts’ 
power to authorize sterilizations derives from their “powers of equity over incompetents 
and their guardians”); In re Terwilliger, 450 A.2d 1376, 1380–82 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) 
(reasoning that courts’ power to authorize sterilizations of incompetent persons derives 
from the State’s parens patriae authority); In re Guardianship of Hayes, 608 P.2d 635, 638–
39 (Wash. 1980) (reasoning that the lack of a statute granting courts power to authorize 
sterilization of incompetent persons does not entail that courts lack such power); 
Eberhardy v. Conway, 307 N.W.2d 881, 885–86 (Wis. 1981) (reasoning that courts’ 
authority to entertain and approve petitions for sterilizations of incompetent persons 
derives from the state constitution’s broad grant of general jurisdiction). 
 378.  See 53 AM. JUR. 2D, Mentally Impaired Persons § 119 (2006). 
 379.  Id. 
 380.  Id. 
 381.  LARGENT, supra note 317, at 1, 7, 8, 83, 138; LOMBARDO, supra note 331, at 294 
app. c (Laws and Sterilizations by State). 
 382.  LARGENT, supra note 317, at 138.  Moreover, this figure does not include those 
sterilized outside of institutions. 
 383.  See Silver, supra note 346, at 886. 
 384.  See id. at 889. 
 385.  See id. at 888.  For this reason, one scholar has proposed that states should “make a 
narrow exception to their patient confidentiality rules.” Id. at 890. 
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However, a handful of states have apologized for these unjust 
laws once used against the disabled, poor, and minorities,386 and two 
states, North Carolina and Virginia, have passed laws compensating 
victims.  For example, in 2011, the Governor of North Carolina 
appointed a task force to determine the method of compensation for 
victims of North Carolina’s eugenics board.387  The task force 
convened for three meetings in 2011 and 2012, at which victims and 
their families addressed the task force and told their stories.  The task 
force issued a final report in January 2012, wherein it recommended 
lump sum payments of $50,000 to each of the estimated 1500 to 2000 
living victims of the North Carolina eugenics board to come forward 
and be verified; mental health services for living victims that would 
supplement gaps in health insurance and pay for services for victims 
without any insurance; and funding for a traveling North Carolina 
eugenics exhibit, a permanent exhibit memorializing the victims, and 
an oral history project recounting the full story of eugenics in North 
Carolina.388  Although the state House of Representatives passed bills 
implementing the key recommendations of the task force in May 
2012,389 the effort ultimately died when it was not included in the state 
Senate’s budget.390  According to news reports, fiscal concerns drove 
the Senate’s decision.391  Other senators raised the concern “that 
paying victims of what had been a legal program could lead to paying 
descendants of slaves or American Indians.”392  “If we do something 
like this, you open up the door to other things the state did in its 
history,” remarked Republican Senator Chris Carney, “[a]nd some, 
I’m sure you’d agree, are worse than this.”393 After several years of 
                                                        
 386.  See LOMBARDO, supra note 331, at 258–66 
 387.  See 25 N.C. Reg. 2197–99 (Apr. 1, 2011), available at 
http://www.ncoah.com/rules/register/Volume25Issue19April12011.pdf. 
 388.  See GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE TO DETERMINE THE METHOD OF COMPENSATION FOR 
VICTIMS OF NORTH CAROLINA’S EUGENICS BOARD, N.C. DEP’T ADMIN., FINAL REPORT TO 
THE GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 2 (2012), available at 
http://www.sterilizationvictims.nc.gov/documents/FinalReport-
GovernorsEugenicsCompensationTaskForce.pdf. 
 389.  See H.B. 947, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2012); H.B. 73, 2011 Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2012). 
 390.  See Kim Severson, Payments for Victims of Eugenics are Shelved, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 
2012, at A14. 
 391.  It was reported that “[i]f all of the 1,350 to 1,800 living victims came forward, the 
state could have been liable for about $90 million.”  Id.  However, “the actual cost was 
expected to be much less.  Only 146 living victims have been verified, and an additional 
200 requests were pending.  The House bill included $11 million for the program.”  Id. 
 392.  Id. 
 393.  Id. 
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advocacy, however, North Carolina finally approved a plan to 
compensate victims in 2014.394  Virginia, the home of Carrie Buck, is 
set to become the second state to compensate victims.395 Virginia’s law 
will provide $25,000 for each living victim of its eugenic sterilization 
law.396  
Still, recognition that so many people were systematically 
wronged has been slow.  As of 2015, just six of the thirty-two states 
with official sterilization programs have apologized to their victims,397 
and only two states have decided to compensate the victims. 
Moreover, other than Relf and other cases spearheaded by civil rights 
organizations discussed in Part III.A., there has never been systematic 
                                                        
 394.  The North Carolina legislature introduced house and senate bills providing for 
compensation for eugenics victims in the 2013 session.  See Eugenics Compensation 
Program, H.B. 7, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013); Eugenics Compensation 
Program, S.B. 464, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013).  In May of 2014, the two bills were 
combined and reconciled and put into an appropriations bill, which was signed by the 
governor in August 2014. Appropriations Act of 2014, N.C. Sess. Law 2014-100, on Aug. 7, 
2014, codified at N.C. GEN STAT. § 143B-426.51, available at 
http://www.ncleg.net/EnactedLegislation/Statutes/PDF/BySection/Chapter_143B/GS_1
43B-426.51.pdf. 
  Under the final compensation scheme signed by the governor, North Carolina set 
aside $10 million to be divided equally among victims of the state’s eugenics board 
program.  See N.C. GEN STAT. § 143B-426.51(a).  Victims had until June 30, 2014, to submit 
a claim.  See N.C. GEN STAT. § 143B-426.52 (a).  Ultimately, 786 claims were received by the 
deadline, and approximately 213 individuals qualified for compensation.  See Press 
Release, N.C. Dep’t Admin., Approximately 213 Qualify Under Eugenics Compensation 
Program, Initial Determinations Continue (Oct. 1, 2014), 
http://www.doa.nc.gov/media/releases/showrelease.asp?id=0001-01OCT14.  The 
successful claimants were awarded $20,000 in the first of two installments from the fund.  
John Raily, Checks Arrive Loaded with Meaning, WINSTON-SALEM J., Nov. 2, 2014, at A33.  The 
total amount of compensation each victim receives, however, will depend on the number 
of people whose claims are approved by the commission, accounting for final appeals.  
That could approach $50,000, according to a spokesman for the agency administering the 
compensation program.  Id.  The sterilization task force’s recommendations relating to 
mental health services for victims, public education, and an oral history project preserving 
the experiences of victims for researchers and future generations were not included in the 
final law.  See supra note 388 and accompanying text. 
 395.  Bill Sizemore, Virginia to Compensate Victims of Forced Sterilizations, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, Feb. 26, 2015 (reporting that the Virginia General Assembly budgeted $400,000 to 
compensate victims at the rate of $25,000 each).  For the original proposed bill, see 
Virginia Justice for Victims of Sterilization Act, HB 1504, 2015 Va. Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(Va. 2015). 
 396.  Id.; Jenna Portnoy, Lawmakers Agree to Pay Those Sterilized by the State, WASH. POST., 
Mar. 1, 2015. For a summary of the events leading to this development, see LOMBARDO, 
supra note 323, at 258–63. 
 397.  See LOMBARDO, supra note 331, at 258–66 (discussing apologies by California, 
Indiana, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, and Virginia); id. at 294 app. c (Laws 
and Sterilizations by State) (listing 32 states with sterilization programs). 
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compensation for low-income women who were sterilized pursuant to 
the federal government’s family planning program in the 1970s. For 
example, such victims were, by definition, left out of the North 
Carolina compensation plan,398 even though some of the victims who 
testified before the Eugenics Victims Compensation Task Force were 
sterilized in this context.399 Newspapers ran editorials decrying the 
exclusion of these victims in North Carolina,400 “the majority of them 
African-American women,”401 and civil rights groups have pressed 
lawmakers to amend the law,402 but news reports suggest that “support 
for closing the loophole ‘ranges from zero to tepid.’”403 Virginia’s law, 
if signed by the Governor, also would compensate only victims 
sterilized under that state’s eugenics law while living in state 
institutions.404 Still, these developments represent breakthroughs and 
create hope that they will build awareness so that a larger, inclusive 
movement will develop some day across the United States to 
recognize the harms of coercive sterilizations and compensate all 
victims.405 
C.  Good Intentions, Victims’ Agency, and Other Caveats 
By highlighting the history of eugenics and involuntary 
sterilization in the United States, I do not suggest that all sterilizations 
during the periods discussed were involuntary, unwanted, 
unnecessary, or unconstitutional.  Moreover, although very few clear 
legal and ethical directives apply to every case, there are some 
                                                        
 398.  See Jim Morrill, N.C. Eugenics Victims Shut Out of Settlement by Law’s Wording, 
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Dec. 6, 2014. 
 399.  See supra notes 284–285 and accompanying test (testimony of Nial Ramirez and 
Mary English). 
 400.  Editorial, Law Needs Fixing, NEWS & RECORD, Dec. 11, 2014; Editorial, What All NC 
Sterilization Victims Deserve, NEWS & OBSERVER, Oct. 13, 2014. 
 401.  Elizabeth Haddix, Op-Ed., United in Justice for NC Eugenics Victims, NEWS & 
OBSERVER, Oct. 22, 2014 (op-ed by a lawyer with the University of North Carolina Center 
for Civil Rights). 
 402.  Id.  
 403.  See Jim Morrill, Victim Advocates Want to Close Eugenics Loophole, CHARLOTTE 
OBSERVER, Jan. 20, 2015 (quoting Democratic Senator Jeff Jackson). 
 404.  See Virginia Justice for Victims of Sterilization Act, supra note 395 (defining those 
eligible as “certain individuals who were involuntarily sterilized under the authority of the 
Virginia Eugenical Sterilization Act of 1924, ‘An ACT to provide for the sexual sterilization 
of inmates of State institutions in certain cases’”). 
 405.  For evidence of this, however tentative, see Mark Bold, Op-Ed, Our Debt on 
Sterilization: An Apology is Not Enough for the 20,000 victims of the State’s Eugenics Law, L.A. 
TIMES, Mar. 6, 2015 (arguing that California’s 2003 official apology is not enough and 
urging compensation for the state’s sterilization victims). 
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contexts that may make a parent or guardian of a person with a severe 
disability conclude that it would be in the best interest of a child or 
ward to protect them from sexual activity or parenthood.406  In some 
instances, sterilization might enable developmentally disabled people 
to live richer, sexually active lives.407  And there are cases, for example, 
of women with such serious handicaps that having a menstrual period 
presents a monthly trauma.408 
Nor do I intend to portray minorities merely as targets of eugenic 
control and repression.  The family planning clinic nurses who took 
the Relf sisters to the hospital were African American,409 as was about 
half of the clinic staff.410  Some of them told a reporter that “they 
know of people—poor people—who have been sterilized or have 
received other birth control aid from the clinic who ‘thank God’ for 
it.”411  Indeed, according to some historians, a certain type of positive 
eugenics held a strong appeal for various segments of the African-
American community.412  And African-American women broadly 
supported the family planning movement; despite their valid 
                                                        
 406.  For a detailed discussion of such a case, see Paul A. Lombardo, The Ethics of 
Controlling Reproduction in a Population with Mental Disabilities, in PEDIATRIC BIOETHICS 173, 
180–81 (Geoffrey Miller ed., 2010) (discussing In re Estate of C.W., 433 Pa. Super. Ct. 167 
(1994), a case where a mother sought a tubal libation of her daughter who had significant 
mental and physical disabilities because of the mother’s “desire to increase the range of 
experience available to C.W., specifically the wish to allow her to live in a sheltered living 
facility rather than the more socially restricted environment of her mother’s home.”). 
 407.  Id. 
 408.  See, e.g., Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361 (D. Conn. 1978).  Note that long-acting 
birth control like Norplant might well moot (or at least soften) these difficulties.  One 
major problem with surgical sterilization is its permanence. 
 409.  See Dorr, supra note 238, at 177. 
 410.  Id. 
 411.  See Bruce Nichols, Staff of Clinic Stunned by Suit, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, June 
28, 1973, at 2. 
 412.  See Gregory M. Dorr & Angela Logan, “Quality, Not Mere Quantity, Counts”: Black 
Eugenics and the NAACP Baby Contests, in A CENTURY OF EUGENICS IN AMERICA 68–92 (Paul 
A. Lombardo ed., 2011).  According to Dorr and Logan, certain leading African-American 
intellectuals and organizations, such as W.E.B. Du Bois, Thomas Wyatt Turner, Marcus 
Garvey, Elijah Muhammad, and the NAACP, “believed in eugenics’ central dogma that (a) 
human beings could be sorted into the relatively ‘fit’ and ‘unfit’ and (b) society as a whole 
could be improved by ensuring the propagation of the fit and reducing procreation of the 
unfit.”  Id. at 69.  Although these ideas represented an effort to lift up the African-
American race and “fight against the fruits of white eugenics: segregation, anti-
miscegenation law, and lynching,” id. at 70, historians also associate black eugenic ideas 
with an “obvious class bias” against poor African Americans, id. at 87, that lined up with 
whites’ view of their “feebleminded” (that is, poor, uneducated, unemployed) as immoral 
and eugenically “unfit.”  Dorr, supra note 238, at 178. 
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concerns about racism, “they still perceived the free services to be in 
their own best interests.”413 
Moreover, one of the Relf sisters was physically and mentally 
disabled,414 suggesting that her mother may have thought at least 
some measure to prevent pregnancy was a good idea.  It is also 
possible that Linda Spitler’s mother had her daughter’s best interests 
in mind when she sought the order authorizing sterilization, 
especially if she thought the procedure was reversible.415 According to 
one authoritative source, “Women were rarely provided complete 
information about the procedure or given information about 
alternative methods of birth control. Many did not understand that 
the procedure was permanent and the use of confusing terminology 
such as ‘tied tubes’ misleadingly implied its reversibility.”416  The 
stories of those sterilized or whose children were sterilized certainly 
support this account. 
Nor have the legal protections for patients attributable to the 
political fallout of cases like Relf been welcomed by all physicians or 
patients.  Some physicians have criticized strict rules governing 
sterilization as an overcorrection, because they allegedly interfere with 
a physician’s clinical judgment and the ability of competent women to 
choose sterilization.417  Moreover, competent women have sued to 
                                                        
 413.  Ross, supra note 240, at 282. 
 414.  See Dorr, supra note 238, at 178. 
 415.  See David Kurtz, Linda and Leo Sparkman Are an Unlikely Test Case for the Courts, 
HERALD TELEPHONE (Bloomington, Ind.), Nov. 21, 1977, at 10 (reporting that when Linda 
Spitler confronted her mother about the sterilization, Ora McFarlin told her daughter that 
her tubes had been tied but they would “come untied on their own accord”); see also 
Complaint at ¶ 18, Sparkman v. McFarlin, No. F 75-129 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 26, 1975), available 
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come untied on their own accord”); COLEMAN & HEADLEY, supra note 1, at v (recounting 
same story).  Assuming this account is true, it is unclear whether McFarlin was being 
duplicitous or really believed this. 
 416.  Historical & Multicultural Encyclopedia of Women’s Reproductive Rights in the 
United States 196 (Judith A. Baer ed., 2002). 
 417.  See David Mannweiler, Kindly Doctor is Frustrated, INDIANAPOLIS NEWS, Sept. 26, 
1979.  Specifically, Mannweiler reports: 
  Before the hospitals changed their rules, doctors often performed simple 
hysterectomies on mentally retarded patients who could not take care of 
themselves hygienically during menstrual periods . . . .  The hysterectomy 
allowed them to be sexually active without having children.  
  A spinoff problem is government intervention in the Medicaid program which 
[as one physician explained] “makes it so hard for women to get sterilized. 
  Medicaid now has a woman wait at least three [sic] days to get her tubes 
tied.  . . . I’ve had women who have said, ‘I’ve got four children, no husband and 
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establish the right to require public hospitals to sterilize them.  For 
example, in 1973, Robbie Mae Hathaway won a suit against a 
Massachusetts public hospital for denying her elective sterilization 
surgery.418  She had asked to receive contraceptive sterilization from 
the hospital as a means of permanent birth control after having eight 
children.419  However, the hospital had a ban on surgical sterilizations 
and denied her surgery.420  The court found the hospital had violated 
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
granted the surgery.421  Other cases presented similar facts during this 
period.422  Sterilization can be a desired procedure, and all 
sterilizations are not undertaken with eugenic intentions. 
Finally, there is the risk that this Article’s focus on “other side of 
reproductive rights” may come back to haunt feminists in the 
abortion and other contexts.423  Indeed, the pretense of protecting 
the reproductive autonomy of minority women is being used in an 
effort to subvert reproductive choice.424  For example, a billboard in 
New York City paid for by Life Always, an anti-abortion group, read 
“The most dangerous place for an African-American is in the 
womb.”425  Today, as women are fighting for free birth control,426 poor 
                                                        
I don’t want more children.’  They ask me to tie their tubes and I say ‘Okay, you 
got it,’ but I don’t bill Medicaid for the operation.” 
Id. (although this quote states that the waiting period was three days, the federal 
regulations, supra note 369, mandated a thirty-day waiting period); see also Cindy Loose, 
Birth Control and Bureaucracy: Poor Women Seeking Sterilization Face a Snarl of Red Tape, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 19, 1998, at A1. 
 418.  Hathaway v. Worchester City Hospital, 475 F.2d. 701 (1st Cir. 1973).  
 419.  Id. at 703. 
 420.  Id. 
 421.  Id. at 706.  This suit was spearheaded by a coalition forged among the American 
Civil Liberties Union, Zero Population Growth, and the Association for Voluntary 
Sterilization. See Kluchin, supra note 241, at 134. 
 422.  See, e.g., McCabe v. Nassau Co. Medical Ctr., 453 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1971) (public 
medical center refused to perform a desired tubal ligation because, according to its rules, 
the plaintiff had to have five children before she could be sterilized). 
 423.  Cf. Jeannie Suk, The Trajectory of Trauma: Bodies and Minds of Abortion Discourse, 110 
COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1197 (2010) (arguing that legal feminists’ arguments in the domestic 
violence context have come back to haunt them in the abortion context, in the form of the 
discourse of regret fueled by “feminist discourse of trauma around women’s bodies and 
sexuality”). 
 424.  See Mary Ziegler, Roe’s Race: The Supreme Court, Population Control, and Reproductive 
Justice, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 40–45 (2013) (describing examples of abortion 
opponents’ invocation of the close relationship between the abortion-rights and 
population-control movements of the past as evidence that contemporary providers and 
activists harbor racist intentions). 
 425.  See Jordana Ossad, Controversial Billboard Focuses on African-American Abortions, CNN 
(Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/02/23/new.york.billboard.  In response 
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women are often invoked as a reason why it is important to provide 
such care.427 
Yet, acknowledging the good intentions of some of the story’s 
villains, the agency of victims, and the complexity of the issue more 
generally should not diminish this ugly, century-long chapter in 
American history during which the mentally disabled, lower-class 
people, and racial and ethnic minorities were subject to eugenically 
motivated and often coercive sterilization.  Stump is an important part 
of this history.  It bridges two chapters of eugenics in America—the 
eugenic sterilization of institutionalized persons by eugenics boards in 
the first half of the twentieth century and the systematic sterilization 
of poor, mostly minority women swept in the tide of federal “family 
planning” initiatives in the second half of the twentieth century.  
Linda Spitler, a poor, working-class teenager from a small town in 
Indiana, stood at the crossroads of these two eugenic periods.  
                                                        
to the billboard, a Life Always board member told reporters, “‘[I]t’s hard to celebrate 
Black History Month’ with abortion ‘hanging over our community.’” Id.; cf. Kessler, supra 
note 7, at 16–18. 
While I am not seeking to diminish the real harms that cries of “black genocide” can 
inflict on abortion rights, the proper response to these difficulties, in my view, is to 
articulate the intersection of gender and race oppression into one’s scholarly analysis, 
rather than refrain from highlighting this history at all.  See Wendy Brown & Janet Halley, 
Introduction, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 36 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 
2002) (calling on progressive scholars to “open the door of political and legal thought as if 
the wolves were not there); cf. Kessler, supra note 7, at 16–18 (explaining how black 
feminists’, in the face of “both racist, antinatalist policies of the white majority and sexist, 
pronatalist ideology within the black nationalist movement,” articulated a distinct black 
feminist perspective by simultaneously asserting the right of black women to “control their 
fertility and to control their vision and practice of motherhood”); Ross, supra note 240, at 
283 (“Th[e] combined support for birth control and abortion and opposition to 
sterilization, a view unique to African-American women at the time, did much to inform 
both the feminist and the civil rights movement in later decades.”).  New and important 
histories disentangling the abortion-rights, population control, and eugenics movements 
also go a long way toward that effort.  See Ziegler, supra note 424, at 48–49 (“While some 
population activists did have ties to the eugenic legal reform movement, many population 
controllers had different aims, priorities, and arguments than did eugenic reformers.  And 
while some abortion-rights activists used population-based claims or joined the population 
movement, the movements for abortion and population control differed considerably 
from one another.”). 
 426.  See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (holding that a 
closely-held for-profit is exempt on religious grounds from a federal regulation requiring it 
to cover certain contraceptives for its female employees in its employer-sponsored 
insurance plan under the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act). 
 427.  For example, a fundraising appeal by Planned Parenthood in response to Texas’ 
recent efforts to shut down abortion clinics states, “Women are being forced to travel 
hundreds of miles to get the care they need—and if they can’t afford to make that trip, 
safe and legal abortion is quite simply out of reach.”  E-mail from Cecile Richards, Planned 
Parenthood, President, to Laura Kessler (Oct. 6, 2014) (on file with author). 
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Reported by a mother who opted to place her allegedly disobedient 
daughter in the hands of the law; sexually abused yet accused of 
promiscuity like Carrie Buck; and handled by legal and medical 
establishments accustomed to paternalistically controlling poor 
women’s sexuality, Linda Spitler’s story was not an aberration, as 
Justice Stewart’s dissent suggested.  It closely resembled other victims’ 
stories and fit comfortably within larger patterns of twentieth century 
eugenic sterilizations in the United States. 
Taking an even longer view, one can see Stump as part of a history 
of Supreme Court participation in institutionalized violence against 
minorities’ bodies.  The echoes of Lynch-law in Stump v. Sparkman are 
haunting.  As Barbara Holden-Smith and others have detailed,428 part 
of what was so heinous about lynching was the participation of state 
officials, including police and judges, either by standing back and not 
restraining mobs or by actively participating.429  Lynching became the 
law of the land through this participation and the Court’s protection 
of it.430  Similarly, in Stump we see how at least one judge made the 
mutilation of poor and minority women the law of the land.  The 
Supreme Court, through its decision, protected judges’ ability to do 
so, much in the same way that the Supreme Court protected 
participation in lynchings with its narrow interpretation of the Ku 
Klux Klan Act of 1871.431  Although Judge Stump was participating in 
an individualized form of gender violence through his sterilization 
order, the Supreme Court, by making a space for this kind of 
injustice—a sterilization decision absent any notice, law, evidence, 
representation, or ability to appeal—elevated Judge Stump’s error to 
a form of institutionalized gender injustice, creating a kind of zone of 
exception around women’s bodies, a place where the law does not 
apply and anything might be done.432 
                                                        
 428.  See Barbara Holden-Smith, Lynching, Federalism, and the Intersection of Race and 
Gender in the Progressive Era, 8 YALE J.L. FEMINISM 31, 40 (1996); see also Hall & Harris, supra 
note 88, at 34, 46; Pope, supra note 83, at 430. 
 429.  See Holden-Smith, supra note 428, at 40 (“Local sheriffs harbored indifference, or 
outright hostility, toward their duties to prevent mobs from killing blacks and to 
apprehend lynchers.  . . . [T]hey were often themselves alleged to be active participants in 
mob violence.”); see also discussion supra note 96. 
 430.  See supra Part I.B. 
 431.  Id. 
 432.  Cf. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 3, 14–15 (2005) (describing the 
indefinite suspension of law in contexts such Nazi Germany, detainment camps such as 
Guatanamo Bay and immigration detention centers as “state[s] of exception”).  That the 
Court achieved this result sub silencio does not change the conclusion.  “[T]he state of 
exception is neither external nor internal to the juridical order;” it is created by the 
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IV.  STUMP’S CONTINUING LEGACY: EUGENIC THINKING IN 
CONTEMPORARY LAW AND POLICY 
Although the most troubling and coercive forms of eugenics are 
no longer prevalent in the United States, some of the attitudes 
motivating the early eugenicists continue to influence contemporary 
law and public policy today.  For example, beginning in the 1980s, 
state prosecutors began targeting women who used drugs during 
pregnancy and delivered drug-exposed babies.433  Poor, drug-addicted 
mothers in need of medical treatment and other services are charged 
with a variety of crimes, including criminal neglect, delivery of drugs 
to a minor, and involuntary manslaughter.434  Only the South 
Carolina Supreme Court has upheld such a conviction.435  However, 
states use other coercive and punitive measures against mothers who 
use drugs during pregnancy.  Several states’ child welfare rules 
include prenatal substance abuse as a basis for terminating parental 
rights.436  Some states authorize civil commitment of pregnant women 
                                                        
absence of law or “a zone of indifference.”  Id. at 23, 51; see also Mary Joe Frug, A 
Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft), 105 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1049 
(1992) (“Legal rules permit and sometimes mandate the terrorization of the female body. 
This occurs by a combination of provisions that inadequately protect women against 
physical abuse and that encourage women to seek refuge against insecurity.”). 
 433.  Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, 
Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1428–32 (1991). 
 434.  See Michelle Oberman, Sex, Drugs, Pregnancy, and the Law: Rethinking the Problems of 
Pregnant Women Who Use Drugs, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 505, 508–09 (1992); Roberts, supra note 
433, at 1420–21; Doretta Massardo McGinnis, Comment, Prosecution of Mothers of Drug-
Exposed Babies: Constitutional and Criminal Theory, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 505, 505 (1990); see also 
LYNN M. PALTROW, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION, CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTIONS AGAINST PREGNANT WOMEN: NATIONAL UPDATE AND OVERVIEW (1992), 
available at http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/file/1992%20State-by-
State%20Case%20Summary.pdf. 
 435.  See Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997).  For a fuller discussion of this 
case, see Ariela R. Dubler, Case Note, Monitoring Motherhood, 106 YALE L.J. 935 (1996). 
 436.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-201 (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 12-18-
103(14)(B), 12-18-402 (2009); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-103(1)(a) (2011); D.C. CODE § 16-
2301(9) (2012); FLA. STAT. § 39.01(30) (2011); 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3 (2011); IND. 
CODE. §§ 31-34-1-10 to -11 (2008); IOWA CODE § 232.68 (2011); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & 
JUD. PROC. § 3-818 (West 2012); MINN. STAT. § 626.556(2)(f) (2010); NEV. REV. STAT. § 
432B.330 (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-02(8) (2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-
1660(F)(1) (2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-2(9) (2012); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 
261.001 (West 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1509(B) (2007); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.02(1) 
(West 2011); see also GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: SUBSTANCE ABUSE 
DURING PREGNANCY 1 (2015), available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_SADP.pdf (reporting that “18 states 
consider substance abuse during pregnancy to be child abuse under civil child-welfare 
statutes”). 
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who use drugs or alcohol.437  A number of states require health care 
professionals to report or test for prenatal drug exposure, which can 
be used in a child-welfare proceeding.438  According to one study, 
there have been 413 cases from 1973 to 2005 “in which a woman’s 
pregnancy was a necessary factor leading to attempted and actual 
deprivations of a woman’s physical liberty” through arrest, detentions, 
and forced interventions.439  Scholars have highlighted the differential 
enforcement of these laws against lower income women and racial 
minorities.440 
                                                        
 437.  See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 253B.02 (2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-20A-70 (2012); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.193 (West 2011); see also GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 436 at 1 
(reporting that three states consider substance abuse during pregnancy grounds for civil 
commitment). 
 438.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3620 (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 12-18-103(14)(B), 12-
18-402 (2009); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-1-103(1)(a), -3-304 (2011); FLA. STAT. §§ 39.01(32), 
39.201 (2011); 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3 to 5/4 (2011); IND. CODE §§ 31-33-5-2, 31-34-1-10 
to -11 (2008); IOWA CODE §§ 232.68 to .69 (2011); ME. REV. STAT. TIT. 22, § 4011–B (2011); 
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-818 (WEST 2012); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 5-
704 to -705 (2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS CH. 119, § 51A (2010); MINN. STAT. § 626.556 (2010); 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 432B.220 (2010); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 27-20-02(8), 50-25.1-03, -03.1 
(2007); OKLA. STAT. TIT. 10A, § 1-2-101 (2011); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 63-7-310, 63-7-
1660(F)(1) (2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 26-8A-2(9), -3 (2012); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 
261.001, .101-.102 (WEST 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1509 (2007); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 
48.02(1), 48.981 (2011); see also GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 436, at 1 (reporting that 
“15 states require health care professionals to report suspected prenatal drug abuse, and 4 
states require them to test for prenatal drug exposure if they suspect abuse”). 
 439.  See Lynne M. Paltrow & Jeanne Flavin, Arrests of and Forced Interventions on Pregnant 
Women in the United States, 1973–2005: Implications for Women’s Legal Status and Public Health, 
38 J. HEALTH POLITICS, POL’Y & L. 299, 299 (2013). 
 440.  See Roberts, supra note 433, at 1421 (arguing that prosecuting poor black women 
for drug use during pregnancy reflects authorities’ racist attitudes); Ira J. Chasnoff et al., 
The Presence of Illicit-Drug or Alcohol Use During Pregnancy and Discrepancies in Mandatory 
Reporting in Pinellas County, Florida, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1202, 1202 (1990) (study finding 
that black women were reported at approximately 10 times the rate for white women, and 
poor women were more likely than others to be reported); Michele Bratcher Goodwin, 
Precarious Moorings: Tying Fetal Drug Law Policy to Social Profiling, 42 RUTGERS L.J. 659, 677 
(2011) (explaining that “enactors and interpreters of [fetal drug laws] . . . exclusively focus 
on . . . socio-economic and racial profiling”); Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 439, at 310 tbl.1, 
311 (showing that of 413 state criminal or civil actions taken against women for 
endangering their fetuses between 1973 and 2005, seventy-one percent were economically 
disadvantaged and fifty-nine percent were women of color); see also Gina Kolota, Bias Seen 
Against Pregnant Addicts, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 20, 1990), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/07/20/us/bias-seen-against-pregnant-addicts.html (“Most 
women prosecuted for using illegal drugs while pregnant have been poor members of 
racial minorities, experts say, even though drug use in pregnancy is equally prevalent in 
white middle-class women.”). 
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In the 1990s, many states, with federal government blessing,441 
began placing conditions on eligibility for welfare benefits that 
significantly impinged on poor women’s reproductive decision-
making.  For example, many states adopted “family caps,”442 policies 
denying welfare-assisted families further financial assistance after the 
birth of additional children.443  About half the states have 
implemented a family cap or similar child exclusion policy.444  Most 
states have exceptions softening the harshest applications and 
consequences of their family caps.445  However, legal challenges to 
                                                        
 441.  Under the current 1996 federal welfare law block grant, Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF), states have discretion to implement a family cap.  JODIE LEVIN-
EPSTEIN, CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POL’Y, LIFTING THE LID OFF THE FAMILY CAP: STATES REVISIT 
PROBLEMATIC POLICY FOR WELFARE MOTHERS 2–3 (2003), available at 
http://www.clasp.org/admin/site/publications/files/0166.pdf.  Prior to TANF, under the 
federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children, states had to obtain waivers before 
imposing family caps.  Id. 
 442.  Historically, the birth of additional children would result in a modest increase in 
welfare benefits.  Id. at 1–2.  Family caps eliminate such increases, an attempt to influence 
the reproductive behavior of poor women.  Id. 
 443.  See Laura T. Kessler, PPI, Patriarchy, and the Schizophrenic View of Women: A Feminist 
Analysis of Welfare Reform in Maryland, 6 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 317, 336–38 (1995); 
Jennifer S. Madden, Recent Development, Family Caps Threaten Women and Their Children, 10 
BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 171, 172–74 (1995). 
 444.  See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-292 (2011); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11450.04(a) 
(West 2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17b-112(d)(2) (West 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
414.115(4)-(5) (West 2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 49-4-186 (West 2009); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-
14-2-5.3(b) (LexisNexis 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256J.24 Subdiv. 6(a) (West 2007); MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 43-17-5(1) (West 2008); N.J. STAT ANN. § 44:10-61 (West 1993); N.D. CENT. 
CODE ANN. § 50-09-29(1)(w) (West 2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-5-1175 (1995); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 71-3-104(h)(4)(i) (West 2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-604 (2007); ARK. ADMIN. 
CODE 208.00.1-2361 (West 2009); 16 DEL. ADMIN. CODE 51000-3008.2 (West 2011); 106 
MASS. CODE REGS. 203.300(B)(1) (West 2011); N.C. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. DIV. 
OF SOC. SERVS., NORTH CAROLINA’S TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES STATE 
PLAN: THE FIRST WORK PROGRAM 27 (2013), available at 
http://www.ncdhhs.gov/dss/dcdl/economicfamilyservices/EFS-WF-06-2013a.pdf; cf. 
IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 16.03.08.248, 16.03.08.251 (West 2011) (providing a flat maximum 
benefit regardless of family size); WIS. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, WISCONSIN WORKS 
(W-2) MANUAL § 10.1 (2012), available at 
http://dcf.wisconsin.gov/w2/manual/default.htm#11/11.6.1_intentional_program_violati
on_(ipv).htm (providing a flat maximum benefit regardless of family size); see generally 
DAVID KASSABIAN ET AL., URBAN INST., WELFARE RULES DATABOOK: STATE TANF POLICIES 
AS OF JULY 2010 (2011), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412381-Welfare-
Rules-Databook.pdf; Martha F. Davis, The Child Exclusion in a Global Context, 60 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 1183 (2010); Family Cap Policies, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (July 2009), 
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/human-services/welfare-reform-family-cap-
policies.aspx. 
 445.  For example, most states with family caps exempt children born as a result of rape, 
sexual assault, or incest.  See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 49-4-186 (West 2009); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 256J.24 Subdiv. 6(b)(3) (West 2007); N.J. STAT ANN. § 44:10-61 (West 1993); MASS. CODE 
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family caps typically fail.446  For example, challenges to family caps 
under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine have been 
unsuccessful.447  This doctrine forbids the government from requiring 
a person to surrender a constitutional right as a condition of receiving 
a public benefit.448  Generally, courts considering these challenges 
have held that the government can place a condition on a benefit so 
long as the condition is a refusal to subsidize the constitutional 
right.449  This approach has allowed government to influence welfare 
recipients’ constitutionally-protected reproductive choices through 
family caps so long as its efforts can plausibly be described as inaction.  
Furthermore, the entire project of “welfare reform,” with its workfare 
requirements, child support enforcement, family caps, responsible 
fatherhood programming, abstinence education, and marriage 
promotion dimensions may be viewed as a eugenic-like project that 
suspends democratic norms and the law in important ways. 
Judges have also urged vasectomies and “no-procreation” orders 
on men (and occasionally women) who have borne many children 
out of wedlock and have required contraception as a condition of 
probation in certain criminal cases.  For example, in 2001, the 
                                                        
REGS. 203.300(C)(3) (West, Westlaw current through January 6, 2012, Register #1199).  
California excludes children who were “conceived as a result of contraceptive failure if the 
parent was using an intrauterine device, a Norplant, or the sterilization of either parent.”  
See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11450.04(b) (2001).  South Carolina provides benefits to 
children subject to the cap in the form of vouchers.  See S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-5-1175 
(1995).  Idaho does not apply its flat benefit, which works like a family cap, to families with 
at least some earned income.  See IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 16.03.08.248, 16.03.08.251 (West 
2011).  For a comprehensive discussion of exceptions, see Rebekah J. Smith, Family Caps in 
Welfare Reform: Their Coercive Effects and Damaging Consequences, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 151, 
166–167 (2006). 
 446.  See Davis, supra note 444, at 1186–87; Christopher Dinkel, Note, Welfare Family Caps 
and the Zero-Grant Situation, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 365, 383–88 (2011) (discussing failed legal 
challenges in state and federal courts); Smith, supra note 445, at 180–86. 
 447.  See Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, Welfare Queens and Other Fairy 
Tales: Welfare Reform and Unconstitutional Reproductive Controls, 38 HOW. L.J. 473, 497–511 
(1995); Susan Frelich Appleton, When Welfare Reforms Promote Abortion: “Personal 
Responsibility,” “Family Values,” and the Right to Choose, 85 GEO. L.J. 155, 162–65 (1996); 
Dorothy E. Roberts, The Only Good Poor Woman: Unconstitutional Conditions and Welfare, 72 
DENV. U. L. REV. 931, 934–43 (1995). 
 448.  See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1415 
(1989). 
 449.  See, e.g., C.K. v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. 991, 1014–15 (D.N.J. 1995), aff’d sub nom. C.K. 
v. N.J. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 92 F.3d 171, 194–95 (3d Cir. 1996); N.B. v. 
Sybinski, 724 N.E.2d 1103, 1112–13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); Sojourner A. v. N.J. Dep’t of 
Human Servs., 828 A.2d 306, 331–37 (N.J. 2003); see also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 
471, 483–87 (1970) (holding that a state-imposed cap on welfare benefits did not violate 
the Equal Protection Clause). 
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Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld such a restriction in State v. 
Oakley.450  In that case, a trial judge sentenced David Oakley to 
probation for intentional failure to pay child support, on the 
condition that “Oakley cannot have any more children unless he 
demonstrates that he had [sic] the ability to support them and that he 
is supporting the children he already had.”451  Laurence Tribe, a 
leading constitutional scholar, petitioned the United States Supreme 
Court on the Oakley’s behalf,452 but certiorari was denied in 2002.453  
The Court’s refusal to hear the issue left the door open for other 
family court judges to follow.  In 2004, a New York family court 
ordered an allegedly drug-addicted homeless couple to stop having 
children after their fourth child was removed from their care.454  
Although the parents in this case and others have successfully 
challenged “no procreation” orders on constitutional and other 
grounds,455 “these conditions are rarely challenged in appellate 
                                                        
 450.  629 N.W.2d 200, 214 (Wis. 2001).  
 451.  Id. at 203.  The justices of the Wisconsin Supreme Court divided on gender lines; 
four men upheld the ruling and three women dissented.  Id. at 223.  Justice Ann Walsh 
Bradley noted the untenable position that the ruling creates for any unlucky woman 
impregnated by Mr. Oakley: “have an abortion or be responsible for Oakley going to 
prison for eight years.”  Id. at 219.  Justice Diane Sykes objected to what she saw as “a 
compulsory, state-sponsored, court-enforced financial test for future parenthood.”  Id. at 
221. 
 452.  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Oakley v. Wisconsin, No. 01-1573, 2001 WL 
34116641 (U.S. Apr. 19, 2001). 
 453.  Oakley v. Wisconsin, 537 U.S. 813 (2002). 
 454.  In re Bobbijean P., No. 03626-03, 2004 WL 834480, at *1 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Mar. 31, 
2004).  The court’s order stated: 
[I]t is the intention of the court that the mother be required to not get pregnant 
until all of her children are being raised by a natural parent, or are no longer 
being cared for at the expense of the public.  It is similarly the intention of the 
court that the father be required to not father another child until all his children 
are being raised by a natural parent, or are no longer being cared for at the 
expense of the public.  It is further the intention of the court that neither parent 
shall conceive another child until found capable of having custody of all their 
current children.  In other words, the respondents shall be required to act like 
responsible parents and for the duration of the order, to have no more children 
unless they can parent them themselves. 
Id. at *3. 
 455.  See In re Bobbijean P., 46 A.D.3d 12, 13–14 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (holding that 
family court lacked authority to impose a “no pregnancy” condition because it did not 
address the goals of remedying the acts found to have caused mother’s neglect of her child 
or relate to the well-being of the removed child within the meaning of the family court 
rules); see also Trammell v. State, 751 N.E.2d 283, 290–91 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (order of a 
mentally retarded woman convicted of child neglect not to become pregnant for the eight 
years of her suspended sentence violated her constitutional right to privacy for procreative 
decisions); State v. Talty, 814 N.E.2d 1201 (Ohio 2004) (overturning a condition that the 
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courts,”456 therefore “trial judges will often have the final say as to 
whether these probation conditions are appropriate.”457 
News reports and legal scholarship suggest that family court 
judges continue to issue such orders.458  For example, one Kentucky 
family court judge reportedly gives repeat offenders who are in 
contempt of court for failing to pay child support the option of 
having a vasectomy rather than going to jail for thirty days.459  The 
judge encourages the procedure in cases of “fathers who owe more 
than $10,000 in child support and have children with more than three 
women.”460  The latter criterion, in particular, suggests that moral 
judgments about the circumstances of unwed parenthood motivate 
this judge’s decision to impose sterilization conditions on those 
before him.  In a 2013 Wisconsin case, the judge announced from the 
bench, “It’s too bad the court doesn’t have the authority to 
sterilize.”461  And, in Virginia, one of two states that recently approved 
compensation for individuals sterilized by its eugenic boards of years 
past, a state judge approved a plea deal in which a man received 
twenty months in prison, five years of probation, and a vasectomy for 
child endangerment and hit and run driving on a suspended 
license.462 The prosecutor’s motivation in offering the vasectomy 
                                                        
defendant make “reasonable efforts” to avoid conception while on probation for criminal 
nonpayment of child support, on the ground that the sentence was unconstitutionally 
overbroad, because it did not include a method for lifting the ban if the defendant caught 
up with his payments). 
 456.  Joanna Nairn, Is There A Right To Have Children? Substantive Due Process and Probation 
Conditions That Restrict Reproductive Rights, 6 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. CIV. LIBERTIES 1, 9 (2010).  
 457.  Id. 
 458.  See Nairn, supra note 456, at 6–10; Bruce Vielmetti, No-Procreation Order Only Latest 
Solution to Child Support, MILWAUKEE WIS. J. SENTINEL, Jan. 17, 2013, 
http://www.jsonline.com/news/wisconsin/judge-orders-deadbeat-dad-not-to-father-
children-b68e4a8-187381811.html (“For the second time in as many months, a Wisconsin 
judge has ordered a man not to father any more children until he pays past-due child 
support.”). 
 459.  Dee McAree, Deadbeat Dads Face Ban on Procreation, NAT’L L. J., May 31, 2004. 
 460.  Id.  For a detailed account of this judge’s methods, see Andrea W. Fancher, Note, 
Thinking Outside the Box—A Constitutional Analysis of the Option to Choose Between Jail and 
Procreation, 19 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 328, 329–30 (2006). 
 461.  See Vielmetti, supra note 458.  
 462.  See Amanda Marcotte, Vasectomies Should Not be Used as Punishment, SLATE 
MAGAZINE (June 20, 2014), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2014/06/18/jesse_lee_herald_agrees_to_a_vasect
omy_as_part_of_his_plea_deal_bad_idea.html; see also Justin Jouvenal, In Unusual Plea Deal, 
Virginia Man Agrees to a Vasectomy, WASH. POST, June 29, 2014, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/in-unusual-plea-deal-virginia-man-agrees-to-
a-vasectomy/2014/06/29/7835371c-fe3e-11e3-932c-0a55b81f48ce_story.html (providing 
additional details of the case). 
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option “was primarily due to the fact that he had seven or eight 
children, all by different women, and we felt it might be in the 
commonwealth’s interest for that to be part of the plea 
agreement . . . .”463  
Along the same lines, some states have considered adding 
castration provisions to their penal codes for certain serious sex 
offenses.  Such proposed laws either require castration, typically for 
repeat offenders, or authorize “voluntary” castration as a condition of 
early release.  For example, in 2007, Virginia Governor Timothy Kaine 
vetoed a law encouraging state agencies to consider allowing early 
release for sexually violent predators who agreed to castration.464  
Almost twenty states have considered adding castration provisions to 
their penal codes.465  Most of these legislative proposals have failed.  
Still, seven states have statutes authorizing chemical or surgical 
castration of sex offenders.466  Most of the proposed laws and enacted 
                                                        
 463.  Id. 
 464.  See S.B. 1203, 2007 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2007).  Senator Emmett W. 
Hanger, the bill’s sponsor, unsuccessfully reintroduced it in 2011.  See S.B. 1470, 2011 Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2011). 
 465.  See, e.g., H.B. 14, 2014 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2014) (providing that any 
person over the age of 21 years who is convicted of certain sex offenses against a child 12 
years of age or younger would be surgically castrated before his or her release from 
correctional custody); S.F. 64, 85th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2013) (“A person who 
has been convicted of a serious sex offense shall, in addition to any other punishment 
provided by law, be required to undergo medroxyprogesterone acetate treatment 
[chemical castration] as part of any conditions of release imposed by the court or the 
board of parole”); S.B. 3386, 234th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2011) (authorizing chemical 
castration of violent felony sex offenders); S.B. 144, 34th Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2008) 
(authorize the chemical castration for persons convicted of certain sex offenses and 
requiring chemical castration for persons convicted of more than one sex offense); H.B. 
1349, 186th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2007) (providing for voluntary chemical 
castration for sex offenders); S.B. 1235, 190th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2007) 
(authorizing or in some cases requiring chemical castration for certain sex offenses); H.F. 
1131, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2005) (authorizing punishment by surgical or chemical 
castration and allowing chemical castration as a condition of a suspended sentence); S.B. 
1585, 50th Leg. Sess., (Okla. 2005) (providing for surgical or chemical castration as a 
condition of deferred or suspended sentence or parole for certain convicted sex 
offenders); Kenneth Fromson, Note, Beyond an Eye for an Eye: Castration as an Alternative 
Sentencing Measure, 11 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 311, 314–15 (1994) (identifying castration 
bills proposed in California, Florida, Hawaii, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, Texas, 
Washington, and Wisconsin).  
 466.  See CAL. PENAL CODE § 645 (West 2002); FLA. STAT. § 794.0235 (2007); IOWA CODE 
§ 903b.10 (2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:538 (2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-512 
(2007); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 501.061 (West 2007); WIS. STAT. § 304.06 (2014). 
Although Georgia and Oregon once allowed chemical castration, these laws have since 
been repealed.  See GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-44.2 (2011); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 144.625–29 
(2011). 
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statutes provide for temporary chemical castration,467 rather than 
surgical castration.  Unlike surgical castration, chemical castration is 
reversible and is more likely to be viewed by courts as a treatment, 
avoiding potential constitutional challenges.  Scholars have argued 
that surgical castration is unconstitutional under the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution,468 and international 
human rights bodies have also denounced surgical castration of sex 
offenders.469 
Writers have also raised concerns about even chemical castration, 
especially when considered in the historical context of racialized 
eugenic actions by American states and private actors, as well as the 
documented history of castrations of allegedly oversexed, predatory 
African-American men as part of white supremacist lynchings during 
slavery and after the Civil War.470 
On the medical front, prenatal tests like amniocentesis and 
ultrasounds, as well as new reproductive technologies, enable parents 
to select offspring with certain genetic characteristics.471  Similarly, 
                                                        
 467.  Chemical “castration” involves weekly chemical injections of medroxyprogesterone 
acetate, otherwise known as “Depo-Provera.”  It inhibits testosterone production and 
consequently sex drive. See Frederico D. Garcia & Florence Thibaut, Current Concepts in the 
Pharmacotherapy of Paraphilias, 71 DRUGS 771, 780 (2011). 
 468.  See Zachary Edmonds Oswald, “Off With His ___”: Analyzing the Sex Disparity In 
Chemical Castration Sentences, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 471, 492–96 (2013) (Fourteenth 
Amendment); Catherine Rylyk, Lest We Regress to the Dark Ages: Holding Voluntary Surgical 
Castration Cruel and Unusual, Even for Child Molesters, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1305, 1317–
26 (2008) (Eighth Amendment); cf. State v. Brown, 326 S.E.2d 410,412 (S.C. 1985) 
(holding that surgical castration is “a form of mutilation” prohibited by the state’s 
constitutional prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment). 
 469.  For example, in 2009, the Council of Europe’s anti-torture committee called 
surgical castration “invasive, irreversible and mutilating” and demanded the Czech 
Republic “bring to an immediate end the application of surgical castration in the context 
of treatment of sex-offenders.”  See Eur. Comm. for the Prevention of Torture and 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CPT”), Council of Europe, Report to 
the Czech Government on the Visit to the Czech Republic Carried Out by the European 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CPT) from 25 March to 2 April 2008 16, 20 (Feb. 5, 2009), available at 
http://www.cpt.coe.int/documents/cze/2009-08-inf-eng.pdf. 
 470.  See Hall & Harris, supra note 88, at 42 (“White terrorist violence, and later 
lynching, frequently involved horrific acts of sexual torture, often witnessed by 
appreciative crowds.”); Marques P. Richeson, Sex, Drugs, and . . . Race-to-Castrate: A Black Box 
Warning of Chemical Castration’s Potential Racial Side Effects, 25 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 95 
(2009); see also Lisa Cardyn, Sexualized Racism/Gendered Violence: Outraging the Body Politic in 
the Reconstruction South, 100 MICH. L. REV. 675, 753–54 (2002). 
 471.  DIANE B. PAUL, CONTROLLING HUMAN HEREDITY: 1865 TO THE PRESENT 3 (1995); 
RAPP, supra note 317, at 37–38, 55 (1999); JOAN ROTHSCHILD, THE DREAM OF THE PERFECT 
CHILD at 79–82 (2005); Cynthia R. Daniels & Janet Golden, Procreative Compounds: Popular 
Eugenics, Artificial Insemination and the Rise of the American Sperm Banking Industry, 38 J. SOC. 
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consumers of sperm can review catalogs and websites listing the race, 
ethnicity, height, weight, hair color, hair texture, skin tone, facial 
structure, IQ, hobbies, talents, education, and interests of men whose 
sperm is for sale.472  To be sure, amniocentesis, in vitro fertilization, 
and related prenatal testing technologies can be seen as promoting 
individual reproductive choice.  One cannot deny that screening 
promotes the reproduction of healthy offspring.  Prenatal testing and 
other reproductive technologies also involve private decisions by 
individuals within the context of the patient-physician relationship or 
the free-market.  There are no central powers limiting who may or 
may not reproduce in these contexts. 
At the same time, as anthropologist Rayna Rapp explains, these 
technologies do encourage individuals “to judge the quality of their 
own fetuses, making concrete and embodied decisions about the 
standards for entry into the human community.”473  Rapp and other 
scholars have written about the subtle coercion parents feel to join 
the testing track only to learn that they cannot get off it.474  Everyone 
expecting a child is now routinely offered an early ultrasound—
“baby’s first picture”—and before they know it, they may find 
themselves faced with a decision they planned to avoid.  Today’s new 
maternal blood tests that detect fetal problems will likely only 
exacerbate such pressures.475 
                                                        
HIST. 5, 7, 11–14 (2004); Daniel F. Goodkind, Should Prenatal Sex Selection Be Restricted? 
Ethical Questions and Their Implications for Research and Policy, 53 POPULATION STUD. 49, 49 
(1999); F. Allan Hanson, Donor Insemination: Eugenic and Feminist Implications, 15 MED. 
ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 287, 288–89 (2001); David S. King, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis and 
the “New” Eugenics, 25 J. MED. ETHICS 176, 176 (1999); Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. 
Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 345 (1978); Dorothy E. 
Roberts, Race, Gender, and Genetic Technologies: A New Genetic Dystopia? 34 SIGNS 783, 784, 
786–91 (2009); cf. Patricia J. Williams, Spare Parts, Family Values, Old Children, Cheap, 28 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 913, 913–27 (1994) (discussing the adoption market for babies). 
 472.  See Daniels & Golden, supra note 471, at 5, 7. 
 473.  See RAPP, supra note 317, at 3.  According to Rapp: 
[W]hen ‘everything’ from well-characterized single-chromosome conditions like 
Down syndrome to polygenic syndromes like manic depression or alcoholism to 
alleged syndromes like a propensity for antisocial behavior or obesity can be 
popularly attributed to genetics and prenatally diagnosed, we may be soon 
standing on a ‘slippery slope’ of a ‘eugenic boutique’. 
Id. 
 474.  Id. at 94–100, 165–90; Barbara Katz Rothman, The Book of Life: A Personal and 
Ethical Guide to Race, Normality and the Human Gene Study (2001); Barbara Katz 
Rothman, The Tentative Pregnancy: How Amniocentesis Changes the Experience of 
Motherhood (1993).  
 475.  See Pam Belluck, Test Is Improved Predictor of Fetal Disorders, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 
2014), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/26/new-dna-test-better-at-predicting-some-
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Although these dynamics occur within the confines of private 
doctor-patient relationships, often these situations present troubling 
parallels with earlier eugenic practices, particularly the softer, positive 
eugenics that developed after the 1930s aimed at influencing adults’ 
procreative decisions so as to “build a better race.”476  Furthermore, 
recent scholarship concerning the impact of genomic research 
cautions us not to expect modern eugenics to assume the forms it 
took earlier in the century.477  Rather, current permutations of 
eugenics “will be rooted more thoroughly in the free-market economy 
of contemporary capitalism, rather than legislation aimed directly at 
controlling reproduction.”478  Finally, although most medical 
professionals may not acknowledge or even know about the 
continuities, the contemporary field of genetic counseling has 
antecedents in turn-of-the century eugenic ideologies479 and the field 
of eugenically-motivated marriage and family counseling in the early 
twentieth century.480 
In sum, although eugenics is formally a movement of the past, 
eugenic thinking is still with us.  Moreover, the general assault on the 
reproductive autonomy of poor people and minorities, especially 
                                                        
disorders-in-babies-study-finds/?_r=0 (“A test that analyzes fetal DNA found in a pregnant 
woman’s blood proved much more accurate in screening for Down syndrome and another 
chromosomal disorder than the now-standard blood test, a new study has found.”). 
 476.  See supra text accompanying notes 357–361. 
 477.  RAPP, supra note 317, at 37 (1999). 
 478.  Id.  
 479.  For example, the condition we call Down syndrome was initially labeled 
“mongolism.”  Id.  John Langdon Down, the British doctor who fully described the 
syndrome in 1866, viewed it as “lower-stage of human life characteristic of forms of lower 
races.”  STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE PANDA’S THUMB: MORE REFLECTIONS IN NATURAL 
HISTORY 164–65 (1980).  While such explicit eugenic thinking is no longer used, even 
today, “Down syndrome babies are often considered ‘wrong babies’ marked almost from 
the moment of birth by medical scrutiny as incurably damaged.”  See RAPP, supra note 317, 
at 266–67 (recounting stories of mothers advised by physicians to put their Downs 
syndrome babies up for adoption hours after giving birth or subject to callous remarks by 
medical professionals such as “[t]he only blessing is that they don’t tend to live very 
long.”). 
 480.  As Rapp explains, “the more blatant forms” of eugenic ideology were gradually 
dispersed into other areas such as sociobiology and evolutionary psychology,” and “as 
genetics developed as a science . . . eugenics was replaced by an applied individual and 
familial counseling model.”  Id. at 55; see also DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS 
253 (1985) (“In its efforts to encourage the use of genetics for medical purposes and 
improve the biological quality of human populations, reform eugenics had helped lead to 
the opening of facilities devoted explicitly to genetic advisory services.”); KLINE, supra note 
357, at 4, 123–26 (describing the strategic shift by eugenicists in the 1930s toward marriage 
and family counseling to counteract declining birthrates and expand the white middle 
class). 
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women, continues to the present day.  One recent study found that 
African-American women and women with no insurance or public 
insurance are about fifty percent more likely to have undergone tubal 
sterilization compared with white women and women with private 
insurance.481  The most recent assault on poor women’s reproductive 
autonomy appears in the dramatic increase in abortion restrictions 
that disproportionately impact lower-income women.482 
                                                        
 481.  Sonya Borrero et. al., Race, Insurance Status, and Tubal Sterilization, 109 OBSTETRICS 
& GYNECOLOGY 94, 97 (2007) (finding in study of women ages 15 to 44 that 21.3% of 
African-American women were sterilized compared to 15% of white women, and 21% of 
women who had no insurance or public insurance were sterilized compared to 14% of 
women who had private insurance).  
 482.  For example, many states ban late-term abortions, which are more likely to be 
sought by poor women who delay because they cannot afford an abortion.  See 
GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: STATE POLICIES ON LATER ABORTIONS 
(2013), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_PLTA.pdf 
(summarizing state laws on late-term abortions); Rachel K. Jones & Lawrence B. Finer, Who 
Has Second-Trimester Abortions in the United States?, 85 CONTRACEPTION 544, 546 (2012) 
(finding that “[s]econd trimester abortions [are] inversely associated with education and 
poverty status”).  The Supreme Court upheld late-term abortion bans in Gonzales v. 
Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
Furthermore, several states have adopted relatively new types of abortion restrictions 
that disproportionately impact lower-income women.  In 2011, seven states (Arizona, 
Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota and Tennessee)—all largely 
rural states with large, scarcely populated areas—prohibited “telemedicine” for medication 
abortion, requiring instead that the physician prescribing the medication be in the same 
room as the patient.  See Rachel Benson Gold & Elizabeth Nash, Troubling Trend: More States 
Hostile to Abortion Rights as Middle Ground Shrinks, GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV., Winter 2012, at 
14, 16, available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/15/1/gpr150114.html. 
Other restrictions that disproportionately burden low-income women include 
requiring an ultrasound prior to having an abortion, even without medical reason to do 
so; laws restricting insurance coverage for abortion; and expanded counseling 
requirements and waiting periods.  Id.; see also, e.g., North Carolina Gen. Stat. Ann. § 90-
21.85 (law requiring physicians to perform an ultrasound prior to an abortion, which was 
held unconstitutional as a violation of physicians’ First Amendment Rights in Stuart v. 
Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014)).  Finally, state and federal lawmakers have aimed to 
completely shut down women’s health programs such as Planned Parenthood by 
withdrawing all public financing, see Mary Ziegler, Sexing Harris: The Law and Politics of the 
Movement to Defund Planned Parenthood, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 701 & n.1 (2012); Pam Belluck & 
Emily Ramshaw, Women in Texas Losing Options for Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2012, at 
A1, and by requiring abortion clinics to meet the same building, equipment and staffing 
standards as hospital-style surgical centers.  See, e.g., H.B. 2, 83rd Leg., Tex. Sess. Law Serv., 
ch. 1 §§ 1–12 4795–802 (Tx. 2013) (codified at Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 
171.0031, 171.041–.048, 171.061–.064, & amending §§ 245.010–.011; Tex. Occ. Code Ann. 
amending §§ 164.052 & 164.055).  Enforcement of the Texas law has been enjoined, in 
part, for now.  See Whole Women’s Health v. Lakey, (W.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2014), 2014 WL 
4346480; Adam Liptak, Clinics to Open as Justices Halt Abortion Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 
2014 (“The Supreme Court’s order—five sentences long and with no explanation of the 
justices’ reasoning—represents an interim step in a legal fight that is far from over.”). 
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More generally, if we adopt an expansive view of eugenics as a 
broad, loosely-related set of ideas used opportunistically to attack 
poor people, minorities, the disabled, unwed mothers, and the social 
welfare state—as some leading historians on eugenics have 
argued483—then perhaps the “history” of eugenics in America has not 
ended.  Increasingly aggressive immigration laws484 can be fairly 
understood as “eugenic” under this definition,485 as can mandatory 
federal sentencing guidelines486 that disproportionately impact 
African Americans and other minorities487 and state marriage and 
adoption bans that have been routinely justified on grounds that 
same-sex couples are not fit to bear and raise children.488 
                                                        
 483.  See, e.g., ALEXANDRA MINNA STERN, EUGENIC NATION: FAULTS AND FRONTIERS OF 
BETTER BREEDING IN MODERN AMERICA (2006).  Seeking to “push the bounds” of what has 
been considered eugenics, id. at 18, this book covers areas as diverse as medicine, 
immigration, sterilization, and environmentalism. 
 484.  See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (upholding in relevant 
part a state law that allows police to investigate the immigration status of an individual 
stopped, detained, or arrested if there is reasonable suspicion that individual is in the 
country illegally); see also 8 U.S.C.A. § 1152(a)(2) (2012) (establishing a limit on the 
number of visas that can be issued to natives of any one foreign country). 
 485.  See STERN, supra note 483, at 57–81 (discussing links between the establishment of 
U.S. Border Patrol, public health measures, and eugenic immigration policies). 
 486.  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2009), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2009_guidelines/Manual/GL2009.pdf. As the son of a 
North Carolina eugenics program victim explains, “[W]e have an obligation to challenge 
these systems.  . . . [T]wo million people we have incarcerated in prison today. A young 
man nineteen years old, first time convicted, nonviolent offense, you give him fifteen to 
twenty years in prison.  Now look at what happens, now he can no longer be a father, his 
mother loses a child, we have to reevaluate these things today man.  We have to look at 
these things differently.”  See GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE JUNE 22, 2011 HEARING, supra note 
284, at 12 (testimony of Mr. Tony Riddick). 
 487.  According to the US Bureau of Justice Statistics, blacks accounted for 43.2% of the 
total prison and jail population in 2009.  See HEATHER C. WEST, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, PRISON INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2009—STATISTICAL TABLES 19 tbl.16 (2010), 
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pim09st.pdf.  Hispanics were 
20.6% of the total jail and prison population in 2009.  Id.  Blacks were incarcerated at a 
rate more than six times higher than whites, and Hispanics at a rate 2.46 times higher than 
whites.  Id. at 21 tbl.18.  Although there is significant variation among states in the 
incarceration rate of blacks and Hispanics, the proportion of blacks and Hispanics in 
prison exceeded the proportion of whites in every state of the country in 2005.  See MARC 
MAUER & RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, UNEVEN JUSTICE: STATE RATES OF 
INCARCERATION BY RACE AND ETHNICITY 5, 6 tbl.2, 7, 12 (2007), available at 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rd_stateratesofincbyraceandethnicit
y.pdf. 
 488.  For example, in the litigation defending Utah’s ban on same-sex marriage in the 
Tenth Circuit United States Court of Appeals, the Attorney General justified its ban on the 
“serious risk to children raised by same-sex parents,” suggesting that same-sex parents are 
more likely than heterosexual parents to “subordinate their own interests to the needs of 
their children.”  Brief of Appellants Gary R. Herbert and Sean D. Reyes at 42, 66, Kitchen 
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Finally, although it is not clear how widespread the 
phenomenon, nonconsensual sterilizations continue to occur in the 
United States in certain contexts, such as prisons.  For example, a 
series of news stories by the Center for Investigative Reporting 
(“CIR”) revealed that women in two California prisons had been 
sterilized after being coerced or misled by their doctors.489  From 2006 
to 2010, 148 women received tubal ligations in violation of state 
regulations requiring approval from a review committee of medical 
professionals.490  For example, Kimberly Jeffrey, one woman 
interviewed as part of the CIR investigation, “was pressured by a 
doctor while sedated and strapped to a surgical table for a C-section 
in 2010,” 491 during her imprisonment at a California prison for a 
parole violation.492  Jeffrey “was horrified,” and she resisted.493  “Being 
treated like I was less than human produced in me a despair.”494  
Other women reported being repeatedly pressured to agree to a tubal 
ligation once the prison physician found out they had other 
children.495  The physician who performed most of the sterilizations 
defended his actions, telling the CIR that the money the state spent 
on sterilizations was minimal “compared to what you save in welfare 
paying for these unwanted children—as they procreated more,”496 but 
the investigative report ultimately led to a new law in California 
making the practice of sterilizing incarcerated people for the purpose 
of birth control illegal.497 
                                                        
v. Herbert, No. 13-4178 (10th Cir. Feb. 3, 2014), available at http://www.nclrights.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/02/2014.02.03-Appellants-Opening-Brief1.pdf.  Conservative states 
such as Arkansas, Florida, Mississippi, and Utah have defended laws disallowing LGBT 
people from fostering or adopting children on similar grounds, arguing that families 
headed by gay parents produce children who are more likely to be violent, sexually 
promiscuous, or gay.  See generally Kari E. Hong, Parens Patri[Archy]: Adoption, Eugenics, and 
Same-Sex Couples, 40 CAL. W. L. REV. 1 (2003). 
 489.  See Corey G. Johnson, Female Inmates Sterilized in California Prisons Without Approval, 
CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (Jul. 7, 2013), http://cironline.org/reports/female-
inmates-sterilized-california-prisons-without-approval-4917. 
 490.  Id.; see also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3350.1 (b)(4) & (d) (2006). 
 491.  Id. 
 492.  Id. 
 493.  Id. 
 494.  Id. 
 495.  Id. 
 496.  Id. 
 497.  See S.B. 1135, 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2014) (enacted), codified at CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 3440 et seq. (West 2014).  Under the new law, sterilization is only permitted if the 
procedure is required “for the immediate preservation of the individual’s life in an 
emergency medical situation” or, under certain limited conditions, including consent, 
“medically necessary . . . to treat a diagnosed condition.”  Id. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
The legacy of eugenics in the United States continued well into 
the twentieth century, yet it was hidden by the Supreme Court 
decision in Stump v. Sparkman.  The Court achieved this erasure by 
employing two of the most forceful legal mechanisms of denial: 
immunity and jurisdiction.  Moreover, Justice Stewart’s dissent did as 
much to obscure the ongoing reality of sterilization abuse in America 
as the majority’s opinion.  Stewart’s main justification was that 
holding Judge Stump accountable for his actions would not disrupt 
100 years of legal doctrine on judicial immunity, because Judge 
Stump’s order was an isolated incident.498  The irony of this reasoning 
is that the Supreme Court’s decision was issued just a few years after 
the Relf decision ignited a national scandal on sterilization abuse of 
poor women;499 in the same year that HEW issued regulations 
requiring a mandatory thirty-day waiting period for federally-funded 
sterilizations, among other protections;500 during a period of rapid 
expansion of minors’ reproductive rights by the Supreme Court;501 
and just two years after Congress waged a major attack on poor 
women’s reproductive autonomy by enacting the Hyde 
Amendment.502  That all of this was occurring right around the time 
of the Court’s decision makes its silence on the reproductive rights 
issue all the more deafening.  Furthermore, as this Article 
demonstrates, eugenics never really disappeared after the Supreme 
Court decided Stump; arguably it persists in different forms today.  
Stump is thus not even the last gasp of the unbecoming history of 
eugenics in America. It is the middle of a continuing story.  
As this article has demonstrated, Stump also fits within a long line 
of federal cases developing, interpreting, and applying procedural 
rules in a manner frustrating civil rights claimants’ ability to prosecute 
their claims in federal court.  Indeed, the historical record suggests 
that the judicial immunity doctrine, relied upon by the Supreme 
Court in Stump, has its genesis, at least in part, in an earlier Supreme 
Court’s opposition to the Reconstruction Congress’s efforts to remedy 
the incidents of slavery by enacting a comprehensive civil rights 
regime.  The heightened pleading standard announced by the 
                                                        
 498.  See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 367 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 499.  Supra notes 270–282, 294–298 and accompanying text. 
 500.  Supra notes 364–370 and accompanying text. 
 501.  Supra notes 302–308 and accompanying text. 
 502.  Supra notes 291–293 and accompanying text. 
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Seventh Circuit on remand is a later chapter in this same story, when 
federal judges, beginning in the 1960s, invoked heightened pleading 
standards in civil rights and other disfavored public law actions.  In 
this sense, Stump is not simply about the trans-substantive value of 
judicial independence, although this concern certainly contributed to 
the Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit decisions.  It is also a story of 
a political struggle, begun after the Civil War and continuing to 
present day, over our society’s commitment to ameliorating civil 
rights violations. 
Perhaps it is not a surprise that then-Chief Justice Burger, who 
voted with the Stump majority, advocated curtailing the federal 
jurisdiction of the federal courts.503  According to federal courts and 
constitutional law scholar Judith Resnik, in several major addresses to 
the American Bar Association and American Law Institute, Burger 
expressed his opinion against enlarging federal jurisdiction.504  For 
example, in a 1970 speech to the American Bar Association, he said, 
“[T]he federal court system is for a limited purpose . . . .  People 
speak glibly of putting all the problems of pollution, of crowded cities, 
of consumer class actions and others in the federal courts.”505  As 
Resnik observes, Chief Justice Burger was opposed to liberal standing 
doctrine,506 too “expansive” interpretations of federal statutes,507 too 
many prisoner petitions,508 and too narrow understandings of the 
immunity of government officials.509  The monstrosity of Stump 
becomes comprehensible, if not forgivable, in light of this vision of 
limiting the role of federal courts in protecting individual rights. 
                                                        
 503.  See Judith Resnik & Lane Dilg, Responding to a Democratic Deficit: Limiting the Powers 
and the Term of the Chief Justice of the United States, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1575, 1608 (2006).  
 504.  Id. 
 505.  Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice of the United States, Remarks on the State of the 
Judiciary, Before the American Bar Association (Aug. 10, 1970), in STATE OF THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIARY: ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 17 (Shelley L. Dowling ed., 2000). 
 506.  See Resnik & Dilg, supra note 503, at 1609 (citing Warren E. Burger, Address to the 
American Law Institute, 57 A.L.I. PROC. 29, 33–34 (1980)).  
 507.  Id. 
 508.  Id. (citing Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice of the United States, Remarks to the Am. 
Bar Ass’n: Report on the Federal Judicial Branch (Aug. 6, 1973), in STATE OF THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIARY: ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 12–13 (Shelley L. Dowling ed., 2000)).  Specifically, Chief Justice Burger 
suggested that prisoners’ claims be resolved by informal grievance procedures or 
administrative hearings and that magistrates or special masters hear habeas cases.  Id. 
 509.  Id. (citing Warren E. Burger, Address to the American Law Institute, 57 A.L.I. PROC. 
29, 32–33 (1980)).  Chief Justice Burger attributed the “litigation explosion” in part to “a 
narrowing of the scope of immunity of government officials.” 
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In the end, Stump presented a conflict between fundamental 
principles of constitutional law: privacy, equal protection and due 
process, on the one hand, and judicial independence on the other.  
The majority of the Court sided with the latter.  This alternative 
reading of Stump v. Sparkman is intended to give voice to the 
principles so well hidden by that unfortunate choice, and to help 
courts envision alternative routes to the present course on these 
fundamentally important substantive and procedural questions. 
EPILOGUE 
Shortly after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Stump v. 
Sparkman, Judge Stump was re-elected to another six-year term.510  
Two years later, the Supreme Court unanimously held that a private 
defendant who conspires with an immune state judge acts under 
“color of state law” for the purposes of civil rights law and is not 
derivatively protected by that judge’s absolute immunity.511  In the 
following decades, the Supreme Court twice rejected the practice of 
requiring a heightened pleading standard for civil rights claims.512 
Although Sparkman’s legal strategy in federal court was vindicated by 
these later decisions, and Linda Sparkman (now Jamie Coleman) was 
honored at a 2007 state ceremony commemorating Indiana’s eugenic 
past,513 she has never been compensated for her own extralegal 
sterilization. 
                                                        
 510.  See Warren Weaver, Jr., High Court Rules Judge Immune to Lawsuit in Girl’s 
Sterilization, N.Y. TIMES, March 29, 1978, at A18. 
 511.  See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 29 (1980).  According to the Court, “[T]he 
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